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Summary 
One of the more unusual and unexpected trends to emerge in 21st century international 
politics has been the proliferation of official apologies issued by European states for violations 
committed against their erstwhile colonies.  Undertaking a detailed analysis of these apologies, 
this thesis reveals them to be rituals which powerfully capture the anxieties, ambivalences, 
continuities and ruptures by which contemporary liberal elites wrestle with the colonial past 
and its implications in the present.  In particular, the thesis locates official apologies as crucial 
textual, symbolic and ritualistic sites where (post-)colonial relations are illuminated, 
rearticulated and reproduced.  Focussing on four case studies, the thesis deploys the concept 
of collective memory to map out the ways in which government apologies and accompanying 
texts engage with and recollect the past so as to articulate new, though not always radically 
different, historical narratives.  In sketching these processes, the project conveys the 
overlapping contours by which, through apology, states both simultaneously impart particular 
perceptions of the past and, in turn, employ such constructions in their political, economic, 
diplomatic, and ideational armoury.  The central argument of the thesis is that, despite 
offering discourses that moderate and temper conventional colonial narratives, the 
performatives nevertheless reconfigure a relationship that resembles patterns and 
asymmetries forged in the colonial era.  This proceeds in two key ways: 1) the apologies 
advance particular interests of states (or particular people within the states) that historically 
practiced colonialism and 2) the apologies and adjacent elite discourses are laden with 
sentiments (paternalism, normative complacency, colonial glorification/sanitisation) that are 
reminiscent of the core legitimising tenets of the colonial enterprise.  The examination and 
dissection of these ambivalent, multifaceted and peculiarly liberal utterances provides a 
significant, yet neglected, research platform that adds value to a burgeoning IR and 
multidisciplinary literature that, influenced by postcolonial study, traces the endurance and 
ruptures of colonial dynamics in the present. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A few years ago, a bourgeois – and colonialist – commentator could find nothing better 
to defend the West than this: ‘We are not angels. But at least we feel remorse.’ What 
an admission! In the past, our continent had other devices to keep it afloat: the 
Parthenon, Chartres, the Rights of Man, the swastika. We now know what they are 
worth: and now the only thing they claim can save us from shipwreck is the very 
Christian sentiment of our guilt. This is the end, as you can see: Europe is taking in 
water everywhere.        
 
Jean-Paul Sartre (2001: 84) Preface to Wretched of the Earth by Frantz Fanon  
 
The locomotive of colonialism is, of course, violence.  In this respect, the acquisition of other 
peoples’ territories has always entailed dispossession, enslavement and killing.  However, as 
Joseph Conrad (1995: 20) recognised as long ago as the 19th century, this is redeemed 
somehow by an ‘idea at the back of it’.  That is, adjacent, even integral, to the physical violence 
and patterns of domination are stories that absolve it, make it intelligible, perversely desirable.  
As Said (1994: xii-xiii) wrote in Culture and Imperialism ‘the main battle in imperialism is over 
land, […] but when it came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, 
who kept it going, who won it back, and who now plans its future – these issues were 
reflected, contested, and even for a time decided in narrative’.  The discourses of colonial 
domination have garnered much academic attention and are familiar.  Colonial projects were 
replete with the grandiose, the heroic, the epic; they valorised masculinised notions of 
adventure, discovery and bravery.  Equally, they situated the plunder in altruistic terms, 
emphasising the gifts of civilisation, Christianity, science and so forth. 
 
Yet, while contemporary global patterns of domination and inequality resemble those of the 
colonial period, the mechanics that underlie it have changed.  Today’s geopolitics of haves and 
have nots is not sustained in formal empires, but located in neo-liberal capitalism, market 
economies, immigration visas and the like.  And just as the mechanics of domination have 
shifted and altered, so too have the scripts.  Western elites may speak of ‘development’, 
‘failed states’ and ‘humanitarian warfare’, but who today would speak of ‘savages’, 
‘Christianising’ or ‘racial superiority’?  This shifting etiquette of discourse seems to be causing 
some rather vexing dilemmas for elites in formerly colonial states.  In particular, the heroic 
plotlines by which politicians reflexively cloak their ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983), 
especially in regards to the colonial past, seem to be rather misplaced, even vulgar, in the 
liberal world.  This thesis addresses exactly this dilemma; it constitutes an interrogation of the 
2 
 
under conceptualised shifting ways in which European elites narrate the colonial past, and how 
this both sheds light on and reconfigures contemporary colonial/postcolonial relations.  
 
Representing the past: a new ‘grammar’ 
As ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983), states have long expended a great deal of effort 
in constructing particular stories about the past.  These narratives lend the state domestic and 
international legitimacy, reify prevailing political-economic and social structures and give 
credence to foreign policies.  In this sense, states conventionally used the mechanisms 
available to them – statues, political rhetoric, school curriculums, museums, national 
remembrance days – in evoking episodes that are considered to be of national achievement.  
Pride of place in these sites of memory (Nora 1989) was reserved for the colonial; intrepid 
explorers, expansionist monarchs, noble battalions, upstanding administrators.  Even where 
episodes of national defeat or disaster are evoked (consider, for instance, U.S. remembrance 
of 9/11 or British reverence of the evacuation of Dunkirk), this is invariably imbued with ‘epic 
narratives of the tragic hero’ (Assmann 2006: 217).  In contrast, episodes of perceived national 
shame were conventionally left uncommemorated and conspicuously absent from the state’s 
mnemonic sites.  It seems, however, that while, to differing degrees, these grandiose 
narratives remain in circulation, in recent years there has been a discernible trend towards – as 
Schwartz (2008) dubs it – ‘post-heroic’ forms of memory.  This entails states grappling with 
some of the more ignoble episodes of their pasts in ways that show a heightened introspection 
and moral problematisation of the past. 
 
This new ‘grammar’ (Assmann 2006: 219) of countenancing the past can be both 
contextualised within and be seen to have a causative impact upon important normative 
developments within international politics.  Broadly speaking, realist notions that permeated 
the Cold War – threat, self-help, survival – were not conducive to expressions of empathy with 
others’ suffering or, indeed, interrogations as to Western states’ culpability in such anguish.  In 
contrast, since the 1990s, there has been, at least in a superficial manner, a surfacing of an 
apparent ‘new international morality’ (Barkan 2000: ix).  This new discourse is closely tied to 
the emergence over the last quarter of a century of an invigorated liberal internationalism.  
This has heralded a phenomenon that Fassin (2012: 1) calls ‘humanitarian government’, 
whereby ‘moral sentiments have become an essential force in contemporary politics’.  At the 
heart of this, it is ‘the disadvantaged and the dominated’ that have become the focal points for 
such sentiments’ (Fassin 2012: 1).  In this normative climate, rhetorical adherence to ethical 
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foreign policies, ‘human security’, norms of human rights and the dignity of others, even those 
far afield, have become central to processes of state legitimation (Levy and Sznaider 2010: 3).  
As Barkan (2000: xvii) writes, this ‘new international emphasis has been characterised not only 
by accusing other countries of human rights abuses but also by self examination’.  Moreover, 
this critical self examination appears to be decidedly backward looking.  That is, in the swagger 
of the liberal ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1989), states are now compelled to rummage through 
their pasts and excavate and distance themselves from moments of shame and atrocity.    This 
feeds into what Levy and Sznaider (2010: 4) term a ‘memory imperative’; a normative 
obligation for states to renounce past atrocities that are incompatible with their contemporary 
liberal credentials. 1 
 
These dual modes of representing the past – the heroic and introspective modalities – are 
nowhere so vividly captured in all their stark contradictions than in regards to European states’ 
colonial pasts.  In other words, the colonial conquests and epic voyages of discovery that were 
once so prime for the posterity of statues and school syllabi can be seen in a rather different 
light in an age of apparent cosmopolitan liberal empathy.  That is, the very narratives that once 
furnished the colonial state’s desired national imagery are now out of tune with the liberal 
pitch for legitimacy.  In this way, it seems that former colonial states are torn, to almost 
schizophrenic proportions, between two apparently irreconcilable impulses; the conventional 
propensity for aggrandising plotlines and the reassessment and denouncement of atrocity.  
Albeit with considerable unease and clumsiness, European elites have found several modes to 
address this dilemma.  On the one hand, formerly colonial states may persist in emphasising 
                                                             
 
1 Liberalism is, of course, a difficult concept to pin down and without a ‘readily available’ definition (Jahn 
Forthcoming 2013).  Attempting to offer a full overview of the concept and its intellectual heritage of 
Kant, Locke, Mill and so on is obviously beyond the scope of this thesis.  Moreover, clearly there are 
different strands of contemporary liberalism, ranging from neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism 
through to more communal strands.  Liberalism is commonly used to denote states’ supposed and 
broad commitment to such aspects as the right of equal treatment before the law and a fair trial, 
democratic elections, market economies, individual protection for private property accumulation and 
checks and balances against excessive and arbitrary governmental oversight of individuals’ lives.  While 
all these aspects are important to liberalism, as this discussion suggests, this thesis is concerned with the 
ritualistic and symbolic projection of elites’ liberal credentials.  In this respect, at least at first sight, 
apologies sit with elites’ self understanding of liberalism to the extent that they can be seen as highly 
public outward proclamations that disavow egregious human rights violations and give moral and 
normative traction to contemporary norms of human rights, aspirations of inter-state/community 
harmony, understanding and reconciliation and even notions of intergenerational justice. 
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the supposedly ‘progressive’ moments of the colonial encounter; the roads, the schools, the 
hospitals.  On the other hand, they may deemphasise the colonial past and underscore 
contemporary humanitarian work and aid projects in the erstwhile colony.  However, in some 
limited cases, Levy and Sznaider’s (2010) ‘memory imperative’ has manifested itself in states 
apologising for transgressions in their former colonies.  The starting premise of this thesis is 
that the offering of colonial apologies constitute fascinating, yet under researched and ill 
understood, forums in which European elites simultaneously wrestle with the incongruities, 
contradictions, continuities and ruptures of the imperial past and the liberal present.  In this 
sense, the novel phenomenon of colonial apology serves as a Petri-dish for powerfully 
capturing the anxieties, ambivalences, continuities and discontinuities by which contemporary 
liberal elites tussle with the colonial past and its implications in the present.  
 
A novel phenomenon 
While the current era is experiencing something akin to ‘contrition chic’ (Shapiro 1997) – an 
outpouring of official apologies from business leaders, religious groups and governments on 
almost a daily basis – it should be noted that while colonial apologies may be novel, state 
apologies themselves are not an entirely new phenomenon.  Where apologies conventionally 
did occur, however, they were typically for rather mundane misdemeanours; violations of 
territorial waters, injuries to diplomats and so forth (Bilder 2008: 25).  At the more serious end 
of the spectrum, they were ‘humiliation rituals’ (Kampf and Löwenheim 2012: 50); symbolic of 
militarily defeated and prostrate states.  This category of apology, it seems, occurs under 
coercion from the victors and circumstances where governments have little practical option 
but to repent (Bilder 2008: 25).  However, adjacent to the liberal normative turn in 
international political discourse, the 1990s, as Gibney (2002) observes, ushered in a 
qualitatively new type of state mea culpa.  First, instead of just the banal, contemporary 
apologies relate to what one might term ‘big’ issues; they deal with slavery, wrongs to 
indigenous peoples, genocide, assassinations and colonialism. Moreover, in dealing with such 
issues, certain states have shown a willingness to apologise for injustices that occurred in 
comparatively distant history and often for events where the primary perpetrators and victims 
have long since died.  Second, in dealing with these issues, they are not the last resort of 
defeated states that are coerced into admissions of guilt.  In fact, quite the opposite appears to 
be true: there has been a spate of apologies from certain relatively affluent Western states to 
certain relatively dispossessed peoples in what has crudely come to be known as the ‘Global 
South’.  Perhaps the most striking aspect of this qualitatively new trend is the spectacle of 
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certain Western States apologising to the peoples they once colonised (or continue to 
colonise).  Canada and Australia, for instance, have both apologised to the indigenous peoples 
within their respective states (see Nobles 2008).  Internationally, such examples include 
Belgium apologising for its role in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the first elected Prime 
Minister of current day Democratic Republic of the Congo; Germany apologising for the 
genocide of the Herero and Nama people in current day Namibia; Britain apologising for the 
‘Bloody Sunday’ massacre of civilians in Derry, Northern Ireland2 and Italy apologising for 
colonialism in Libya.  It is these colonial apologies that form the empirical basis of this study.  
 
In focussing on these latter four case studies (the apologies by Germany, Belgium, the UK and 
Italy) this thesis deploys the concept of collective memory so as to map out the ways in which 
government apologies and accompanying texts (proximate treaties, political speeches etc.) 
engage with and recollect the colonial past so as to articulate new, though not always radically 
different, constructions of historical narratives.  In sketching these elongated, complex and 
sometimes contradictory processes, the thesis investigates the contrite recollections in 
relation to contemporary constructed political identities and expediencies.  In other words, 
this project seeks to analyse the overlapping contours by which, through apology, political 
elites both simultaneously impart particular perceptions of the colonial past and, in turn, 
employ such constructions in processes of state legitimation as well as narrower, frequently 
opportunistic, political, economic and diplomatic imperatives.   
 
It is through this novel research agenda that the thesis reveals apologies to be crucial textual, 
symbolic and ritualistic sites where colonial/postcolonial relations are illuminated, 
rearticulated, renegotiated and reproduced.  It is this analysis of the textual and seemingly 
micro-phenomenon of apology that gleans a vivid insight into more macro-concerns of 
enduring and altering colonial configurations in the present.  In particular, the case study 
analysis reveals the processes of mea culpa as unique convergences of curiously contradictory, 
yet interconnected and embedded sentiments.  They are sites in which elites wrestle with such 
notions as colonial guilt, colonial nostalgia, contemporary geopolitical inequality, human 
                                                             
 
2 Given Westminster’s continued sovereignty over Northern Ireland, in some respects, this may also be 
understood as a domestic state apology.  Beyond the complex issue of inter-‘national’ relations at play 
here, this is framed here as an interstate apology because of the key role the Republic of Ireland played 
in prompting and facilitating the contrition (see page 139).  
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rights, racial prejudice, political correctness and, perhaps most importantly, their nation’s 
projected story and perceived character.         
 
The Argument 
Undertaking this research agenda, the thesis recognises that apology inescapably marks a 
more tempered, moderated and meditative discourse than that which circulated at the zenith 
of Empire.  Nevertheless, while acknowledging the important discontinuities represented by 
mea culpa, the overriding argument of this thesis is that rather than destabilising or radically 
exploding conventional patterns and discourses of domination, the state apologies of this 
thesis reconfigure a relationship that resembles patterns of domination forged in the colonial 
era.  This, it is contended, proceeds in two key ways: 1.) The apologies advance particular 
interests of states (or particular people within the states) that historically practiced colonialism 
and 2.) The apologies and adjacent elite discourses are laden with tropes and narratives that 
are remarkably reminiscent of the core legitimising tenets of the colonial enterprise. 
 
Before exploring these two points in turn, it should be recognised that the thesis paints a more 
complex picture than apology simply being a device that unproblematically and 
instantaneously serves the immediate imperatives of a monolithic ruling class.  By drawing on 
debates within collective memory literature, the argument here attempts to temper notions of 
an excessively instrumental utility of perceptions of the past.  In this regard, while state elites 
do opportunistically draw certain gratuity from their mea culpa, the very act of apologising 
necessitates humbled and penitent stances that are at odds with the aggrandising postures 
that are conventionally the default position of politicians in regards to both themselves and 
their state.  It is, then, in observing the unease by which even the silkiest of politicians 
approach mea culpa, that one must recognise that apologies reflect an elite that have been 
forced to vie, negotiate and compromise with competing historical narratives so as to retain 
credible and plausible constructions of the past.  In this way, the argument does assert that 
apologies are utilised in the expediency of metropolitan actors and that they retain colonial 
like sentiments.  Yet, this illuminates apologies as defensive mechanisms, whereby the 
contrition operates as somewhat of a salvaging mission in preserving historical narratives that 
have, in recent years, been subject to severe duress.  That is, as the empirical chapters 
demonstrate, apologies arise at moments where there is intense international and domestic 
societal contestation or rupture at particular ‘officialised’ narratives of the past.  It is with this 
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in mind that the following passages proceed to consider the two key points of the argument in 
more detail.     
 
The expediency of apology 
To start with the expediency of apology: state leaders do, in varying ways, utilise mea culpa in 
the service of contemporary political expediency.  In this respect, the different case studies 
posit that contrite recollections of the past can be used to buttress diplomatic and cordial 
relationships with geopolitically strategic partners; serve prevailing economic interests; 
reaffirm the state’s liberal normative complexion and boost political leaders’ and parties’ 
cultivated self image.  These varied imperatives are indicative of the multiple audiences of the 
apology.  In some respects, they reflect and reproduce unequal contemporary relations 
directly vis-à-vis the formerly colonised.  This is to say that the apologies are frequently 
implicitly and explicitly entwined with policies or treaties that recodify political and economic 
structural configurations that resemble colonial disparities.  For instance, Chapter 3 explores 
how Germany’s refusal to pay reparations is, even in apology, discursively justified through 
contemporary policies of aid and development assistance towards Namibia.  It is argued that 
these policies contribute to the endurance of German descendants’ ownership of land that 
was appropriated in colonial genocide. Likewise, chapter 5 locates the apology for Bloody 
Sunday within the dynamics of the Northern Ireland Peace Process, a process that continues to 
entrench Westminster’s sovereignty over Northern Ireland.  Chapter 6 explores the ways in 
which the Italian apology for colonialism in Libya is couched within the Treaty of Friendship, 
Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya, which, through setting the parameters 
of ‘reparations’, establishes a relationship which facilitates Italian access to Libyan oil and gas, 
in exchange for ‘basic infrastructure’ building (Camera del Deputati 2008).  This is not to 
contend that these policies are identical or of moral equivalence to the violent endeavours of 
the colonial period.  However, it is to recognise that they reproduce political and economic 
dynamics that approximate the geopolitical inequalities of the colonial period. 
 
Beyond having direct policy making implications upon contemporary colonial relationships, the 
apologies and their expediencies frequently speak past or exclude subaltern audiences.  For 
instance, the case studies on the Belgian and British apologies assert that, at moments of 
domestic public disquiet with the political classes, the expressions of contrition were examples 
of leaders drawing emotionalised and introspective stances so as to foster electorally popular 
images of trustworthiness and transparency.  Likewise, the imperative of renouncing episodes 
that are incompatible with states’ constructed contemporary liberal complexion is, in many 
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senses, addressing a primarily domestic and Western audience.  In so far as the apologies are 
rituals of characterising European politicians and cleansing the conscience of the stained copy 
books of their liberal states, they are acts that are less concerned with the people to which 
they ostensibly address, than with their own constituencies.  In this sense, there is an 
egotistical, even narcissistic, element to these rituals, whereby the colonised become, in part, 
supporting actors for scripts about and for the metropole.  It is, in other words, to produce a 
situation whereby subaltern suffering becomes an inanimate vehicle for the interests of the 
metropole’s elites. 
 
Reconfiguring colonial tenets 
Observing the apparent incongruity of political apology and conventional galvanising state-
sanctioned historical narratives, the thesis tracks the modes by which – through apology – 
state elites contest and weave new constructions of the past.  It is posited that, rather than 
renouncing the colonial past in its entirety, the apologies here frequently reformulate 
narratives that are analogous to core legitimising tenets of the colonial enterprise.  To repeat, 
this is not to say that the contemporary discourse is an exact replica of the erstwhile colonial 
variety.  Indeed, apology does inescapably endow negative traits upon a past action, and the 
apologies do reflect degrees of introspection that were largely absent from the zeal of the 
colonial endeavour.3    Nevertheless, one can point to certain familial semblances between the 
apology process and colonial discourse.  It is this taxonomy of contemporary colonial 
discourse, as located within mea culpa, which is explored below. 
 
1.  The santitisation/glorification of the colonial past 
The core modality by which apologies discursively sanitise the colonial past is by addressing 
only certain aspects of the project.  In the German, Belgian and British case studies, one may 
observe that the apologies are offered only in relation to particularly egregious acts of violence 
(genocide/assassination/massacre), rather than for the colonial enterprise in its entirety.  
Thus, rather than positioning these episodes as symptomatic of the more mundane mentalities 
and structures that sustained colonialism, these narrow apologies foster the impression that 
the atrocities were somehow detached or anomalous from the wider colonial process.  By 
                                                             
 
3 One must recognise, however, that even at the zenith of colonialism, this discourse was not 
unassailable.  As explored in more detail on pages 79-81, colonial discourse has always been subject to 
ambivalence, subversion and mockery from both the colonised and the colonisers. 
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extension, this suggests that while these acts are considered moral violations, the wider 
colonial endeavours are not to be disavowed (cf. Gibney 2002: 281). 
 
With the wider colonial projects not being subject to apology, they are, instead, frequently 
further imbued with sanitising or glorifying narratives.  For instance, in his parliamentary 
apology, British Prime Minister David Cameron emphasised his ‘strongest admiration for the 
way in which our security forces have responded over the years to terrorism in Northern 
Ireland. They set an example to the world of restraint combined with effectiveness given the 
dangerous circumstances in which they are called on to operate’ (Cameron 2010).  Outside the 
text of the apology, one can point to representations from members of the government 
(including the apologiser) that revere the colonial past.  Louis Michel, the Belgian Foreign 
Minister who offered the apology, elsewhere stated that King Leopold II was a ‘visionary’ and 
an ‘ambitious hero’.  Against the accusation of turning Congo into a labour camp, Michel 
rehearsed the conventional colonial script of progress and infrastructural development, saying 
that ‘the Belgians built railways, schools and hospitals and stimulated economic growth in 
Congo. A labour camp? Not at all’ (cited in Flandersnews.be 2010).  In similar language, 
Umberto Bossi, formerly Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign affairs under 
Berlusconi, ventured that in Libya ‘the Italians brought not only roads and employment, but 
also those values, that civilisation, and those laws that are a lighthouse for a whole culture’ 
(cited in Mellino 2006: 470).  Silvio Berlusconi, himself the apologiser, infamously described 
Mussolini as a ‘benign dictator’ (cited in Farrell 2003), while elsewhere speaking of the 
‘superiority’ of Western civilisation (cited in Testas 2003: 183).  In highlighting similar 
representations throughout the empirical chapters, one can observe a curious and, in some 
respects, contradictory process, where there are certain contrite stances intermixed with 
apologia and conventional colonial assumptions. 
 
2. Expounding contemporary paternalism 
Just as apologies emphasise the supposedly benign aspects of the colonial past, they equally 
serve as platforms for the colonial states to expound their contemporary seemingly 
benevolent and altruistic policies.  To this end, the empirical chapters detail how the German 
apology proclaims how the state is now ‘multicultural’, and ‘a committed member of the 
United Nations, working for world-wide peace, human rights, development and poverty 
reduction’ (Wieczorek-Zeul 2004).  The Belgian apology established a Patrice Lumumba Fund, 
dedicated to ‘seek democratic development in Congo by financing of projects for prevention of 
such conflicts, strengthening the rule of law and training of youth’ (Michel 2002: 52).  While 
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largely neglecting its own historical role in instigating violence in Northern Ireland, the Bloody 
Sunday apology venerates Britain’s contemporary role in ‘working towards a peaceful political 
settlement in Northern Ireland’ (Cameron 2010).   On its part, the Italian apology retreads the 
myths of the altruistic colonial project with the adjacent treaty providing for education visas, 
construction of health care facilities and the building of a highway (Camera del Deputati 2008).  
Such sentiments clearly advance a contemporary discourse which is loaded with patronising 
and infantilising sentiments that resemble the paternalistic narratives of the colonial epoch.  
Moreover, there are again self indulgent and congratulatory overtures in the use of apologies 
as forums for emphasising apparently positive traits of contemporary relations.  By this 
measure, this is not European governments unequivocally humbling themselves before those 
they have wronged, but, in contrast, it is indicative of European governments again engaging in 
degrees of triumphalism and paternalism in relation to the periphery. 
 
3. Ventriloquism:  Speaking for the colonised 
Marx observed in relation to revolutionary French peasantry that the dispossessed ‘cannot 
represent themselves; they must be represented’ (Marx 1963: 124).4  In her essay Can the 
subaltern speak? Spivak (1988) takes up this concern and argues provocatively that colonised 
peoples are denied a voice and are spoken for by Western intellectuals.  This colonial 
discursive mode of ventriloquism, it is contended, is also reproduced and played out in the 
process of apologies.  Indeed, a curious feature of apology is that, as explored in chapter 1, 
their complexion demands that they are articulated by the transgressor.  In simple terms, this 
is to say that apologies are characterised by the offender speaking and the offended listening.  
This is not to say that the offended have no input into the apology; subaltern contestations of 
Western ‘official’ narratives play an important role in rupturing conventional colonial 
memories, demanding recognition and shaping the apology’s text.  In this respect, Western 
governments do discursively negotiate with alternative representations of the past and 
incorporate aspects of these counter-narratives into the new plotline of the apology.  
Nevertheless, in apology, it is the Western governmental elite who articulate a particular 
version of events.  Just as the coloniser previously negated and re-authored colonised people’s 
history, this process is reformulated in the contemporary format of apologies.  While the 
apologies are undoubtedly more introspective and comparatively inclusive than the 
conventional colonial discourses, the format of Western politicians narrating a subaltern past 
                                                             
 
4 A quote that Said (1978) employs as an epigraph to Orientalism. 
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remains in place.  Bolstered by the trappings of office, instant media access and ‘official’ 
historical inquiries5 – it is Western elites whose voice is disproportionately voluble in these 
new representations of the past. 
 
The format of Western politicians rearticulating a subaltern past has several implications.  
Firstly, as already considered, it imitates the conventional format of Europeans denying and 
inscribing another people’s history.  Secondly, the format allows for the apology to be largely 
articulated on the terms of the orator.  By this measure, the apologiser has increased capacity 
to set the tone of the apology, inculcate particular caveats and enlarge or sanitise certain 
aspects of the past on terms that may be deemed politically expedient to the orator.  Thirdly, 
the apology becomes a story that is told by and, in many ways, becomes about Western actors.  
In particular, the apologies are pregnant with stories about the contemporary liberal character 
of Western states and their supposedly benign and ethical current foreign policies.            
 
Situating the thesis 
Before locating the thesis’ core contributions to postcolonial International Relations literature 
and the study of collective memory, it should be recognised that there is an emerging extant 
literature on state apologies both within IR and other adjacent social science disciplines (for 
example, Brooks 1999; Cunningham 1999, 2004a, 2004b; Barkan 2000; Gibney and Roxstrom 
2001; Gibney 2002; Barkan and Karn 2006; Gibney, Howard-Hassmann et al. 2008; Lind 2008; 
Nobles 2008; Celermajer 2009; Kampf and Löwenheim 2012).  Focussing on post World War II 
apologies by Japan and Germany, Lind (2008) analyses how apologies impact, sometimes 
negatively, upon interstate threat perception.  Also centring on post-war contrition, Yamazaki 
(2004; 2006) focuses on Japanese apologies regarding their communication styles and 
shortcomings.  Several authors evaluate apology’s potential as a diplomatic dispute resolving 
mechanism (Cohen 2004) or as part of a reconciliation process (Weyeneth 2001; Edwards 
2005; Kampf and Löwenheim 2012).  Likewise, other works discuss apology with questions of 
ethics (Mookherjee, Rapport et al. 2009), forgiveness and transgenerational (in)justice 
(Thompson 2002, 2008, 2009; Marrus 2007; Freeman 2008).  Other authors look at the 
relationship between apology and international law (Gibney and Roxstrom 2001; Josephs 
2004; Bilder 2008).  In regards to colonial apologies, there is considerable literature on 
                                                             
 
5 Of the empirical case studies, the British and Belgian apologies both resulted from state led historical 
inquiries. 
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apologies to indigenous peoples in Australia (Gooder and Jacobs 2001; LeCouteur 2001; 
Morton 2003; Celermajer 2006, 2009; Smits 2008; Moses 2011) and Canada (James 2008).  
Nobles (2008) and Corntassel and Holder (2008) conduct comparative analyses as to how 
different apologies to indigenous groups impact upon inter-group relations and group 
membership.  There are also individual case studies of colonial apologies, including some of 
the cases studied in this thesis (Jamfa 2008; Kerstens 2008; Zimmerer 2008).  This project is 
distinct from these works insofar as it is the first multi-case study analysis of colonial apology 
that focuses on the colonial/postcolonial implications of mea culpa.  It is this novel 
postcolonial contribution and its place in the discipline of IR that is now considered. 
 
The contribution to International Relations postcolonial literature 
The key contribution of this thesis is to locate colonial apologies as complex and ambivalent 
rituals that are uniquely placed to capture and add value to the study of late 20th and early 21st 
Century European elite discourses in regards to the colonial past and its enduring significance.  
In recognising this, the thesis expounds a novel research agenda that captures these peculiarly 
liberal rituals and reveals them to be politicised and textual sites that both enact and 
illuminate shifting – yet often familiar – contemporary patterns of domination between the 
former coloniser and the formerly colonised.  To this end, it is certainly clear that even after 
independence days and the formal period of decolonisation, Western states continue to hold 
disproportionate political, economic and military power over their erstwhile colonies.  
Capturing this exploitative relationship, there has been significant research in the IR sub 
discipline of Global Political Economy (GPE) by Marx influenced scholars into the enduring 
capitalist structures of disparity between the core and the periphery (Frank 1967; Wallerstein 
1974).  However, this valuable Dependency and World Systems analysis has not grappled 
meaningfully with ‘the cultural representations that sustain the unequal relations of power 
between the colonizer and the colonized’ (Chowdhry and Nair 2004: 7).  Indeed, at least until 
the turn towards constructivism (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992) and post-structuralism (Der Derian 
and Shapiro 1989; Campbell 1992; George 1994; Ashley 1996) in the early 1990s, issues of 
representation had traditionally been marginalised in the discipline of IR (see Darby and Paolini 
1994; Doty 1996). In this respect, the orthodox suppositions of mainstream IR theory 
concealed the historical contingencies of the very reference points they studied.  For instance, 
rather than recognising the particular geographical and historical conjuncture at which they 
emanated, neo-realism and liberalism characterise such issues as rationality, anarchy, balance 
of power, military capability, self-help and statehood as somehow  immutable and ‘timeless’ 
(Buzan 1996) doctrines.  As Chowdhry and Nair (2004: 2) postulate, ‘conventional IR obscures 
13 
 
the racialized, gendered, and class bases of power, and in fact […] naturalizes these divisions’.  
Similarly, Krishna (2001: 401) laments the discipline’s focus on theory building at the expense 
of ‘descriptive or historical analysis’, contending that ‘IR discourse’s valorization, indeed 
fetishization, of abstraction is premised on a desire to escape history, to efface the violence, 
genocide, and theft that marked the encounter between the rest and the West in the post-
Colombian era’. 
 
In particular, the conspicuous absence of focus on textual and cultural enactments of power 
within IR was all the more remarkable given the operational dynamics of the colonial past and 
its enduring legacies.  That is, beyond the military and economic structures of domination, 
other humanities and social science disciplines had been far quicker to pick up on the 
postcolonial recognition, principally (although certainly not exclusively) laid down by Said 
(1978) and influenced by Foucault, that power operates ‘at the very point of textual 
representation and the construction of language and discourse’ (Darby and Paolini 1994: 385).  
As Said (1994: xiii) wrote in Culture and Imperialism, ‘the power to narrate, or to block other 
narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and 
constitutes one of the main connections between them’.  In similar terms, in their seminal 
work, The Empire Writes Back, Ashcroft, Griffiths et al. (2002: 7) depict how ‘language 
becomes the medium through which a hierarchical structure of power is perpetuated, and the 
medium through which conceptions of ‘truth’, ‘order’ and ‘reality’ become established’ 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths et al. 2002: 7).  It is such an emphasis on the interplay between text and 
dynamics of power that, until recently, had been underdeveloped within IR. 
 
Fortunately, the general disciplinary shift towards post-positivist methods of studying IR have 
gone some way to plugging this gap.  Indeed, where once, with considerable justification, 
Darby and Paolini (1994: 384) could write that ‘international relations and postcolonialism pass 
like ships in the night’, there have since been important steps in rectifying this lacuna.  For 
instance, there has been postcolonial influenced research in the discipline of IR into how 
discourses of gender (Darby 1997; Eisenstein 2007; Khalid 2011), race (Krishna 2001; 
Chowdhry and Nair 2002), security (Barkawi and Laffey 2006), development (Duffield 2007; 
Duffield and Hewitt 2009), peacekeeping (Darby 2009), liberalism and human rights (Bricmont 
2006), North-South relations (Doty 1996; Slater 2004) and fictional literature (Darby 1998) feed 
into contemporary forms of dominance and inequality.  This thesis sits at the intersection of 
this literature, holding that apology serves as a novel and crucial Petri-dish for glimpsing and 
grappling with the complex ways in which states negotiate and construct their identities in 
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relation to the colonial past and, in turn, how these identities are constituted in their 
asymmetrical relations with their former colonies.  It is in dissection of these ambivalent sites 
that one can ascertain the continuities, discontinuities, contradictions and fluster by which 
former colonial states recount the past.  It is also to highlight brittle points in Western elites’ 
contemporary discourses that leave space for subversion, mockery and resistance. 
 
Contribution to the study of collective memory 
Beyond the postcolonial implications of apology, the thesis makes a contribution to the field of 
collective memory.  In one respect, the purpose of drawing on collective memory is functional; 
the goal of the thesis is not to overhaul the concept, but utilise some of the key principles of 
the theory in the study of apology.  In particular the concept of collective memory is valuable 
to this thesis in terms of its starting assertion that understandings of the past are mediated 
socially through discursive exchanges and intersubjective representations (such as apologies).  
Moreover, the premise as to the intersection between power and the uneven struggle over 
representing the past speaks to key debates in this thesis as to how the past is employed in 
political jostling and expediency.  Nevertheless, beyond the functional, this thesis does 
attempt to locate, decipher and advance understanding of what, as previously mentioned, 
appears to be a new ‘grammar’ in the way that states narrate their pasts (Assmann 2006: 219).  
This is to say that the emergence of political leaders and states drawing introspectively and 
disparagingly on their own ignoble past is a novel and little understood phenomena.  It is, 
then, in analysing the multifaceted ways in which these contrite recollections enmesh with 
identity and policy that the thesis contributes to a subtle understanding of the intersection 
between apology and collective memory.  In developing this understanding of the grammar of 
contrition, the thesis demonstrates, at least within the confines of its case studies, a blurring 
between the orthodox ‘heroic’ postulations of the past and the supposedly more recent 
contrite representations.  In this manner, the thesis shows that these contrite enunciations 
have not rendered the conventional galvanising sentiments in some way obsolete.  Instead, 
the heroic and valiant expressions are loaded within the process of mea culpa.  That is, the 
galvanising sentiments are not just parallel to the apology, but enmeshed in the very same 
texts and uttered by the same politicians.   
 
Case study selection and research methods 
Case study selection 
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The mushrooming of public apologies since the 1990s has been striking and has included 
contrition from religious organisations (not least the Catholic Church), corporations, 
universities and governments and governmental institutions for both grave and minor offenses 
(for a comprehensive overview of examples, see (Nobles 2008: 155-165).  While any of these 
vast case studies could be sociologically interesting, this thesis chooses to study international 
colonial apologies for a number of reasons that have already been touched upon in this 
introduction.  Firstly, colonial apologies are specifically interesting and - as shall be shown - 
illuminative, because there is something counter-intuitive about them.  That is, where the 
colonial past has provided a reserve for states’ most grandiose historical narratives, apologies, 
by contrast, inescapably offer somewhat of a climb-down from this once axiomatic aspect of 
state veneration.  The thesis very much commenced as an attempt to apprehend this 
phenomenon and advance understanding of both the domestic and international political 
significance of this apparent shift in colonial representation.  Secondly, the thesis opts for 
colonial apologies because of both the sheer severity of the transgressions6 and the 
unprecedented nature by which they have emerged in 21st century politics.  As a novel and 
under researched phenomenon that speaks concretely to issues of international violence and 
prominent aspects of contemporary international redress, this is a pressing issue that demands 
research and further understanding.  Finally, occurring between former metropole and 
periphery, such apologies interact with and straddle shifting power relations that are of keen 
interest to researchers of both IR and, in particular, postcolonialism.  In this respect, 
postcolonialism’s broad focus on the way in which shifting discourses are a key dimension of 
enacting power hierarchies between coloniser and colonised – both before and after formal 
independence – sits neatly with the study of these performatives.7      
 
Having positively set out the grounds for selecting colonial apologies, it is also necessary to set 
out negative selection criteria by which the specific cases were chosen.  Given that the breadth 
of colonial atrocity is wider than the scope of apologies that have thus far been offered, it 
seems that comparatively little about this subject can be gleaned by analysing one of the 
innumerable examples where the phenomenon has not occurred.8  As such, in terms of case 
study selection, the thesis opts for case studies whereby an apology has been realised.  A 
                                                             
 
6 As already noted on page 4, state apologies were traditionally for relatively minor offenses. 
7 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of postcolonial theory and the role of discourse in colonial authority.  
8 There is a further discussion regarding refusals to apologise and avenues for further research on pages 
186-189 in the conclusion. 
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consequence of undertaking a case study approach to positive cases of a finite phenomenon is 
that the population of possible cases from which to select is partially restricted.  Consequently, 
case study selection, as with the vast majority of studies analysing emerging political or 
cultural phenomena, is somewhat delimited and empirically provided, rather than actively 
distinguished by the researcher (Ragin 2007: 68).  Nevertheless, below a criteria and 
justification is outlined by which the case studies have been chosen. 
 
1. A state apology has to have been issued   
As explored in chapter 1, the task of defining what exactly constitutes a verifiable apology and 
what does not is a fraught task.  Moreover, as intimated by the thesis’ argument, each of the 
apologies studied here have certain deficiencies that render them less emphatic than what 
Smith (2005) calls a ‘categorical’ apology.  Nevertheless, for the purpose of case selection, an 
‘admission of blame worthiness or regret’9 (Schlenker and Darby 1981) must have been issued 
by the head of the government/head of state or a significant government minister on behalf of 
the government/state.10 
 
2. The apology must have been offered by a European government to a state or people 
it once colonised (or continues to colonise) 
Of course, non-European governments have also undertaken the conquest and looting of 
other people’s territory, before later offering mea culpa.  Japan, for instance, has offered 
apologies to various Asian countries for activities related to its previous expansionist policies.  
Saddam Hussein apologised for the 1990 invasion of Kuwait (Hussein 2002).  Nevertheless, 
exemplified most clearly by the work of Said (1978; 1994), the postcolonial literature that this 
thesis situates itself within has its genealogy in the analysis of Eurocentric (and later US 
centric) lexicons of domination. Along with the factors mentioned above, it is the postcolonial 
purchase of this thesis that makes colonial apologies the key sites of analysis in this study.  To 
this end, while there is capacity for wider studies of non-European apologies, this work is 
located in the study of the peculiarly European discourses of Empire.11 
                                                             
 
9 Of course, apology is quite a slippery concept and it is not always immediately clear what does and 
does not constitute an apology.  Chapter 1 deals in detail with the features and linguistic characteristics 
of apology.  
10 In 2011 the Dutch ambassador to Indonesia, Tjeerd de Zwann, apologised for a massacre of up to 430 
people in the village of Rawagede (see Associated Press 2011).  However, this case has not been 
included on the grounds that it was not offered by a member of the government. 
11 See pages 186-189 for a wider discussion of avenues for further research. 
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It should equally be noted that in the study of European governmental apologies, this thesis 
has opted not to select cases of apologies to indigenous peoples outside of Europe from 
European settler states, such as Australia, the U.S. and Canada.  The rationale for this is 
twofold:  firstly, there is already considerable literature on indigenous apologies (see pages 11-
12), thereby enabling analysis of overseas apologies to tackle a less clustered field.  Secondly, 
the analysis of overseas apologies more succinctly locates the thesis in the discipline of IR.  It is 
with these criteria in mind that the thesis’ case studies have been narrowed down to:  
 
1. The German apology for the Herero genocide in current day Namibia 
2. The Belgium apology for involvement in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 
current day Democratic Republic of Congo 
3. The British apology for the Bloody Sunday massacre in Derry, Northern Ireland. 
4. The Italian apology for colonialism in Libya 
 
Research techniques 
The research engages in a qualitative case study analysis so as to unearth cross case 
comparisons and divergences as to the processes by which apologies and adjacent elite 
discourses imbue the colonial past with particular plotlines and, by extension, how these 
narratives are employed in processes of identity formation, state legitimation and political 
expediencies.  Given the distinctively discursive, ritualistic and narrational dimensions of 
apology, the research undertakes a textual analysis and deconstruction of these speech acts.  
In recognising that apologies are neither ‘standalone’ texts (Yamazaki 2004: 156) nor isolated 
from larger societal processes and ideational landscapes, the thesis seeks to analyse other 
pertinent narrative forming sites. The purpose is to forge a detailed and multi-layered 
depiction of the narratives proffered by the apologies as well as the political, economic and 
societal contexts in which they both arose and beget.  In undertaking such a textual analysis, 
the following sites are located for examination: 
 
1. Analysis of the primary textual apologies 
In analysing the primary speeches of the apologies, the case studies examine how these texts 
narrate particular stories about the past.  In this regard, the texts are deciphered so that one 
can apprehend the plotline imparted and the ways in which they confer responsibility.  
Moreover, any moral and legal caveats are analysed and the ways in which the texts both 
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condemn and, indeed, revere the past are scrutinised.  The texts are also scanned for direct or 
implicit links to ongoing political and economic policies. 
 
2. Analysis of wider discourses as articulated by the apologising politicians and other 
governmental elites 
Outside of the apology, politicians frequently enounce perceptions of the past that both 
reinforce the contrition or even contradict it.  In this way, these articulations and the ways in 
which they foster perceptions of the past are analysed and interpreted. 
 
3. Analysis of the states’ wider efforts in narrative formation in respect to their 
transgression 
Away from the rhetoric of politicians, the case studies analyse the wider processes by which 
the states narrate and manufacture their current and historical relationship with colonialism.  
This involves an analysis of such narrative forming devices as educational syllabuses, museums, 
state sponsored statues, memorials, public holidays and so forth.  The ways by which these 
sites convey the states’ colonial past and how these messages have fluctuated over time are 
studied.  In this regard, the thesis also analyses these sites of memory and how they correlate 
with apology. 
 
4. Analysis of directly conjoined political and economic agreements 
As shown in the empirical chapters, apologies are often frequently directly attached with 
particular economic and political agreements.  For example, the Belgian apology was attached 
to the Patrice Lumumba Foundation, while the Italian apology outlined ‘reparations’ in the 
adjacent Treaty of Friendship and Reconciliation.  Analysis of these agreements are undertaken 
so as to further illuminate the ways in which apology interacts with policies that advance 
particular relationships vis-à-vis the former colony. 
 
5. Analysis of implicitly connected political and economic agreements 
While some political and economic agreements are overtly attached to apologies, often the 
apologies relate to policy developments in a more implicit way.  For example, the relationship 
between the British apology for Bloody Sunday and the trajectory of the Northern Ireland 
Peace Process is one that is only partially alluded to by politicians.  Similarly, there are 
intimations within the text of the Belgian apology as to a relationship between mea culpa and 
a more outward looking foreign policy.  Such tacit relationships are put under the microscope 
so as to begin to apprehend and map how these developments intersect with apology.  
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6. Analysis of the wider political and social context of apology 
The case studies also partake in a wider analysis of the political, economic and social 
circumstances in the metropole in which these apologies were realised.  In densely 
contextualising these conditions, the empirical chapters attempt to locate and comparatively 
analyse the societal and political conditions in which apology is elicited and interacts.    
 
Undertaking this research, the thesis extensively utilises primary texts of the actual apologies.  
Beyond this, the project primarily draws on secondary literature in the form of academic books 
and journals.  Aside from academic literature, the research also draws on grey literature, such 
as governmental press releases and media coverage.  Due to linguistic limitations, the thesis 
relies largely on English based material, although a limited number of translations have been 
undertaken.12  These language limitations are partially mitigated by the wealth of original 
documents and academic research on pertinent areas that is available either originally in 
English or in English translation. 
 
Before continuing, it is necessary to be clear about the focus of the thesis:  This work is about 
how European elites draw upon, utilise and portray the colonial past.  In this respect, the thesis 
does not seek to extensively analyse the ways in which (formerly) colonised people receive or 
employ the apology.  The project does not attempt to systematically address whether the 
recipients13 of the apology are satisfied or unsatisfied with the contrition or how they respond.  
This is not to say that subaltern narratives of the past are ignored entirely – indeed, at 
different junctures the thesis traces the ways in which subaltern contestation at official 
European narratives ruptures and contributes to a reshaping of these official plotlines.  
However, the central focal point of the thesis is the orators of the apology and their 
surrounding elite.  While there is a wider discussion on pages 188-189 regarding some of the 
consequences, dilemmas and limitations of this approach, it is, at this juncture, necessary to be 
explicit regarding the immediate scope of the thesis. 
 
                                                             
 
12 There are some exceptions where translations have been undertaken.  For example, the original 
Belgian parliamentary apology has been translated, as has the Treaty of Friendship.  Press releases from 
the office of Belgian foreign minister Louis Michel have also been translated.  Translations have been 
assisted using ‘Google Translate’ combined with consultation with speakers of the pertinent languages.     
13 As discussed on pages 50-52, the recipient of the apology is often blurred or unclear in collective mea 
culpa. 
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The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured into six chapters, the final four of which constitute the in-depth 
empirical case studies.  The opening chapter explores and dissects the constitutive 
characteristics of the rather slippery term that is apology.  In initially studying interpersonal 
apologies, the chapter considers the device’s social function and discursive features.  It is 
posited that apology is principally a face saving mechanism that functions by providing a story 
that acknowledges the negative connotations of a past action of one’s responsibility.  
However, in direct relation to the argument of the thesis, it is demonstrated that apology does 
not necessarily provide an absolute disavowal of an action.  Contrastingly, apologies are 
frequently (though not always) fused with justifications, excuses and denials of particular 
events.  In this sense, apologies may range from acts of sincere self-flagellation and remorse, 
to qualified acceptance of responsibility (I’m sorry, it was a mistake), through to apportioning 
blame on the victim (I’m sorry, but you were asking for it).  Observing the intricate ways by 
which apology narrates the past and may caveat, deny or even celebrate certain actions, sits 
with the wider argument of the thesis that points to certain modes by which, even in mea 
culpa, governments continue to revere the colonial past.  The final section of this chapter 
contributes to the existing literature on political apologies by pointing to some of the 
departures and continuities between interpersonal and state apologies.  
 
Chapter Two focuses on the dual theoretical aspects of the thesis, namely collective memory 
and postcolonial study.  Drawing first on collective memory, the chapter builds on the premise 
– initially offered by Halbwachs (1980; 1992) – that social groups develop an understanding of 
their identity through shared and socially conditioned ideas of the past.   In applying this to the 
thesis, the chapter locates the nation state as a site in which ‘official’ constructs of the past are 
mediated and disseminated through a number of different forums, such as political rhetoric, 
historical tribunals, official ceremonies and so on.  In this sense, one can locate the officialised 
and ritualised utterance of mea culpa as a commemorative event that imparts a particular 
representation of the past.  The second section of the chapter explores the (broad) 
postcolonial project of locating, deciphering and critically subverting the discourses of empire.  
In this way, postcolonial analysis offers a toolkit for analysing the persisting themes of colonial 
rhetoric and applies this analysis to the sentiments offered within apology texts.  In 
undertaking these tasks, the chapter shows a conceptual thread between the notions of 
collective memory and postcolonialism, insofar as they both emphasise the endurance of the 
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past in contemporary configurations of power and the centrality of discourse and 
representation in the mechanics of domination and hierarchy.  
 
Chapter Three consists of the empirical case study into the German apology for the Herero 
genocide.  Internationally, it situates the apology within the context of parallel Herero 
demands for reparations.  In this regard, the chapter contends that the apology amounts to a 
vigilantly scripted text that carefully proffers caveats and clauses that attempt to discursively 
evade legal accountability and neutralise Herero demands for reparations.  It is suggested that 
this obstruction to reparations claims is linked to enduring German state interest in the 
welfare of those in Namibia who are descendants of German settlers (Jamfa 2008: 207).  
Beyond this realpolitik aspect, the apology emerges within a wider process of heightened 
societal introspection into the German colonial past.  It is posited that German colonialism was 
conventionally recollected as marginal and largely insignificant (certainly compared to other 
European powers).  However, in recent decades there has been a revision of this perspective, 
with growing academic and public introspection into the colonial past.  It is this introspection 
that intersected with the centenary of the genocide, sparking a surge in media coverage and 
public awareness of the event that provided occasion for apology (Kössler 2006).  The final 
section of the chapter locates the apology within slowly shifting public memories and 
perceptions of the Holocaust.  It is suggested that in the 21st Century there has been a gradual 
shift away from the Holocaust as the sole all encompassing event of German history.  Although 
the Holocaust still looms large in the public psyche, there is now a more conducive discursive 
and ideational space in which other acts of violence and genocide may be contemplated and 
publicly commemorated. 
 
The fourth chapter focuses on Belgian foreign minister Louis Michel’s parliamentary apology 
for participation in the assassination of the DRC President, Patrice Lumumba.  The chapter 
contextualises the apology within a period of political and societal turmoil following a number 
of scandals and perceived corruption within Belgian society.  In this sense, the apology and 
‘truth’ commission served as devices by which the new government could advantageously 
forge a perception that, in distinction to the former government, it could be perceived as more 
humble, transparent and trustworthy (cf. Kerstens 2008: 190-191).  Positioning the apology 
amidst longer term governmental representations of colonialism, the chapter points to areas 
by which state institutions and politicians, even in apology, continue to articulate sanitised and 
reverential representations of the Belgian colonial past.         
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The penultimate chapter comprises an analysis of the 2010 apology for the British army’s 1972 
massacre of civilians in Derry, Northern Ireland, an event commonly known as ‘Bloody Sunday’.  
The chapter demonstrates an intimate correlation between the Saville Inquiry14 (which 
subsequently induced an apology) and the Northern Ireland Peace Process.  It suggests that 
the process represented a symbolic overture to the ‘nationalist community’ so as to buttress 
their courting into the Westminster vision of a devolved form of Northern Ireland governance.  
The second section places the apology amidst a particular style of politics as cultivated by 
Prime Ministers Tony Blair and David Cameron.  It contends that the remorseful rhetoric 
bespeaks politicians who are savvy in their emotionalised gestures of pseudo-sincerity and 
skilled at drawing on contrition in manufacturing images that emphasise trustworthiness and 
humility in contexts of increasing public misgivings for politicians.  The final section scrutinises 
the apology alongside conventional British narratives of Northern Ireland.  In pursuing this, the 
chapter argues that Cameron reproduces familiar colonial-like narratives that largely 
emphasise the essential righteousness of British policy in Northern Ireland and the necessity 
for British led security measures within the ‘disorderly’ province.        
 
The final empirical chapter investigates Italy’s 2008 apology for colonialism in Libya.  In doing 
so, it situates the apology within Italy’s pre-Arab Spring geopolitical objective of forging more 
cordial relations with Gaddafi’s Libya and introducing the some-time ‘pariah’ state back into 
the international community.  The second section puts the adjoined Treaty of Friendship under 
the microscope, deciphering the ways in which the apology intersects with perceived 
expediencies in the realms of economics and migration.  This analysis underscores the modes 
by which the treaty serves Italian strategic interest in natural resource accumulation, while 
simultaneously embedding ‘reparations’ within a typical colonial discourse of ‘basic 
infrastructure projects’ (Camera del Deputati 2008).  The final section of the chapter positions 
the apology and other concurrent governmental discourses amidst shifting societal narratives 
of the Italian colonial past.  While the apology represents an establishment that has become 
comparatively more introspective over recent decades, the chapter demonstrates that 
governmental rhetoric remains permeated by notions of a benign Italian colonialism, the 
‘superiority’ of Western civilisation and a disposition towards fascist rehabilitation.       
 
                                                             
 
14 The Saville Inquiry was established with the remit of establishing the events leading up to the 
massacre. 
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The conclusion reaffirms the core arguments of the chapters and elaborates on both the 
striking similarities and dissimilarities between the disparate empirical case studies.  This 
chapter also points to related areas of this field that require further research.   The thesis 
concludes by offering some final remarks on the contradictions and dilemmas the issue of 
colonial apologies posit to the hegemonic ascendency of contemporary liberalism. 
  
24 
 
CHAPTER 1:  ON APOLOGY 
 
I do not think I was wrong, but if they think so, I apologise.  
 
Carlos Tevez (quoted in Aitken 2012)15  
 
 
Introduction 
The principal task of this chapter is to apprehend a sharper understanding of state apologies, 
their functions and implications.  Thus, it is also necessary to offer a wider understanding of 
apologies in general – including the interpersonal – thereby garnering a deeper 
comprehension of the ways in which state apologies operate and function as particular sites of 
representation.  As established in the Introduction, this thesis contends that rather than 
disavowing colonialism in its entirety, the apologies examined here renarrate this episode of 
the past in ways that resemble some of its core legitimising tenets.  At first glance, such an 
argument may appear counterintuitive because apologies, in a sense, endow a past event with 
negative connotations.  As such, one of the core tasks of this chapter is to bolster this 
argument’s credence through an examination of the rather nebulous phenomenon that is 
apology and considering modes by which apologies may function so as to reformulate 
transgressions into a more agreeable format.  This is initiated through a survey of the limited, 
but expanding, extant interdisciplinary literature on apologies. 
 
While hesitating to offer an exact definition of apology, the first goal is to explore its 
constitutive characteristics and functions.  Subsequently, the chapter turns to explore how 
apology contrasts and overlaps with accounts and excuses.  In departing from the seminal 
work of Tavuchis (1991) and Goffman (1971), this section contends that the process of 
apologising and offering accounts is far more intertwined than normally recognised.  Indeed, in 
sitting with the wider argument of this thesis, an apology is not by necessity an absolute 
disavowal of an action, but frequently entails – to differing degrees – elements of justification, 
defence and denial.   
 
                                                             
 
15 Tevez offered the apology after the footballer seemingly refused his manager’s instructions to come 
on as a substitute in a Champions League match.  After being ostracised from the squad, the apology 
seems to be an act in attempting to be reincorporated into the fold. 
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Exploring this idea of the duality of apology and account further, the chapter next identifies 
and considers a number of discursive modes an agent may employ so as to attempt to 
moderate his or her perceived offence, even while apologising.  Importantly, these modes can 
be pointed to in the empirical cases of this thesis.  The overall aim of this is to demonstrate 
that apologies have the capacity to carry out a more complex function than simply disavowing 
a misdeed; among other functions, they can provide accounts, trivialise incidents, apportion 
blame and evade accountability. 
 
Having focused largely on interpersonal apologies, the final section joins the dots between 
interpersonal and state apologies.  In doing so, it contributes to the existing literature by 
reflecting on some of the distinctions between the two types of apology in terms of their 
manner of delivery, functions and mnemonic and legal connotations.  In drawing together 
diverse research on apologies and building connections in regards to international apologies, 
the chapter advances an interdisciplinary research agenda on this subject matter.       
 
Defining apology: A fraught task 
Though one may have an intuitive idea as to what constitutes an apology, the concept is 
surprisingly difficult to pin down.  This difficulty is, at least in European languages, because 
there is no one template by which to apologise.  Instead, one may draw phrasing from an 
assemblage of contrite phrases, such as ‘saying sorry, expressing regret and asking for 
forgiveness’ (Celermajer 2009: 14).16  Fraser (1981: 261) goes as far as to claim that ‘when the 
speaker utters, “I apologize for...” there is no question that an apology has been made’ – a 
claim that is problematised by Smith (2008: 20-21) and Lazare (2004: 26).17  Most significantly, 
the uncertainty is due in no small part to the malleable and poly-functional use of the term 
‘sorry’.  Indeed, as Lakoff (2008: 202) recognises, ‘the phrase in English ‘I am sorry,’ can 
function variously as an apology, an expression of non-responsible sympathy, and as a denial 
that an apology is, in fact, in order at all’.  One usage, for instance, can depict a pitiful situation, 
                                                             
 
16 As considered later in this chapter, some of these phrases become ambiguous when seemingly 
expressing empathy rather than apology.  
17 Addressing Fraser’s claim, Smith (2008: 20-21) is more sceptical about this, offering the example of 
someone saying ‘I apologize for your stupidity’ as a counter example.  Smith proclaims to be less 
concerned with the linguistic structures of apology than their particular significance to people.  Lazare 
(2004: 26) takes issue with what he sees as an increased trend for public signs ‘apologizing for the 
inconvenience’ during renovation work, or a parking lot declaring ‘Our lot is filled. We apologise’.  For 
him, such statements do not qualify as apologies as they have no intention to modify their behaviour in 
the future, should the circumstances arise again.    
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such as one’s finances being in a ‘sorry state of affairs’.  Another use of sorry in a non-
apologising manner is the expression ‘I am sorry you are sick’.  In this example, the speaker is, 
of course, not accepting responsibility for the unfortunate situation, but is merely expressing 
sympathy.18  This may, however, be reworked into an apology through the utterance ‘I am 
sorry you are sick, my cooking gave you food poisoning’.  Away from these simple examples, 
there are further grey areas as to what constitutes an apology.  In Smith’s (2005: 473) words 
‘some behaviours are obviously not apologies, some empty expressions are mistaken for 
apologies, [and] some statements serve a few of the functions of apologies’ .  It is in this hazy 
area that we witness such potentially ambiguous and empathic statements as ‘I regret....’, or ‘I 
am sorry to hear that....’   
 
Especially in legal and political circles, it seems that orators have become savvy at exploiting 
this ambiguity.  One particularly illustrative example of this is offered by Kampf (2009: 2261), 
where, in response to international criticism following exchange of fire between Israeli soldiers 
and Palestinian security officers, Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, sent US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell a letter expressing ‘sorrow [tsa’ar] for the regrettable incident’ (quoted in 
Kampf 2009: 2261).  Israeli media reports that Sharon had apologised for the shootings led to 
vociferous criticism from right-wing elements within Israel.  Responding to this criticism, a 
spokesman maintained that 
 
The prime minister did not apologize [hitnatzel] and does not intend to apologize 
[lehitnatzel].  He is simply expressing his sorrow [tsa’aro] that the incident 
occurred...The letter was written in a highly sophisticated manner.  If one reads it 
carefully, he will notice that, in fact, the PM blames the Palestinians (for the incident) 
and is not apologizing for any Israeli act  (quoted in Kampf 2009: 2261). 
 
Here, then, one can observe a wily and seemingly intentionally ambiguous use of the 
polyfunctional word sorry so as to satisfy multiple audiences.  In Kampf’s (2009: 2261) words, 
‘while Sharon’s statement was intended to suffice as an apology in the eyes of the U.S., he 
intended it to be a general expression of sorrow, or even a shifting of blame to the Palestinians 
in the Israeli context’.  
 
                                                             
 
18 Several works have a similar discussion along these lines, for example see Cunningham (1999: 287), 
Smith (2008: 34-35).  
27 
 
Having briefly recognised the surprisingly nebulous nature of apologies, one might think it 
appropriate to now rigorously define the core attributes of apology, identifying a mechanism 
for locating exactly what can and cannot be considered verifiable mea culpa.  Instead, rather 
than undertake this arduous task, this thesis will take Smith’s (2008: 12) lead and not enter 
into the binary and slightly facile endeavour of identifying exactly what is and is not an 
apology.  There is, it would seem, an array of apologies ranging from the token routine apology 
for a very minor offense, through to very sombre and categorical apologies for severe 
offenses.  Equally, there is clearly a whole range of apologies that take differing forms and 
range from the sincere to the insincere, and from the lengthy and eloquent to the short and 
muttered.  Thus, rather than entering into the trap of such binaries, the following passages 
first broadly consider some of the general features of apology, before then considering some 
of the core functions. 
 
The characteristics of apology 
Leaning on the foundational linguistic work of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), apologies are 
widely understood in the academic literature to be speech acts.  This is to say that the 
utterance ‘I am sorry’ or ‘I apologise’ is a deed that is manifested through the enunciation of 
the words.19  This rests on the idea that language is not merely passive or descriptive, but 
assists in constructing and shaping understandings of the social environment.  The most 
illustrative example of the constituting function of words is the declaration ‘I do’ at a wedding 
ceremony; the vocalisation of this utterance being an intrinsic aspect of the doing of the action 
– namely getting married (Austin 1975: 5).  Likewise, ‘I apologise’ is recognised by Austin 
(1975: 45-46) as a performative phrase; in other words, this utterance, more than merely 
describing a situation, actively undertakes an action.  Of course, for an utterance to have any 
social meaning it must be contextualised within socially legible parameters and settings.  As 
such, Fraser (1981: 261) identified four necessities for the realisation of apology, being that 1. 
the apologiser believes an act occurred previous to the utterance; 2. the person who delivers 
the apology considers that the event offended or harmed the recipient; 3. the speaker 
                                                             
 
19 While it is of particular value to conceptualise apologies as speech acts, it is not clear whether apology 
must, by necessity, be vocalised.  Smith (2008: 20) raises the example of a hypothetical society that has 
the custom of baking a pie as a sign of contrition.  It would seem that this would operate as a non-verbal 
apology.  More concretely, Willie Brendt’s famous kneefelt before the Warsaw Memorial to the Jewish 
ghetto fighters is a gesture that has widely been interpreted as an apology, yet contains none of the 
verbal attributes.   
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considers himself/herself to be responsible, at least to some degree, for said incident and 4. 
the apologiser feels regret for the incident (see also Benoit 1995: 49).20     
 
Beyond being speech acts, according to Schlenker and Darby (1981: 271) apologies ‘are 
admissions of blameworthiness and regret for an undesirable event’.  ‘They are appropriately 
offered when an individual has violated a social norm’ (Scher and Darley 1997: 127).  Their 
core function is ‘remedial’, in so far as that they are ‘designed to smooth over or remedy any 
social disruption that was caused by the norm violation’ (Scher and Darley 1997: 127).  
Ignoring, for the moment, ritualistic acknowledgement for very minor offences, there is a 
relatively high degree of convergence around the characteristics of an apology for a grave 
offence, if not the format by which one offers it.  According to Tavuchis (1991: vii), in pleading 
mea culpa, ‘we acknowledge the fact of wrongdoing, accept ultimate responsibility, express 
sincere sorrow and regret, and promise not to repeat the offense’.21  Likewise, Schlenker and 
Darby (1981: 272) identify five components of a ‘full blown’ apology.  These include 
 
(1) A statement of apologetic intent such as “I’m sorry,” (2) expressions of remorse, 
sorrow, embarrassment, etc., to indicate the actor knows he or she has transgressed 
and feels badly about it, (3) offers to help the injured party or make restitution in an 
attempt to redress the damage, (4) self castigation, in which the actor disparages the 
“bad” self that misbehaved, and (5) direct attempts to obtain forgiveness, such as 
saying, “Please forgive me”. 
 
Again, in a very similar fashion, Gill (2000: 12) initially suggests that ‘in its fullest version’ an 
apology contains 
 
(1) An acknowledgement that the incident in question did in fact occur; (2) an 
acknowledgement that the incident was inappropriate in some way; (3) an 
acknowledgement of responsibility for the act; (4) the expression of an attitude of 
regret and a feeling of remorse; and (5) the expression of an intention to refrain from 
similar acts in the future.22 
 
                                                             
 
20 One can take issue with Fraser’s idea that the speaker must feel remorse.  It seems to this author that 
there is no way to decisively determine whether the speak feels remorse or is feigning it.  It seems that 
even if feigned the utterance still constitutes an apology.  Moreover, state apologies problematise the 
question of the speaker’s actual responsibility for the action.  See pages 46-50 for a wider discussion of 
this.  
21 While offering this sketch, Tavuchis does recognise that there are other additional factors in mea 
culpa. 
22 After briefly considering some potential obstacles to these points, two pages later Gill (2000:14) offers 
a slightly moderated version of this criteria. 
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Though not terming it ‘apology’, Burke considers the expression of ‘mortification’ as a mode of 
expunging guilt and restoring social equilibrium (hierarchy).  The process of mortification 
entails ‘a sacrifice of self, an acceptance of wrongdoing [...] an apparent heartfelt confession 
and request for forgiveness’ (Benoit 1995: 18).  Similarly, for Goffman (1971: 113) 
 
In its fullest form the apology has several elements: expression of embarrassment and 
chagrin; clarification that one knows what conduct had been expected and 
sympathizes with the application of negative sanction; verbal rejection, repudiation 
and disavowal of the wrong way of behaving along with vilification of the self that so 
behaved; espousal of the right way and an avowal henceforth to pursue that course; 
performance of penance and the volunteering of restitution. 
 
Of importance here is the emphasis on recognising and disavowing inappropriate modes of 
behaviour.  Smith (2005) concurs with this in his ‘categorical apology’ where he emphasises 
the centrality of a corroborated factual record and the identification of each moral wrong.  In 
this sense the apologiser should move beyond expressing remorse for an unspecified offence à 
la “I’m sorry for what I did”.  Moreover, in identifying each moral wrong, Smith (2005: 479) 
demands that the categorical apology should refrain from ‘conflating several wrongs into one 
apology’.  Instead, the offender must ‘isolate precisely what she is responsible for so that the 
parties can disentangle the causal chain and match each transgression with the moral principle 
transgressed’ (Smith 2005: 480). 
 
With only very limited divergence, from the preceding passages one can infer a certain synergy 
in terms of the constitutive features of a ‘full’ or ‘categorical’ apology.  This is to say that there 
is a broad concurrence that apologies express remorse for a previous event; they castigate 
oneself; indicate that the transgression will not be repeated and offer restitution.  Moreover, 
the apology should detail and itemise the offences one has committed.  Following this 
discussion on the constitutive aspects of apology, the proceeding section considers in more 
detail the societal functions of apology. 
    
The functions of apology: What does an apology do? 
Of course, the core function of an apology is, when successful, to mend and heal relationships.  
However, as Tavuchis (1991: 5) considers, there is a sense in which, no matter how sombre, an 
apology cannot undo the offence.  As ‘a discursive gesture’ (Tavuchis 1991: 5), even the most 
sincere apology cannot revive the men that were shot by British paratroopers in 1973 or 
restore the first post independence elected Prime Minister of the DRC.  Given that the 
transgression itself cannot be undone, the apparently ‘mysterious’ (Tavuchis 1991: 6) capacity 
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for social affect must be located in alternative functions that apologies do.23  In other words, 
one can posit that the apparent healing or remedial qualities of the apology descend from the 
discursive enmeshing in, and altering of, the mutually conceived social environment.  The 
following section endeavours to unravel some of these functions so as to attempt to itemise 
what it is an apology does.  This is not to claim that this is an exhaustive list of all the functions 
of apology.  One could legitimately add other functions or rest on different categorisation.  
Moreover, clearly the following items are overlapping.  However, it is to outlay an array of 
functions that are prominent themes in the empirical chapters of this thesis.  In this sense, 
such an itinerary serves the utility of providing a base through which one can refer back to in 
the course of the empirical analysis.          
 
It proffers a narrative of a past event 
That an apology is a narrative forming device is captured in its etymology; the Greek root 
apologos denoting ‘story’ (Tavuchis 1991: 15).  In this sense an apology recollects a previous 
event and endows it with both a plotline and normative significance.  Even the ritualistic and 
mumbled ‘sorry’ for bumping into someone on the street recalls a past event and implicitly 
narrates to the victim that it was not the intention of the transgressor and was an accident.   
As already recognised, a graver transgression usually demands a more detailed narrative, with 
the offender outlining what he or she actually did.  Indeed, it seems that the transgressor 
replotting the event in a manner that echoes the victim’s version of events is a central 
component of the cathartic aspect of apologies.  In this way, the apology and accompanying 
texts disseminate a particular story of a past event to a listening audience.  In the apologies of 
this thesis, then, the contrite politicians articulate and recount the transgressions in particular 
ways.  As seen in the Belgian and British apologies, this entails ‘truth commissions’ that in 
painstaking detail provide supposedly scientific step-by step accounts of the events in 
question.24  On the other hand, the Italian apology provides little detail beyond the ‘deep 
wounds’ (Berlusconi quoted in Gazzini 2009) inflicted during colonialism.  Nevertheless, 
whether detailed or euphemistic and whatever its actual historical veracity, the state apologies 
provide a public and officialised chronicle of a past deed. 
 
                                                             
 
23 To return to Austin’s (1962) concept of speech acts, it is clear that one can ‘do things with words’. 
24 See pages 129-131 for a critique of the mechanical and supposedly comprehensive accounts offered 
by the Belgian commission into Lumumba’s death. 
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One of the recurring themes of this thesis is that an apology is not a standalone text, but is 
forged through multiple interactions and subtexts over a period of time (c.f. Yamazaki 2004).  
In this respect, the story is not only narrated in the actual apology, but is constructed and 
given meaning through a series of supporting texts and representations.  On the one hand, 
some of these texts can be seemingly congruent with the apology; examples of this are texts 
offered by leading politicians in the British and Italian case studies that, while not apologising, 
took progressively contrite stances on the given episode.  On the other hand, the thesis also 
highlights some accompanying narrative forming representations that appear discordant.  
Indeed, as explored in detail in the following chapter, it is such plotlines as proffered by state 
actors that are incorporated into society’s collective memory of the past, where they can be, 
to varying extents, both internalised and open to contestation.    
 
It identifies a moral wrong and endows the event with a negative significance 
In narrating the past, there is a sense in which apologies imbue the speaker’s act with a 
negative significance.25  To return to bumping into someone in the street, the ritualistic 
apology recognises the (mild) harm caused by the mistake.  At the other end of the spectrum, 
the apologies of this thesis unquestionably endow the events – the genocide of the Herero 
people, the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the shooting of civilians in Derry, colonialism in 
Libya - with negative characteristics.  Though sometimes euphemistic, one can point to a series 
of phrases that accompany the apology to demonstrate this, such as ‘indefensible’ (Cameron 
2010), ‘deep wounds’ (Berlusconi, quoted in Gazzini 2009) and ‘atrocities’ (Wieczorek-Zeul 
2004).  It seems that recognition of the wrong and culpability is a component of the cathartic 
nature of apologies, wherein it affirms that the injuries inflicted on the victims were unjust and 
not of the victims’ making.    
 
To recall, the argument of this thesis is that the apologies do not represent an absolute 
disavowal of colonialism, but engage in techniques that caveat their responsibility and even 
engage in glorification.  Nevertheless, despite the caveats, moral disclaimers and wider 
glorification, one must start with the recognition that, for certain deeds at least, the apologies, 
almost by necessity, reflect on the injurious nature of the state’s actions and engage in a 
certain self-castigation.  In this sense, while there may be a wider discourse that engages in 
                                                             
 
25 One may, for instance, say ‘I am sorry you feel that way, but I’m glad I did it’.  However, disregarding 
such gestures, it is clear that - as a rule - apologies endow an event with a negative significance. 
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exalting, excusing or trivialising empire in a way that resembles the colonial period, one cannot 
talk of a linear continuation of this narrative.  The self castigating element of the apology, 
however limited, reflects an important disjuncture from past representations of the events in 
question.    
 
It reaffirms adherence to a moral/legal principle 
One of the central facets of apologies is their ability to illuminate the ‘normative principles’ of 
social life (Tavuchis 1991: 4).  Given that apologies are offered when a social norm is 
transgressed, they provide an interesting insight into society’s overt and tacit moral code 
(Tavuchis 1991: 12-13).  Thus, in apologising, the agent can be said to be reproaching their self 
for offending the rule, while avowing allegiance to the given edict.  Goffman (1971: 113) 
eloquently illustrates this process, writing that ‘an apology is a gesture through which an 
individual splits himself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offense and the part that 
disassociates itself from the delict and affirms a belief in the offended rule’. 
 
To use Goffman’s idea of splitting, we can see that apologies enable the apologiser to position 
their ‘true’ self on the correct side of the moral or legal code.  In this sense, the apology speaks 
to one’s identity in relation to the offence; ‘it calls attention to what we may be as well as what 
we have done’ (Tavuchis 1991: 9).  For instance, Tiger Woods apologising for extra marital 
affairs is implicitly affirming the normative social convention of marital monogamy.  Moreover, 
in doing so he is calling attention to a rehabilitated contemporary character that henceforth 
attempts to obey such a societal code.  In the apologies of this thesis, it seems that those 
apologising on behalf of the state are thus affirming their belief in the given rule and asserting 
their identity as such.  This is most clearly evident in the German case, where, in apologising 
for the genocide of the Herero people, the government affirms its adversity to genocide and 
reaffirms the German republic as a state whose identity, to some extent, rests on its 
composition in opposition to the genocidal Third Reich (see chapter 3 for a wider discussion of 
this point).  Similarly, it seems that in the contemporary liberal order, all the case studies of 
this thesis reflect states that are affirming the normative liberal principles of the contemporary 
discourse of human rights.       
   
This observation of an altering identity in relation to normative principles reflects a certain 
temporal flux in regards to both identity and morality.  To clarify:  An apology seems to reflect 
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that the transgressor once disregarded a principle, but has since shifted their position towards 
this standard.  Alternatively, it may be that the normative principle itself has altered.26  In 
other words, it may be that, for instance, the assassination of an African leader with apparent 
anti-Western and pro-Communist leanings is considered by a different normative barometer in 
2002 than it was in 1960.  Likewise the killing of an estimated 60,000 Herero people was 
considered in a different light in 1904 than in 2004.  This is not to engage in crude justifications 
of extreme racist violence on the grounds that ‘things were different back then’.  Clearly there 
were contemporaries who spoke out against these acts, and it is not surprising that the 
atrocities studied in this thesis were largely concealed or obscured by the state.  However, it is 
to establish that the apologies of this thesis arose in the context of the end of the Cold War 
and the ensuing revived optimism of liberal and cosmopolitan notions of human rights.  This 
temporal disjuncture between transgression and atrocity means that, as explored in more 
detail in the following chapter, the apologising agent is simultaneously speaking about a past 
event in order to construct their contemporary and even future identity.  In the post-Cold war 
world, states place a great deal of energy constructing an identity that conforms to a liberal 
normative agenda.  Such a liberal identity demands a distancing or splitting from some of the 
gross violations of the past.           
 
It speaks to group membership 
Adjoined with affirming normative principles, the apology speaks to group membership. By 
this measure, in authorising a normative framework, the apologiser equates themselves with 
the moral norms of a particular group or a community and attempts to implant him/herself 
into the given group.  Moreover, if the transgression in question led to the marginalisation of 
the agent, then an apology, if accepted, is a useful tool by which one can be embraced back 
into the fold.  The classic example of this is post-war West German contrition facilitating the 
state’s normalisation into the ‘international community’.  In this way, much of the literature 
focuses on the rehabilitation of the offender back into the group.  However, especially in 
situations involving asymmetric power relations and the ‘dominant’ agent apologising, it may 
be that the inverse holds and the apology enables the ostracised victim to re-enter the 
offending agent’s group.  In an overly simplified interpersonal format, this may entail the 
bullied child rejoining the bully’s clique.  In domestic state based apologies, Mellissa Nobles 
                                                             
 
26 It may also be the case that the transgressor continues to view the normative principle with 
contempt, but apologises so as to evade severe sanction. 
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(2008) observes a parallel phenomenon in contending that apology can function as a means by 
which states can ratify a politically ostracised group’s interpretation of history, thereby 
incorporating marginalised groups into the broader history of the state.  Indeed, one can point 
to such a process in this thesis, whereby the Italian apology to Libya assists in Libya (not Italy’s) 
reincorporation into the international community (see chapter 6).  Likewise, Tony Blair’s 
establishment of the Saville Enquiry into Bloody Sunday (and Cameron’s subsequent apology) 
facilitated the re-engagement of the ‘Nationalist Community’27 into mainstream governance.  
The pertinent point here is that, while apologies can rehabilitate the offender’s membership of 
a group, they may equally reintegrate the offended.                
 
It affirms the dignity of the victims 
A categorical apology, according to Smith (2008: 65), has the capacity to radically transform 
the relationship between transgressor and victim.  This is primarily because, seemingly unlike 
when the transgressions occurred, with an apology the victim is afforded the status as a moral 
interlocutor (Smith 2008: 65).  In other words, when an agent exploits or wrongs another, 
there is the implicit indication that the offender has little regard for the other’s dignity.  An 
apology (in certain circumstances) has the capacity to reinstate this dignity in that it recognises 
the hurt caused and accepts that the treatment of that person/group was wrong.  This has 
particular resonance for apologies for colonialism, whereby the colonial project necessitates 
that the subaltern is portrayed in some way – morally, culturally, spiritually, biologically – as 
inferior to the coloniser.  In this sense, an apology could function so as to overcome such 
misplaced colonial complacencies and recognise the equal moral worth of the peoples.  
Indeed, in some respects, it is this equal moral worth that sits with the revived post Cold-War 
tenets of liberal and cosmopolitan discourse. 
 
Certainly there does seem to be an element to the apologies where the relationship between 
coloniser and colonised is discursively transformed.  Indeed, in recognising responsibility and 
the suffering caused, there is undoubtedly a break from the discourse by which colonialism 
was sustained.  However, as discussed further in the proceeding chapter, there is a sense in 
which the apologies and surrounding representations and policies actually reproduce a 
discourse that reframes the hierarchical position of metropole over periphery.  This, for 
                                                             
 
27 The concepts of distinct ‘Nationalist’ and ‘Loyalist’ communities are problematised on pages 135 and 
141-142. 
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instance, is evident in the paternalistic undertones of some of the apologies and accompanying 
discourses that continue to revere, or at least trivialise, colonialism.  Moreover, beyond 
apologies, such sustained paternal and hierarchical structures are forged in neo-colonial 
modes of governance and enduring configurations of inequality in the post independence 
world.  In this way, one can be critical to any idea that apologies reflect a West that now 
considers an entirely equal relationship with the formerly colonised. 
 
It simultaneously ‘saves face’ and castigates oneself 
One of the paradoxes of apology is that it is simultaneously self castigating and face saving.  
The self-castigating aspect of apology has already been discussed, whereby one admits 
culpability for an undesirable deed and expresses remorse and chagrin.  It is this process of 
public self-rebuke and prostration that undoubtedly causes such reluctance to apologise.  
However, it is the very process of self-flagellation that allows one to engage in remedial work 
as to the redemption of one’s perception amongst others.  It is this aspect of public 
presentation that is pivotal to the argument of this thesis regarding one’s discursively narrated 
identity.  In other words, the apology is a story that, in some ways, is more about the 
transgressor than the victim; there is a capacity for a certain indulgence – even narcissism – 
where the apologiser attempts to reformulate and modulate both the event in question and 
their projected self image and social standing.  This reformulation of self image is termed by 
Goffman (1971) as ‘remedial work’.  Given the central importance of the narration of self 
image to this thesis, the discursive modes of undertaking this process are explored in the next 
section.      
 
Apology or apologia?28  Accounts and apologies  
In his influential work, Relations in public: microstudies of the public order, sociologist Erving 
Goffman examined ‘social order’ through the face-to-face interactions of persons in daily 
public life.  He was concerned with the modes by which, in their interactions, people partake in 
and conform to routine and patterned social practices and their divulgence and violation of 
such practices (Goffman 1971: xii).  Though relatively brief, Goffman dedicated a highly 
                                                             
 
28 Using this subtitle, there is an interesting work entitled The Fourth Estate and the Case for War in Iraq: 
Apology or Apologia (Marks 2008).  Marks analyses the print media’s acknowledgements of its failures 
to hold the Bush administration to account for their claims in the build up to the 2003 war in Iraq.  It 
contends that these partial expressions of mea culpa have frequently engaged in offering defence and 
justifications for their actions.    
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influential section to processes by which an offender can seek to rehabilitate their social 
standing following a violation of a social norm.  He contends that following such an infraction 
(or alleged infraction) there are three core techniques by which the offender can undertake 
‘remedial work’ and thereby attest that they did indeed have a virtuous relationship to societal 
rules (Goffman 1971: 108).  These three techniques consist of offering accounts, apologies and 
requests (Goffman 1971 109).29   Having already discussed apologies, the following passages 
explore in more detail the role of accounts in remedial work; this is done with explicit 
reference to the work of Goffman (1971), Scott and Lyman (1968) and Ware and Linkugel 
(1973).  
 
Accounts 
An account closely resembles the classical meaning of apologia, where one offers a defence of 
a position.  At least until the last decade or so, accounts had conventionally been explored in a 
richer array of literature than that of apologies.  Despite this richness, there is a fair degree of 
convergence in the literature as to the modes by which the alleged transgressor may 
rhetorically seek to recover standing.30  In their seminal work, Scott and Lyman (1968: 46) 
define accounts as ‘a statement made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or untoward 
behaviour’.  Their societal role, then, is to bridge ‘the gap between action and expectation’, 
thereby repairing relationships and restoring social harmony.  Scott and Lyman identify two 
forms of accounts, namely excuses and justifications.  A justification is where ‘one accepts 
responsibility for the act in question, but denies the pejorative quality associated with it’ (Scott 
and Lyman 1968: 47).  Such an example may be admitting killing someone, but claiming that it 
was in self-defence.  Excuses, on the other hand, ‘are socially approved vocabularies for 
mitigating or relieving responsibility when conduct is questioned’.  For instance, one claims 
that the offending incident was owing to accident, defeasibility, biological drives or 
scapegoating (Scott and Lyman 1968: 47). 
 
In very similar terms, Goffman identifies five modes of offering an account.  Firstly, the 
offender may claim that the act did not occur, or that the act did occur but he/she was in no 
way responsible for it.  Secondly, an account may admit to carrying out the deed, but claims 
                                                             
 
29 ‘A request consists of ‘asking license of a potentially offended person to engage in what could be 
considered a violation of his rights’ (Goffman1971: 114).  An example of this might be asking ‘would you 
mind if I ask how old you are?’ Although interesting, requests are not central to this thesis and for this 
reason are not further explored here. 
30 For an excellent overview on the existing literature on accounts, see Benoit (1995: esp Ch 2).    
37 
 
that mitigating circumstances ‘were such as to make the act radically different from what it 
appears to have been, and that, in fact, he is not really at fault at all’ (Goffman 1971: 109-10).   
Thirdly, ‘the putative offender can agree that the act occurred and that he did it but present 
the mitigation that he was ignorant and unforseeing, excusably so, and could not reasonably 
be asked to have acted so as to forestall it’ (Goffman 1971: 110).  One late for a meeting, for 
instance, may claim that there was an unforeseeable railway accident which meant that her 
train was delayed.  A fourth form of account is claiming ‘reduced responsibility by virtue of 
reduced competence’ (Goffman 1971: 111).  This essentially entails accepting culpability for 
the action, but explaining this as a result of incompetence rather than intent.  Mitigation may 
‘be based on sleepiness, drunkenness, youthfulness, senility, druggedness, passion, lack of 
training, but maintain that she was subordination to the will of superiors, mental deficiency, 
and so forth’.31  The final and, according to Goffman (1971: 112), weakest form of account is to 
admit culpability and competence, but avow that one was ‘indefensibly unmindful or ignorant 
of what was to happen’ and would not have behaved in such a way had one seen the 
consequences. 
 
In their exploration of apologia, Ware and Linkugel (1973) draw on the work of Abelson (1959) 
to classify modes of defending oneself against allegations.  Interesting, these do not depart 
significantly from the literature explored above.  These techniques are termed denial, 
bolstering, differentiation and transcendence.  Denial is self explanatory and equates to 
Goffman’s stance on saying the event did not happen.  Bolstering, does not necessarily 
attempt to deny the event, but entails a ‘rhetorical strategy which reinforces the existence of a 
fact, sentiment, object or relationship’.  In this way, the ‘speaker attempts to identify himself 
with something viewed favourably by the audience’.  In his infamous public apology, Tiger 
Woods highlighted – despite the tenuous link to adultery - his foundation that helps ‘young 
people achieve their dreams through education (Woods 2010).  Indeed, the apologies of this 
thesis are replete with such bolstering:  To underline just two examples: Chapter 5 points to 
Cameron (2010) emphasising the role of Britain in bringing peace to Northern Ireland  and 
Chapter 3 highlights Wieczorek-Zeul’s (2004) emphasis on Germany being a member of the 
European Union.  These seem to point favourably to the transgressor’s ‘good’ character, 
perhaps suggesting that any offences were not in their ‘true’ nature. 
                                                             
 
31 Needless to say, Goffman recognises that such explanations are not equally adequate in all 
circumstances.  Clearly, claiming drunkenness is not an adequate account for crashing a car. 
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Differentiation, Ware and Linkugel (1973: 278) explain, ‘subsumes those strategies which serve 
the purpose of separating some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship from some larger 
context within which the audience presently views that attribute’.  This may entail elaborating 
on ‘extenuating circumstances’ that accompanied the given event.  Alternatively, the authors 
claim, differentiation frequently entails the apologist requesting ‘a suspension of judgement 
until his actions can be viewed from a different temporal perspective’ (Ware and Linkugel 
1973: 278).  An example of this is Tony Blair’s insistence that he can ‘let the day-to-day 
judgments come and go’ regarding war in Iraq, as he will ‘be judged by history’ (quoted in 
Ashley and MacAskill 2003).  Indeed, as discussed in further detail on pages 32-33, it seems 
that the temporal inverse is applied in the apologies of this thesis; that is, the apologiser asks 
for the offence to be considered in the context of the past, rather than the future.  In this way, 
the Belgian inquiry into the assassination of Lumumba contextualises the President’s murder 
within the Cold War, while Cameron contextualises Bloody Sunday within the 1970’s 
‘Troubles’. 
 
The final factor, transcendence, entails ‘any strategy which cognitively joins some fact, 
sentiment, object or relationship with some larger context within which the audience does not 
presently view the attribute’ (Ware and Linkugel 1973: 280).  In other words, the apologist 
attempts to redefine the way in which the audience understands the act by ‘shifting from the 
specific to the abstract’.  This frequently entails appealing to ‘a higher-order value’ (Towner 
2010: 300).  A terrorist, by way of example, may admit responsibility for an attack, but claim 
that the group’s struggle was of a higher order than the resulting death toll.  Likewise, Karl 
Rove, a senior adviser to George W. Bush, called on higher values when questioned about the 
use of waterboarding in gathering intelligence, saying that ‘it allowed us to foil [terrorist] plots’  
and that he was ‘proud that we kept the world safer than it was, by the use of these 
techniques’ (quoted in BBC 2010a).      
 
Reconsidering apology and accounts as polar opposites 
While Ware and Linkugel and Scott and Lyman do not analyse mea culpa as a form of remedial 
redress, Goffman does.  For Goffman (1971: 113), apology is distinct from accounts insofar as 
it operates by castigating the offending deed and thus separates oneself from the aspect of 
one’s character that committed the misdeed.   It is thus clear that Goffman draws a distinction 
between the remedial devices of accounts and apologies.  There is, unfortunately, no 
discussion in his work as to how accounts and apologies may overlap, thereby indicating that 
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perhaps he had not considered the possibility of the enmeshing of the two techniques 
(although the fact that he considered both under the banner of ‘remedial interchanges’ does 
indicate that he saw them as having the familial resemblance of seeking to alter the perception 
of an offensive act into a more acceptable format (Goffman 1971: 109)).  In another seminal 
sociological work on apologies, Tavuchis is far more explicit as to what he considers a key 
distinction between accounts and apologies.  For him, ‘to apologize is to declare voluntarily 
that one has no excuse, defense, justification or explanation for an action (or inaction) that has 
“insulted, failed, injured, or wronged another.”’.  This, he maintains, is ‘in sharp contrast’ to an 
account, where one ‘asks the offended party, in effect, to be reasonable by giving explanations 
that are intended to (partially or fully) release him or her’ (Tavuchis 1991: 17).  However, as 
the following passages attempt to demonstrate, there is, even in official and very solemn 
apologies – such as those analysed in this thesis – far more of a tendency for the boundaries 
between these types of remedial work to overlap.  It is this challenge to the binary notion of 
apologies and accounts that is now considered.  
 
In pointing to the frequent overlap between account and apology, it is pertinent to note that 
the very etymology of the term apology highlights an intersection between defence of one’s 
position and the modern use as an acknowledgement of moral culpability.  In fact, as Lazare 
(2004: 31) highlights, the word ‘apology’, ‘has no root that acknowledges guilt or blame’.  As 
Tavuchis (1991: 15) himself shows, the Greek root apologos refers to ‘a story, from which 
apologia, an oral or written defense, becomes apology’.  In this way, the term was initially 
understood, according to 16th Century versions of the Oxford English Dictionary, as ‘a defence 
of a person or vindication of an institution, etc., from accusation or aspersion’ (quoted in 
Tavuchis 1991).  The epitome of this is Plato’s Apology of Socrates, where Plato recounts 
Socrates’ defence against allegations of corrupting the city’s youth and not believing in the 
gods.  Likewise, apology entailed ‘defending and reinforcing religious belief’, as exampled by 
Montaigne’s Apology for Raymond Sebond (Smith 2008: 8).   It is only in later usage that the 
term develops its connotations with regret, sorrow and culpability.  Despite the undoubted 
prevalence of the contrite variety, apology retains its potential to indicate defence.  This is 
especially evident in the term ‘apologist’ unequivocally referring to one that defends a 
position.   
 
This ambiguity between apology and apologia is also frequently observable in empirical 
examples of both perfunctory and sombre apologies.  Starting with the perfunctory:  Someone 
bumping into another on the street might reasonably offer the phrase ‘I am sorry, I was miles 
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away’.  In this example, admitting to daydreaming is not categorising the offense - for the 
offense is bumping into someone – instead, the offender is offering both an apology and an 
account – the account being daydreaming.  If an employee arrives late, it is reasonable for the 
employee to say ‘I’m sorry I am late, the train was delayed’.  This, again, categorises the 
offence and offers an account.  Indeed, it seems polite to offer the account, as merely saying 
‘I’m sorry I’m late’ without any explanation may seem quite flippant and disregarding of the 
normative code.32 
 
Beyond the perfunctory, even more elongated apologies frequently entail accounts.  In an 
episode of Winnie the Pooh (Disney 1988), Tigger apologises to a cloud that he had earlier 
insulted and thrown rocks at, saying 
 
I have a couple of things to say about earlier today.  I didn’t mean to hurt your feelings, 
but I was trying to jump over this tree, you see and you got in the way.  And hey, I am 
sorry for calling you names and throwing rocks and I promise never to insult any cloud 
ever again – cross my stripes.  Does this mean you forgive me? 
 
Despite not offering reparations, in many respects this apology fulfils the components of 
sincere apology; it implicitly expresses remorse - ‘I am sorry’; it accepts causal responsibility 
(that is, it was he who threw the rocks); it identifies each moral wrong – calling names and 
throwing rocks; it promises not to repeat the offence and requests forgiveness.  Moreover, the 
apology is offered and directed to the cloud in an appropriate tone and body language that 
indicates contrition.  Despite these many aspects that are appropriate to more sombre 
apologies, it is nevertheless evident that Tigger also uses accounts.  Despite attacking the cloud 
with rocks, Tigger offers the rather implausible account that it was not his intention to hurt the 
cloud, saying that he ‘didn’t mean to’ hurt his feelings.  Likewise, Tigger imparts a degree of 
blame on to the victim, suggesting that he did this because the cloud was an obstacle to his 
fun. 
 
Similarly, in John Lennon’s (1971) Jealous Guy, one can witness an offering that straddles both 
an apology and an account: 
 
I was dreaming of the past,  
And my heart was beating fast,  
                                                             
 
32 The issue of lateness and apology is also discussed by Smith (2008: esp 133-136).  
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I began to lose control,  
I began to lose control,  
 
I didn't mean to hurt you,  
I'm sorry that I made you cry,  
I didn't want to hurt you,  
I'm just a jealous guy,  
 
I was feeling insecure,  
You might not love me anymore. 
 
This ‘apology’ is somewhat less emphatic than Tigger’s.  Despite its melancholic tune, it 
remains unclear as to whether the ‘sorry’ is an apology or an expression of empathy.   There is 
also no detail offered as to his exact offence (probably so as to make the record more widely 
applicable to the audience).  Nevertheless, there is admission of culpability – ‘I made you cry’ – 
and there is self castigation – ‘I’m just a jealous guy’.  However, one can equally point to the 
use of accounts:   There are pointers towards Goffman’s (1971: 111) ‘reduced responsibility by 
virtue of reduced competence’, whereby the artist suggests that he was losing ‘control’ and 
with intensified heart rate.  That he was ‘feeling insecure’ is not a detail of the transgression, 
but, seemingly, an account as to why he might have behaved badly.  Also, similarly to Tigger, 
the vocalist suggests that it was not his intention to cause such pain, saying he ‘didn’t mean to’ 
and ‘didn’t want to’. 
 
Clearly, these are just limited examples that, in a world awash with apology, are not sufficient 
to prove a rule.  Indeed, the attempt here is not to prove a rule and suggest that all apologies 
contain accounts.  Evidently, there are apologies that accept unconditional blame and 
renounce the deed entirely.  However, the claim here is that apologies can, indeed frequently 
do, contain accounts.  Making this observation is to pave the way for highlighting the accounts 
that are replete within the apologies of this thesis.  It is to complicate the concept of an 
apology and affirm that it is not by necessity a comprehensive retreat of one’s character and 
deeds.  Moreover, it is a recognition that discourse that engages in defence of oneself does not 
have to be immediately disqualified as an apology.  This recognition enables the pointing to 
accounts within the empirical chapters of this thesis and provides an understanding of apology 
that is congruent with the overall argument of this thesis.  Having recognised the capacity of 
apologies to engage in such processes, the next section proceeds to pursue this line of enquiry 
further by analysing common techniques that apologising agents may utilise so as to delimit 
their personal, moral and legal accountability.       
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Modes of delimiting responsibility 
Lazare (2004: 85-106; see also Eisinger 2011) points to eight techniques by which an 
apologising agent may offer what he calls a ‘pseudo apology’.  These may be listed as 1) 
offering a vague and incomplete acknowledgement 2) using the passive voice 3) making the 
offense conditional 4) questioning whether the victim is damaged 5) minimising the offence 6) 
using the empathic “I’m sorry” or “I regret” 7) apologising to the wrong party 8) apologising for 
the wrong offense.  While Lazare’s analysis is detailed and eloquent, not every one of these 
points is applicable to this thesis.  For this reason, it is only the modes that are pertinent to this 
thesis’ argument that are explored below.  In addition to Lazare’s points, the following 
passages point to other such modes that are prominent in the empirical case studies. 
 
The theme of offering a vague and incomplete acknowledgement of an offence is one that 
threads throughout this thesis.  Such a discursive mode involves offering contrition without 
detailing exactly what it is for, such as offering the platitude of ‘I am sorry for what happened’ 
(Lazare 2004: 86).  This relates closely to Smith’s (2005: 476) demand that a categorical 
apology should corroborate the factual record and identify each moral wrong.   An incomplete 
acknowledgement of the offence leaves an ambiguity as to the historical episodes for which 
the agent is apologising – an ambiguity that evades accountability and can be exploited by a 
wider discourse of denial, justification or glorification.  This discursive mode is observed in the 
Italian case study, whereby Berlusconi apologises for ‘the deep wounds that we caused you’ 
(quoted in Gazzini 2009).  Such a euphemistic employment of the term ‘deep wounds’ eludes 
accepting accountability for any detailed historical episode, such as the use of poison gas or 
concentration camps in Libya.  Moreover, apologising for the ‘wounds’ caused is to engage in 
an apologetic mode that Kampf (2009: 2266) identifies as substituting ‘the act with the 
outcome’.  In effect, this serves to deplore the undesirable outcome of the process – the 
wounds - rather than the process itself.  In terms of colonialism, such emphasis on outcome 
over process is to fail to condemn the process of colonialism per se.       
 
In addition to the euphemistic emphasis on outcome over process, an incomplete 
acknowledgement of the offence may offer contrition for only one component of an offence 
that sits within the framework of a wider wrongdoing (Kampf 2009: 2263). By this token, the 
Belgian apology for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba speaks to just one egregious issue 
that can be situated within a broader context of Belgian colonialism (Gibney 2002: 281).  Thus, 
isolating this one offence and showing no contrition for the wider practice of colonialism is to 
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implicitly condone the latter.  Moreover, isolating only one offence is to show a disregard for 
the structures and processes that led to the transgression.  In other words, marginalising the 
colonial context of the assassination is to omit the far wider violent and racist ideologies that 
are intrinsic to colonialism and are surely entangled with the processes from which Lumumba’s 
assassination arose.  In remarkably similar ways, the apologies for Bloody Sunday and the 
Herero genocide isolate particular atrocities while ignoring the wider colonial landscape.   This 
ambivalence, silence and absence of introspection regarding the actual colonial project further 
intimates these states’ gauche position towards their colonial pasts. 
 
As Lazare (2004: 88-90) emphasises, the use of the passive voice in apology evades identifying 
oneself as the transgressor; it is to detach the pronoun from the offending verb.  This is to say 
that the admission ‘I am sorry I stole your wallet’ is qualitatively different from the passive 
utterance ‘I am sorry your wallet was stolen’, whereby in the latter example the identity as to 
whom committed the crime is unclear.  This technique can most prominently be observed in 
the German apology, where Wieczorek-Zeul (2004) narrated that ‘the survivors were forced 
into the Omaheke desert’ and that ‘they were denied any access to water resources and were 
left to die of thirst and starvation’.  In chapter 3 it is contended that such a use of the passive 
voice represents a savvy technique so as to evade legal accountability for the genocide. 
 
The use of the empathic ‘I’m sorry’ or ‘I regret’ has already been discussed in relation to Ariel 
Sharon’s ‘apology’ for the exchange of fire between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian security 
officers.  In fact, in this thesis the Belgian, British and Italian utterances clearly use the noun 
‘apology’ and verb ‘apologise’ in a non-ambiguous manner, at least for the transgressions that 
they identify, if not the wider colonial project.  Interestingly, in terms of British relations with 
Ireland outside of Bloody Sunday, one can point to the euphemistic and empathic use of terms 
such as ‘regret’.  For instance, regarding the Irish potato famine, Tony Blair spoke regretfully of 
‘deep scars’, saying that the fact ‘that one million people died in what was then part of the 
richest and most powerful nation in the world is something that still causes pain as we reflect 
on it today’ (quoted in Lyall 1997).  Similarly, in the Queen’s recent visit to Ireland she 
extended her ‘sincere thoughts and deep sympathy’ to ‘all those who have suffered as a 
consequence of our troubled past’ (quoted in Crimmins 2011).  As well as compromising the 
apology and the issues of accountability, such expressions may be condescending statements 
that indicate unequal relationships (Lazare 2004: 99).  In terms of the other apologies of this 
project, this discursive mode is most evident in the German apology for the Herero genocide, 
where Wieczorek-Zeul (2004) asked the audience to “forgive us our trespasses”, before stating 
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that “without a conscious process of remembering, without sorrow, there can be no 
reconciliation”.  Here the use of the noun ‘sorrow’, without a clear issue of apology is to 
obfuscate the utterance and render the text unclear as to whether it is an expression of 
empathy or apology.  Indeed, Wieczorek-Zeul later had to clarify this utterance, confirming 
that everything she said ‘was an apology from the German government’ (quoted in Meldrum 
2004).  A wider analysis of this in relation to legal responsibility and reparations is undertaken 
in chapter 3.    
 
A technique that Lazare seemingly overlooks is that of apologising on one hand, while later (or 
simultaneously) contradicting/retracting the apology or showing an alternative attitude to the 
misdeed.  This may be observed whereby a schoolboy apologises to the teacher so as to evade 
detention, but later regales his friends with the story of his glorious rebellion.  In interstate 
relations, Lind (2008) points to a ‘backlash’ phenomenon, particularly in Japan, whereby 
apologies induce counter narratives among conservatives who, in response to the apology, 
either glorify or deny the incident.  The empirical case studies of this project show a 
moderated argument from this, wherein one can point to an accompanying elite discourse 
both within and without the actual text of the apology that continues to emphasise the benign 
and progressive aspects of colonialism.  This does emerge from conservative politicians as Lind 
(2008) postulates, but it is equally in the text of the apology and in the accompanying 
discourse of those who uttered it as well as members of that government (who are, of course, 
often conservatives).  To take just two examples of this, one can point to Italian cabinet 
minister Gianfranco Fini celebrating how in Libya ‘the Italians brought not only roads and 
employment, but also those values, that civilisation, and those laws that are a lighthouse for a 
whole culture’ (quoted in Mellino 2006: 470).  Likewise, the Belgian Foreign Minister (and 
apologiser), Louis Michel, wrote of a ‘set of positive contributions that our Congolese partners 
do not fail to recognise’ (Persdienst Buitenlandse Zaken 2004).  One can also point to 
contemporary accompanying representations in ‘official’ narrative constructing formats – 
museums, school syllabuses, university courses – that continue to disregard, trivialise or exalt 
the colonial project.  Given that historical narratives are multilayered and require continual 
recoding, these wider utterances on colonialism may submerge or contradict the contrite 
stances in the apologies.  The theme of an accompanying discourse that continues to portray a 
benevolent colonial project is flagged throughout this thesis and points to the contradictory 
positions of glorification and mortification that these states are wrestling with in regards to 
their colonial past.                     
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A further theme that emerges from this is the rhetorical turn that seeks to cut-short the inter-
group dialogue and historical introspection.  By this token, both the British apology (Cameron 
2010) and Italian Treaty of Friendship (Camera del Deputati 2008) employ the metaphor of 
closing a chapter, while the Belgian investigation into Lumumba’s assassination speaks of 
coming to ‘terms with the past’ (Chambre des Représentants 2001a).  The insinuation here is 
not on opening a debate by which official narrative is exposed to further intensive scrutiny or, 
as postcolonial thought suggests, history is encountered with all its pluralistic dimensions.  
Rather, these expressions suggest that the apology represents an attempt at a closing of the 
dialogue, historical introspection and a desire, to use Cameron’s (2010) phrase, to ‘move on’.  
This sense is compounded by the context in which the apologies arise, whereby in all four case 
studies, especially the Belgian, British and German ones, the apologies take place in 
circumstances where there has been a sustained attack on the conventional colonial narratives 
as offered by the ‘official’ arms of the state.  In this sense, the apologies are offered in a 
context where the state and its official or implicit constructs of history are on the back foot 
and seeking to engage in restorative work.   
 
Given that such apologies seem to represent a defensive posture, it appears that, along with 
the expressions of ‘closing chapters’ and ‘moving on’, the apologies are devices that seek to 
halt further introspection.  Of course, the conventional picture of the prostrate apologiser and 
emboldened addressee suggests that the victim must then retort (either forgiving or not 
forgiving).  However, where the relationship is between coloniser and colonised, it seems that 
the subaltern has less capacity to retort (an issue in cohort with Spivak’s (1988) question ‘Can 
the Subaltern speak?’).  This is not to suggest that the formerly colonised are passive and 
cannot respond to the apology.  Indeed, it was the formerly colonised that played an 
influential role in forcing governments of the metropolis into these defensive and remedial 
discursive positions.  However, it is to point to the unequal access to media outlets and other 
agenda setting formats.  In this sense, while the apologies garner instant media attention and 
public discussion, it may be that, rather than opening a space for subaltern voices and 
historical introspection, in the short term the apologies serve to restore a lost equilibrium and 
impede further introspection.  Nevertheless, as explored in more detail in the following 
chapter, even with the metaphors of ‘closing chapters’, there is a sense in which the offering of 
apologies induces more demands for mea culpa from other groups and, in the longer term, 
opens up further cracks in states’ conventional colonial narratives, thereby begetting further 
contestation. 
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In deciphering the above modes of delimiting one’s perceived responsibility, this chapter has 
further underscored the idea that apologies have a capacity to play an almost dual function; 
while they inescapably endow events with a negative connotation, apologies, in employing 
certain techniques, can provide a space where the orator may obfuscate or delimit their 
responsibility.  In the biopsy of the empirical chapters, it is such modes that are highlighted in 
sustaining the thesis’ overall argument that, in significant ways, the apologies of this thesis 
reformulate enduring colonial sentiments. 
 
Contrasting individual and public apologies 
Thus far, this chapter has explored apology largely as an interpersonal phenomenon.  
However, it is important to recognise that the apologies analysed in this thesis are interstate 
apologies.  With the exception of some notable works (Tavuchis 1991; Pettigrove 2003; Smith 
2008), there remains a relative paucity in literature that compares and contrasts the 
interpersonal apology with the group or state based variety.  As such, beyond the central 
argument of the thesis, one of the minor contributions of this work is to seek to ascertain 
some of these key distinguishing factors.  In distinguishing between the interpersonal and the 
state variety, it is hoped that one can garner a greater understanding of the meaning and 
implications of the growing phenomenon of interstate mea culpa.  It is these distinctions that 
are explored below. 
 
The shifting ontology of state apology   
 
Perhaps the key distinguishing factor between group apology and interpersonal apology is 
regarding the issue of the speaker’s personal responsibility for the transgression.  As already 
established, in an interpersonal apology it is customary (though to varying degrees) for the 
apologiser to accept personal responsibility for the offence.  In terms of group apology, the 
apologiser’s actual responsibility is frequently far more ambiguous or even non-existent.  Thus, 
‘a speaker who issues an apology on behalf of an institution or collective is speaking for that 
institution or collective, not for himself or herself as an individual’ (Govier and Verwoerd 2002: 
75).  Indeed, in terms of this thesis, the apologies can be termed intergenerational in so far as 
the politicians that offered contrition were either not born at the time of the offence or were 
children; they played no personal role in the actual transgression, either directly or as part of 
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the state apparatus.33  That the individuals were apologising for an offense that they 
themselves did not commit represents a curious ontological break from conventional ideas of 
secular liberal justice.34  This is to say that the liberal concept of justice typically emphasises 
the moral and legal responsibility for one’s own individual actions, rather than those of one’s 
forefathers or community (cf. Freeman 2008; Celermajer 2009: 1).  It is such ‘ahistorical 
liberalism’, as Thompson (2009: 196) terms it, that feeds into former Australian Prime 
Minister, John Howard’s, refusal to apologise to the indigenous ‘stolen generation’,35 on the 
grounds that he does ‘not believe as a matter of principle that one generation can assume 
responsibility for the acts and deeds of an earlier generation’ (Howard 2008). 
 
While this philosophical debate is not considered here in full,36 there are two interesting, 
though far from watertight, critiques of the liberal concept that historical obligation rests only 
with those that committed the misdeeds.  Firstly, in a series of publications, Thompson (2002; 
2006; 2008; 2009) makes the case that citizens have enduring obligations to the past actions of 
the state.  Thompson (2008: 38) contends that states are ‘transgenerational polities in which 
members pass on responsibilities and entitlements from one generation to another’.  She 
explains that clearly present citizens make policies, treaties and contractual agreements that 
bestow binding commitments upon future actions.  In making these agreements, the present 
generation anticipates and, moreover, requires that future members of the polity adhere to 
these commitments.  This entails a moral relationship in which members are bound to accept 
the stipulations laid down by a previous generation.  As Thompson (2008: 39) writes, ‘to the 
extent that individuals value their membership in states and other organizations, they are 
bound to value a practice which entails respect for transgenerational associations and for the 
interests of individuals, past, present and future, that are bound up with their continued 
existence’.  In this way, while the current generation of the polity may not feel remorse or 
                                                             
 
33 David Cameron (2010) even points this out in his apology for Bloody Sunday, saying that ‘for someone 
of my generation, Bloody Sunday and the early 1970s are something we feel we have learnt about 
rather than lived through’. 
34 See page 3 for a discussion of liberalism in the context of this thesis. 
35 The ‘stolen generation’ refers to native Australian children who were removed from their parents by 
government agencies, supposedly for their protection.  In some areas this process was still taking place 
in the 1970s.  
36 The argument as to whether the current generation has a responsibility or obligation for the 
transgressions of an earlier generation has generated considerable philosophical debate within the 
academic literature.  See Abdel-Noir (2003), Weiner (2005) and Miller (2007) for examples of scholars 
who champion the idea of intergenerational obligation.  For counter views, see Boxill (2003), Corlett 
(2003).    
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sentiment, they are still tied by the moral imperative of fulfilling the obligations of previous 
incarnations of the polity, thereby leading to the import of offering apology and compensation 
for the past injustices committed by the state (Thompson 2008: 39). 
 
A second argument regarding the responsibility of one generation for the next is termed ‘guilt 
by virtue of privilege’ (Bartky 2002: 139).  As Bartky (2002: 142) explains, she is ‘guilty by virtue 
of simply being who and what I am: a white woman born into an aspiring middle class family in 
a racist and class-ridden society’.  By this argument’s logic, one can acquire guilt through 
reaping the unearned benefits of crimes and appropriations carried out by a previous 
generation.  There can, in one sense, be no doubt that the West’s contemporary comparative 
affluence is based in no small measure on the enslavement, looting and exploitation that took 
place under colonialism.  Yet, from another perspective, clearly the ‘rewards’ of colonialism 
and neo-colonialism are not felt evenly across society, with many in the West suffering as a 
result of this.37  Moreover, the process of attributing guilt and gauging privilege in this way are 
deeply problematic and does not provide adequate conceptualisation of the different degrees 
of responsibility between perpetrators, bystanders and descendants.  Equally, in multicultural 
societies where citizens frequently have heritage that derives from both the metropole and 
the colony, such notions of guilt surely create identity dilemmas of schizophrenic proportions.  
Nevertheless, in the eyes of some, it is such notions of unearned privilege that endow a moral 
obligation to another generation, even beyond the ahistorical assumptions of liberal justice. 
 
The question as to the apologiser’s actual guilt speaks to the ‘standing’ of the speaker – that is 
the question as to whether the apologiser is the appropriate vessel for contrition.  Certainly, in 
the interpersonal context, one can witness complex issues of standing, for example with 
parents apologising for their children or pets’ actions (Smith 2008: 52-53).  As Pettigrove 
(2003: 321) writes, in such circumstances ‘we are so closely connected with the wrongdoer 
that we are identified with one another’.  Indeed, there seems to be particular expectation of 
apology where the offender was deemed to be under one’s supervision or duty of care.  Thus, 
just as parents or managers appear (problematically) as appropriate representatives of their 
children or employees, it may be that state leaders and politicians conceive themselves 
                                                             
 
37 One may venture that in Europe many people may also be deemed as ‘victims’ of colonial and neo-
colonial projects.  Examples of this include those who have lost their lives or family members in colonial 
and neo-colonial wars.  Also, many of those settling in colonial territories were fleeing poverty or 
religious persecution in Europe.   
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(problematically) as appropriate representatives of the people.  In this sense, Gill (2000: 13) 
demands that ‘there is some relationship between the responsible actor and the apologizer 
that justifies her taking responsibility for offering an apology’.  Given that the apologiser is a 
representative of the state that committed such violations, it appears that it is this relationship 
that lends the speaker, in their view, the appropriate standing.  Moreover, as elected 
representatives of a populace (a population that is also largely not directly responsible for the 
transgression) perhaps the apology speaks on behalf of the population.  This has its own 
problematics, whereby clearly not the whole populace support the apology, and, moreover, in 
a multicultural society many may identify more closely with the colonised than the colonialists.       
 
Pointing to this disjuncture between expressing apology and the agent’s actual guilt, it is 
interesting to note, as Lakoff (2008: 203) observes, that ‘the willingness of many public officials 
to make such statements is striking compared with their reluctance to make apologies for their 
own, personal past misbehaviours’.  The archetypal example of this is Blair’s proclivity for 
contrite stances on a range of historical episodes, in contrast to his own apologia for 
contemporary warfare of his own making.  The significance of this is perhaps to remove such 
intergenerational apology from Goffman’s concept of splitting oneself into the parts that 
committed the offence and the part that renounces it.  The contemporary politician, by this 
token, is not splitting him/herself in two, because it is patently clear that it is not they that 
committed the offence.  Thus, rather than presenting an unsightly aspect of themselves, they 
are presenting an unsightly aspect of their predecessors.  This, one can suggest, is both a more 
painless process than contrition for one’s own shortcomings and, as can be seen in this thesis, 
can be politically advantageous.  In this respect, the apologies of Cameron/Blair, Michel, and 
Wieczorek-Zeul all represent a discursive turn where they not only publicly distance 
themselves from the perpetrators of the offence, but, perhaps more importantly, distance 
themselves from the previous administrations that were often handicapped by their perceived 
inflexibility towards thorny historical episodes.   
 
Just as there are complex issues of standing in regards to the speaker, there are equally 
complex issues as to the standing of the recipient of the apology.  This dilemma may succinctly 
be summarised with the question ‘to whom should we apologise?’ (Pettigrove 2003: 327). For 
instance, the contemporary Herero and Nama communities in Namibia in 2004 are not the 
direct victims of genocide in the sense that they were not alive in 1904.  Moreover, among 
those that were alive, clearly there are those that themselves collaborated with the colonialists 
and materially benefited from the colonial project.  Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly 
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intergenerational echoes as to these atrocities:  the genocide and dispossession of the Herero 
has significant consequences in terms of twenty first century landownership and 
contemporary inequality.38  Equally, the assassination of the first democratically elected 
President, followed later by decades of the Mobutu regime (that received large Western 
support) must have consequences for contemporary citizens of the DRC.  It is, to some degree, 
an exercise in teleology to ascertain exactly the intergenerational effects of such atrocity.  
Nevertheless, it seems that it is membership of the (imagined) community that appears to lend 
such populations appropriate standing as recipients of apology.       
 
The ambiguous recipient of apology 
Extending from the issue of standing:  In interpersonal apologies there is usually a clearly 
defined recipient of the apology (i.e. a partner/parent/friend etc).  In contrast, the recipient is 
not always clearly defined in state apologies and may be left vague.  For example, in 
apologising for Bloody Sunday, it is not exactly clear who the recipient is; the families of the 
bereaved, the people of Derry, the nationalist community, the people of Northern Ireland, the 
people of the island of Ireland?  Similarly, the German apology requests ‘you to forgive us our 
trespasses’ (Wieczorek-Zeul 2004).  Here, again, it is not clear exactly who this is directed at – 
whether it be descendants of the Herero and Nama, the people of Namibia or just the 
audience who were present at the speech.  This imprecision over the exact recipient of the 
apology has curious resonances in terms of responding to it.  That is, where, in interpersonal 
apologies, the recipient is clear, he or she can easily respond; either rejecting the apology or 
offering forgiveness.  In contrast, the indistinct recipient in terms of state apologies makes the 
issue of response more complex.  For instance, it is unclear who exactly can and should 
respond to the apology and whether even the closest relatives of the victims can legitimately 
offer forgiveness.  Indeed, it is likely that there may be diverse reactions among the ‘recipients’ 
of the apology, with some rejecting it and others welcoming it.  
 
This observation as to the unclear recipient of apology pertains to two issues that are 
prominent throughout the thesis:  Firstly, the indistinct nature of the ‘recipient’ makes the idea 
that apology closes the chapter of the events a virtual impossibility.  This is unlike 
interpersonal apologies where the victim may offer forgiveness and both actors may agree to 
‘draw a line under the event’ and ‘move on’.  Instead, where there are indistinct recipients of 
                                                             
 
38 See page 91 for details on 21st Century land ownership in Namibia. 
51 
 
the apology, it seems that some will not forgive and, as already discussed, many are not in a 
position to offer forgiveness.  In this sense, despite metropolitan politicians’ pleas to ‘move on’ 
and ‘close the chapter’, it seems that this is far harder than with interpersonal apologies.  
Secondly, the indistinct recipient of the state apology is in stark juxtaposition to the very 
identifiable orator.  In other words, the politician offering the apology is given a platform, 
given considerable media coverage and is widely known by name.  This is in contrast to the 
recipients of the apology of whom it is unclear exactly who they are, and, in turn, have a 
fraction of the media coverage that is experienced by the apologetic politician.  This 
observation feeds into one of the larger arguments of the thesis, whereby it is contended that 
the apologies are less about subaltern experiences, than narcissistic and self indulgent stories 
about the magnanimity of the apologising state/politician.  
 
The wider audience of state apologies 
One of the key distinguishing factors of a state apology is that they invariably speak to a far 
wider audience than that of the interpersonal variety.  Interpersonal apologies are typically 
delivered in the solitary presence of just the offended and offender.  There are, however, 
occasions when it may be appropriate to have a wider audience.  For instance, it would be 
appropriate for a boss who needlessly embarrassed a worker in front of their colleagues to 
also make the apology in front of the same audience so as to restore the worker’s lost face.  In 
extreme cases, such as Tiger Woods’ (2010) apology, the apologiser speaks to both the directly 
afflicted (the family), but also a wider audience of fans and sponsors etc.  However, beyond 
such rare cases, it is reasonable to establish that the nature of state apologies requires that the 
apology speak to a larger audience.  Indeed, governments’ immediate and extensive access to 
the media, coupled with the press’s coveting for mea culpa, entails a considerable audience.  
Illustrating this point, David Cameron’s apology for Bloody Sunday was transmitted live on a 
huge screen in Guildhall Square in Derry in front of a crowd of thousands (McClements 2010). 
 
Related to the issue of the wider audience, it is clear that in state apologies there is a 
distinction between the audience and the recipient.  Notwithstanding the examples above, in 
most cases of interpersonal apology, the recipient is the only member of the audience.  In 
contrast, the audience of state apologies is far more diverse than the direct victims and those 
assumed to be adversely affected by the transgression.  In this respect, the audience of state 
apologies entails the diverse domestic population of the apologising state and the wider 
international community.  Indeed, as continually emphasised in the empirical chapters, the 
political expediencies of mea culpa can extend to the messages conveyed to domestic 
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audiences in a more prominent way than the sentiments conveyed to those in the former 
colony.  As such, in some respects, it appears that the contrite politicians consider the 
concerns of the subaltern as of lower import than of other audience members who do not 
constitute recipients of the apology.  As is explored in the next paragraph, this entails a 
rhetorical tightrope walk by the apologising politician and his/her scriptwriters. 
 
The pre-prepared nature of state apologies   
Whereas interpersonal apologies are usually unscripted and comparatively reflexive, state 
apologies are typically pre-prepared (Lazare 2004: 40).  Such meticulous scripting serves at 
least four related points.  Firstly it enables a considered attempt to negotiate the perceived 
vested interest of the aforementioned multiple audiences.  In this way, the scriptwriters can 
pre-conceive a text that can attempt to mollify the various, sometimes competing, audiences.   
This careful scripting can, as seen in the chapters on the Belgian and British apologies, enable 
the speaker to attempt such disparate ends as pacifying and flattering the domestic military 
veterans that served in the colonial episodes, while simultaneously apologising to their victims.  
Moreover, in providing an agreeable text for the parties involved, there is a capacity for ‘co-
writing’.39  This is not to say that the text is literally co-authored by the competing parties in a 
joint writing session.  Nor is it to suggest that the competing parties hold equal sway in their 
input; clearly some groups wield larger governmental influence.  However, given that 
apologies are not ‘standalone’ texts (Yamazaki 2004: 156) and arrive after an elongated period 
of interactions, there is a sense in which the various inputs can be contemplated.    
 
Overlapping with the mindful consideration of the vested audiences, the scripted apology 
equally allows for a text to enounce a narrative of the past that has been carefully authored, 
presumably entailing multiple drafts and revisions.  In this sense, at least in terms of the actual 
apology, the projected historical narrative is not one that is improvised, but is pre-considered.  
Such a scripted narrative allows for carefully conceived caveats that enable the state to limit 
their responsibility and provide thought through accounts for their actions.  Akin to the 
potential for caveats as to the state’s moral responsibility, the scripted apology similarly 
enables the capacity for intricate legal caveats that appear to fend the state from prosecution 
or reparations.  This is most clearly illustrated in the German apology for the Herero genocide, 
where it seems that the script employs a range of grammatical and phrasing techniques to 
                                                             
 
39 Yamazaki (2004: 156) discusses apologies as forged in a process of ‘co-construction’. 
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eschew the legal demand for reparations.  Given that interpersonal apologies are less likely to 
be documented or recorded, combined with their more spontaneous nature, it is unlikely that 
such examples would have the capacity to entail such meticulous qualifications.   
 
The formal tone and staging of state apology 
Complimenting such scripting, state apologies are typically staged and delivered in a more 
formal tone and setting than their interpersonal cousins.  The interpersonal between friends, 
even at its most sombre, is not likely to be staged with the same pomp as the state apology.  
This formal staging is most clearly encapsulated by Clinton delivering his apology for the 
Tuskegee syphilis experiment40 in the White House Rose Garden because, according to a 
spokesperson, ‘it was proper and dignified to use the seat of our government and the White 
House itself as a place to render the apology....[the] White House itself is the people’s house’ 
(quoted in Harter, Stephens et al. 2000: 26-27).  Similarly, the British and Belgian apologies 
were delivered in their parliaments, while the Italian and German apologies are delivered at 
symbolic locations in Libya and Namibia respectively.  In the same vein, the state apology has a 
penchant for symbolism that is not likely to be matched by the interpersonal apology.  
Illustrative of this is Silvio Berlusconi’s bow before the son of a famous Libyan rebel leader.  
Building on the scripted apology, it seems that the carefully staged apology is one that is self-
consciously aware of its symbolic and societal import.  Moreover it further reflects the 
managed narrative and memory forming capacity of the ceremony.     
 
The deeper narrative forming capacity of state apologies 
As already discussed, all apologies - however trivial – engage in storytelling; one of their 
functions is to recount (explicitly or implicitly) a misdeed and imbue it with a socially legible 
significance.  However, a state apology has far more tools at its disposal as a narrative forming 
device than that of the interpersonal apology.  As Govier and Verwoerd (2002: 74) write, 
‘states are in powerful positions to acknowledge wrongdoing, because of their power in terms 
of issuing official statements, documents, in establishing memorials and so forth’.  Such 
narrative forming means are explored in more detail in the next chapter.  However, suffice to 
say, states have a multitude of mechanisms at their disposal for effectively enmeshing 
themselves into the multitude of competing voices that constitute historical narrative.  Beyond 
                                                             
 
40 Continuing until the 1970s, the Tuskegee syphilis experiment entailed the US Public Health Service 
intentionally leaving syphilis untreated so as to carry out clinical studies.  Not aware they had syphilis, 
the study was carried out on enrolled African Americans in Tuskegee, Alabama.   
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the apology text itself, this can be accompanied by a host of other state activities such as 
school curriculums, museums and so forth.  The archetypal example of this is the German 
state’s contrition for the Holocaust being accompanied by whole-scale changes as to the 
representation of the genocide throughout society.  
 
The frequent cross cultural/ linguistic nature of state apologies 
A further, and politically significant, differentiation between interpersonal and interstate 
apologies is the increased likelihood of cross cultural and linguistic modes of communication.  
As Trouillot (2000: 175) writes, ‘what obtains as a satisfactory expression of remorse between 
two parties involved in an automobile accident in New York may not work between two 
Caribbean peasants involved in a land feud’.  Of course, interpersonal apologies have the 
potential to be between persons of differing cultures and languages, but the likelihood of this 
is far higher in apologies between peoples of different states and distant geographies.  On the 
one hand, such diversities can lead to misunderstandings:  In their attempt to cultivate a more 
personal and genial form of apology to Korea, Japanese Emperor Akihito’s advisers drafted a 
statement using the terms  ‘kokoro’ (heart) and ‘owabi’ (apology).  As Yamazaki (2004: 161) 
shows, ‘unfortunately, the phrase ‘my heart aches’ of the first draft was translated into a 
Korean phrase commonly used in karaoke (popular singalong genre) to express one’s feelings 
when one has lost one’s lover’.  Rather than being taken as a token of sincerity, the statement 
was mocked in the Korean press and obviously did not achieve its desired goals (Yamazaki 
2004: 161). 
 
On the other hand, such ambiguities of translation can enhance the political expediencies of 
the politicians who are both delivering and receiving the mea culpa.  Following the 2001 spy 
plane crisis between the US and China,41 Debrix (2002: 215) demonstrates how ‘linguistic tricks 
are used to establish a speech act acceptable on both sides’.  In this way, the letter offered by 
the US government was translated by Chinese media in a manner that depicted a far graver 
tone of contrition than was suggested to the American audience.  This process thereby enables 
‘a semantic field in which both agents can claim victory’ (Debrix 2002: 215).  In the same vein, 
chapter 6 of this thesis demonstrates how Berlusconi presented the apology to the Italian 
                                                             
 
41 Known as the Hainan Island incident, the event entailed a collision between a US surveillance plane 
and a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea.  Following an emergency landing, Chinese authorities 
detained 24 US crew members until the US government offered a satisfactory statement regarding the 
event. 
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audience in terms of the practical implications; emphasising its implications in terms of natural 
resources and immigration.  Conversely, Gaddaffi presented the same text in terms of its 
‘historic’ significance and as Italy’s renunciation of its colonial ‘killing, destruction and 
repression’ (quoted in Sarrar 2008).  In this respect, it seems that the ambiguities of cross 
cultural and cross linguistic apologies that are frequently present in state apologies, enables a 
certain leeway in their interpretation.  As shown with these examples, such ambiguities can be 
used in advantageous ways by actors for whom the apology may be politically expedient, 
thereby either bolstering or hindering the supposed earnestness of the apology.   
 
Of course, in some respects, the above contrasts with interpersonal apologies are trades in 
generalisations.  It may be, for instance, that some interpersonal apologies are scripted, read 
aloud and delivered in a symbolic setting.  However, such a summary is designed to engage 
with the still rather under-explored nature of the state apology. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to grapple with the rather elusive, yet socially ubiquitous, 
phenomenon that is mea culpa.  In doing so, it first explored the characteristics and functions 
of apology:  While recognising that apology, almost by necessity, infuses a past event with 
regretful and negative connotations, the primary goal of this chapter has been to illustrate the 
capacity apologies have for delimiting responsibility and engaging in such activities as 
providing - to different degrees - denials, justifications and accounts.  The argument here is 
that apologies do not invariably disavow an episode, but, in contrast, may provide complex 
justifications or caveat laden endorsements of an event.  Indeed, in first analysing the 
etymological and practical proximity of accounts and apology, the chapter further pointed to 
rhetorical modes an apologiser may employ in their attempts to offer such ‘limited’ apologies.  
This analysis is to provide a conceptual starting point for enabling the wider argument of this 
thesis, which points to a contemporary narrative of colonial apologia that is intimately 
connected to the texts and surrounding discourses of the empirical case studies undertaken in 
this project.  In providing this analysis, this chapter provides a foundational point that the 
empirical chapters turn to in sustaining this argument. 
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CHAPTER 2: COLLECTIVE MEMORY, POSTCOLONIALISM AND THE 
(IN)GLORIOUS PAST 
 
Appeals to the past are among the commonest of strategies in interpretations of the 
present.  What animates such appeals is not only disagreement about what happened 
in the past and what the past was, but uncertainty about whether the past really is 
past, over and concluded, or whether it continues, albeit in different forms, perhaps.  
This problem animates all sorts of discussions – about influence, about blame and 
judgement, about present actualities and future priorities. 
 
Edward Said (1994: 3) Culture and Imperialism 
 
Introduction 
‘The legacy of colonialism’ writes Young (1990: 126), ‘is as much a problem for the West as it is 
for the scared lands in the world beyond’. Perhaps the key problem for European elites in this 
regard is that the violence, dispossession and plunder that were intrinsic to colonialism do not 
tally, indeed, contradict, their contemporary projected images as liberal, progressive, bastions 
of human rights.  While this dilemma may be rooted in past events, it is also a problem that 
traverses the present.  If the ‘West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values 
or religion […] but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence’ (Huntington 1996: 
51), then such a notion is to destabilise the discourses that sustain, legitimise, reify and 
naturalise the contemporary geographic disparities of power and wealth between the colonial 
centre and periphery.  To make this point clear:  this is simultaneously a matter of how 
European states articulate and negotiate the past - including through apologies - and how 
these discourses sustain and legitimise current geopolitical formations. 
 
Navigating these issues, the purpose of this chapter is to conceptualise and elaborate on the 
overlapping theoretical underpinnings of the thesis, namely collective memory and 
postcolonial analysis.  In drawing first on the concept of collective memory, the chapter takes 
heed of the theory’s underlying assertion that societal understandings of the past are 
intersubjectively woven through multiple representations and discursive interjections.  
Moreover, it is these representations of the past, its proponents convincingly hold, that shape 
group identity and inform particular hierarchies and complexions of power.  It is this starting 
point that can be powerfully utilised to address core issues of this thesis by tracing the 
narratives of the past as proffered through apologies and other parallel representations.   
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Moreover, the concept of collective memory serves as a device for locating the ways in which 
representations of the past are employed in contemporary elite political expediencies.   
 
The second part of the chapter turns to the contribution of postcolonial analysis in locating 
frameworks by which colonial discourse operates and textually affirms its authority.  In this 
manner, this section highlights recurring tropes and themes in colonial discourse and gears this 
analysis to sentiments offered in apologies and their accompanying texts.  Beyond offering 
analysis as to the intersection between conventional and contemporary (apologetic) colonial 
discourses, the section builds on the postcolonial assertion that colonial discourses are 
themselves replete with ambivalence, contradiction and brittleness.  By the same token, this 
section pinpoints some of the chinks, inconstancies and anxieties extant within contemporary 
elite contrite utterances. 
 
Thus, in drawing on theoretical postulations within both collective memory and 
postcolonialism, the chapter maintains that these fields are mutually complimentary to each 
other.  Indeed, one can observe an overlooked meeting point between the notions of 
collective memory and postcolonial analysis, in the sense that both domains recognise that the 
authority to narrate and mobilise the past speaks to contemporary asymmetries of power. In 
this vein, as Said’s epigraph to this chapter shows, a conceptualisation of how the past is 
narrated informs the ways in which colonial/postcolonial relations are formed.  In particular, 
the medium of apology serves as an important ritual in providing such plotlines.   
 
Delineating ‘collective memory’ 
Before proceeding to explore postcolonial analysis, the first part of the chapter unpacks the 
term ‘collective memory’.  This section is structured by initially exploring the academic 
foundations of the term as developed by Maurice Halbwachs.  The chapter subsequently 
highlights the state as a central forum in which powerful and officialised representations of the 
past are projected.  The final part of this section undertakes an exploration of the discursive 
constraints that state elites operate under in their mnemonic articulations.  In analysing these 
constraints, it is suggested that apologies operate at particular moments where elite narratives 
of the past experience contestation and rupture.  In this sense, apologies can be conceived as 
utterances that attempt to modulate, revamp and give renewed credence to dominant 
narratives of the past that have come under recent scrutiny.  Thus, in undertaking the first task 
of unpacking the intellectual foundations of ‘collective memory’ and delineating its conceptual 
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boundaries, the chapter commences by acknowledging and sparing with criticisms the concept 
has encountered.  The two central criticisms entail the ontological challenge as to whether 
remembrance may transcend the individual and, secondly, thorny questions as to the 
relationship between memory and history.  It is the former that is considered first. 
 
Memory: The individual and the group 
Memory, both at a vernacular and psychoanalytic level, is generally considered to be a faculty 
purely within the domain of the individual.  Beyond the pivotal work of Freud, such 
individualised notions were held in the philosophical work of Bergson and in Proust’s 
autobiographical writings (Connerton 1989: 1).  Memory, in this broad sense, constitutes a 
capacity by which an individual recollects and retrieves figments of the past (Bell 2006: 2).  It is 
this atomised and individualised ontology of memory that informs the principal critique of 
collective memory.  For Fentress and Wickmann, the term is ‘curiously disconnected from 
actual thought processes of any person’ (cited in Olick 1999: 334).  This critique is also 
captured in Sontag’s (2003: 85) assertion that ‘all memory is individual, unreproducable – it 
dies with each person’.  For Sontag (2003: 85-86), ‘what is called memory is not a 
remembering but a stipulating: that this is important, that this is the story about how it 
happened, with the pictures that lock the story in our minds’.  It is this common objection that 
sees collective memory as something mystical or spiritual, evoking Abraham Lincoln’s oratory 
of the ‘mystic chords of memory’ (Klein 2000: 130).  This is to represent the notion as akin, 
somehow, to the fallacy of a group mind or neurological system.  By such a light, the notion of 
a collective memory would function as ‘a modernist synonym for the bad old Romantic notions 
of the “spirit” or the “inner character” of a race or nation’ (Klein 2000: 135). 
 
In defence against this critique: in formulating the term ‘collective memory’, Maurice 
Halbwachs (1980; 1992) and subsequent scholars of collective memory are not radically 
overhauling the ontological ascendency of the individual.  For Halbwachs and his successors, 
the act of remembering does indeed take place within the individual mind.  However, while 
this psychological faculty may take place within a particular nook or cranny42 of one’s cranium, 
for him remembering was nevertheless a socially forged process.  It is the idea that memory 
                                                             
 
42 In Halbwachs’ (1992: 38) words, ‘there is no point in seeking where they [memories] are preserved in 
my brain or in some nook of my mind to which I alone have access: for they are recalled to me 
externally, and the groups of which I am a part at any time give me the means to reconstruct them’.  
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has a social dimension that adds depth to the individualised notion of memory; it is the idea, as 
Schudson (1992: 3) puts it, that ‘group, institutional and cultural recollections of the past 
shape people’s actions in the present’.  This is to demonstrate that individuals’ understandings 
of the past are framed by their social environment and by ‘interaction with other individuals 
and interaction with external signs and symbols’ (Assmann 2008: 50).  As Assmann (2008: 50) 
writes, ‘once they are verbalised in the form of a narrative or represented by a visual image, 
the individual’s memories become part of an intersubjective symbolic system and are, strictly 
speaking, no longer a purely exclusive and unalienable property’. 
 
Thus, in locating the recollection of the past as a socially framed phenomenon, it is pertinent 
to note that there is an overlap between memories of events directly experienced by the 
individual and those experienced second hand or by proxy.  For Halbwachs (1980), one of the 
peculiarities of memory is that aspects of one’s past that are experienced privately and not 
shared are typically those memories that are hardest to recollect.  Contrastingly, those that are 
experienced socially and continually evoked and communally referenced are those that are 
easiest to recapture.  In this way, Halbwachs convincingly contends that events experienced 
and relived in groups endure in a far more vivid manner than either private memories or 
where these groups have dispersed or are no longer existent.  Intriguingly, many of the past 
events that are recollected are not directly experienced in person by all group members.  As 
Assmann (2006: 222) notes, ‘in many cases we have no definite way of knowing whether 
something that we remember is an experiential memory or an episode that has been told us 
by others and has been incorporated into our fund of memories’.  Indeed, it is very possible, 
nay frequent, that one acquires memories of events that took place when the group members 
were not even alive.  These memories can be transported across time through a multiple of 
vessels, including media formats, museums, public representations and oral traditions.  In the 
same way, none of the living Herero community actually experienced the German genocide 
first-hand.  Similarly, large parts of the communities in Derry, Libya, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo did not witness the crimes for which apologies have been offered.43  
Nevertheless, it appears that, even where not experienced firsthand or autobiographically, 
these past events are seared into consciousness in important ways.  Of course, as Halbwachs 
(1980: 48) recognises, not every member of the community perceives the past in exactly the 
same way, and that ‘each memory is a viewpoint on the collective memory’, varying in both 
                                                             
 
43 This does not mean that these people have not suffered from the ramifications of this violence.  
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intensity and position.  However, while not everyone draws ‘on the same part of this common 
instrument’ (Halbwachs 1980: 48), these past events have undoubtedly become common 
reservoirs of remembrance and touchstones for group identity. 
   
 In this way, Halbwachs theorised, it is as members of groups – ‘delimited in time and space’ – 
that memories are both elicited and constituted (Halbwachs 1980: 84).  Such groups may be 
multiple and overlapping, ranging from families, friendship cliques, religious groups, 
generations, political parties, and so forth (see Coser 1992: 22).  Clearly there are different 
vessels for different types of memory; that is, the mnemonic codifiers by which friendship 
groups recollect the past is radically different from the modes by which corporations do so.  
This, perhaps, feeds into the criticism of the vagueness of the term – that collective memory 
serves as an ‘umbrella term for different formats of memory that need to be further 
distinguished, such as family memory, interactive group memory, and social political, national 
and cultural memory’ (Assmann 2008: 55).  Moreover, there are clearly different types of 
memory that neuroscientists, sociologists and anthropologists (and International Relations 
scholars) need to distinguish; while still socially framed, the ways in which one recalls how to 
ride a bike, speak a native language and carry out familiar daily functions is different to the 
way in which one recalls historical battles (Connerton 1989: 22).  In recognising the varied 
processes and typologies of memory, it should clearly be stated that this thesis focuses on the 
procedures by which states attempt, with varying degrees of success, to foster binding notions 
of historical memories upon its (and sometimes other state’s) citizens. 
 
History and memory 
While the ontological question of who remembers may be the primary critique of collective 
memory, a second area of contention regards the interrelationship between such concepts as 
‘history’, ‘historicity’ ‘the past’ and ‘memory’.  The complex relationship between memory and 
history is one that has engaged numerous writers (for example, Nora 1989; Young 1997; Klein 
2000; Cubitt 2007; Assmann 2008) and would be impossible to capture in all its depth here.  As 
Young recognises, the relationship does not necessarily stand up to the easy ‘forced  
distinction  historians  have  maintained  between  memory and history: history as that which 
happened,  memory as  that which  is remembered  of what happened’ (Young 2003: 277).   
Clearly there is a certain slippage between these concepts, and the boundaries between them 
may seem permeable.  Moreover, these porous notions are further complicated by the shifting 
use of the terms, with Assmann (2008) identifying three broad stages by which these notions 
have altered.  Before the rise of professionalised critical historicity in the 18th century, ‘history 
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and memory were not clearly distinguished’ (Assmann 2008: 57).  At this juncture, Assmann 
(2008: 57) asserts that the ‘central function of writing history was to preserve the memory of a 
dynasty’.  In this sense, history was overtly complicit in underscoring the historical legitimacy 
of the orthodox power basis of the church and state. 
 
The post renaissance rise of professionalised historians gave rise to an apparently more clear 
cut distinction between memory and history; one which, in many respects, still holds sway 
today.  This forged an environment in which the emerging group of professional historians in 
the 19th century considered ‘memories as a dubious source for the verification of historical 
facts’ (Klein 2000: 130).  It was here that a history discipline was cultivated of supposed 
scientific objectivity, dispassionate empiricism and ‘specific rules for verification and 
intersubjective argumentation’ (Assmann 2008: 59).   Despite its pretences to neutrality and 
rigorous methodologies, this has, to greater and lesser degrees, been severely compromised in 
processes of creating the conditions whereby Aimé Césaire contends that ‘the only history is 
white’ (cited in Young 1990 119).  Though clearly not every historian has been a ‘court’ or 
‘Whig’ historian, there has undoubtedly been collusion by some members of the discipline in 
terms of inscribing histories that ratify and naturalise processes of both state consolidation 
and their colonial endeavours.  In this sense, both anthropologists and historians were 
officially and tacitly enlisted in the discursive and intellectual process of juxtaposing a “people 
without history” (Wolf 1982) with an enlightened and linear-directional West.  As Fanon 
writes: 
 
The settler makes history and is conscious of making it.  And because he constantly 
refers to the history of his mother country, he clearly indicates that he himself is the 
extension of that mother country.  Thus the history which he writes is not the history 
of the country which he plunders but the history of his own nation in regard to all that 
she skims off, all that she violates and starves (cited in Young 1990 120). 
 
Notwithstanding such valid criticism, in principle, if not practice, the historian, with varying 
degrees of success, endeavours to create a body of work that is overtly free from ideology and, 
above all, seeks to comprehend past events and actions.  It is the historian’s job to grapple 
with the complexities and nuances of the past and expound it in a legible format.  At least in an 
explicit sense, it is not the job of the serious historian to engage in practices of condemning 
particular behaviours, offering apologies, or seeking to ascertain or convey civic lessons for 
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contemporary society.44  This is not to say that professional historians are absent from the 
process of mnemonic construction.  Indeed, as Weber (1946) shows, the projects that 
academics undertake are influenced by areas of interest within civil society.  Moreover, the 
relationship between historical work and memory is fluid and has the capacity to mutually 
impinge on each other; public perceptions and the findings that historians arrive at, to 
differing degrees, shape public understandings and estimations, just as history (as an academic 
discipline) increasingly incorporates individual recollections.45  Indeed, this relationship is 
shown very clearly in this thesis, where particular academic works (albeit, not necessarily by 
those who define themselves as ‘historians’) – King Leopold’s Ghosts (Hochschild 1998), The 
Assassination of Lumumba (Witte 2001), Eyewitness Bloody Sunday (Mullan and Scally 1997) – 
have played catalytic roles in creating the kind of societal introspections that help induce 
apologies.  As such, it is important to consider that all historians’ and academics’ works, 
including this one, are inescapably tinted by their own values and ideologies.  Equally, their 
work does not exist in a vacuum preserved for the ivory tower; historians’ work does spill over 
(unevenly) into public consciousness.  Nevertheless, the field of history and historicity is 
broadened by the study of memory.  Where historiography is concerned with how scholarship 
represents the past overtime, memory incorporates ‘how various versions of the past are 
communicated in society through a multiplicity of institutions and media, including school, 
government ceremonies, popular amusements, art and literature, stories told by families and 
friends, and landscape features designated as historical either by government or popular 
practice’ (Glassberg 1996: 9).  
 
While the academic study of history, however deficient and fallible, is the supposed faithful 
reconstruction of the past, ‘collective memory’, on the other hand, pertains to a far more 
emotive and utilitarian narrative of the past.  As Shudson (1992: 206) writes, ‘historians take 
up the Sisyphean struggle against their prejudices; many others who have control over the way 
the past is reconstructed have no such scruples’.  In this sense, historians are restrained by the 
methodological demands and peer oversight of their discipline in ways that are more elastic 
for others.  According to Nora’s (1989: 9) classic analysis, where history ‘calls for analysis and 
criticism’ and is comparatively ‘prosaic’, memory gives the past a kind of sanctity and shrouds 
                                                             
 
44 For a notable exception to this, see Ferguson’s (2003) Empire: The rise and demise of the British World 
Order and the lessons for global power. 
45 In recent years there has been an increasing methodological acceptance of public testimonies and 
‘memories’.  
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the past with an aura of the evangelical.  Rather than being comparatively sterile, memory 
evokes the past more flagrantly in the service of contemporary action.  Unlike historians, 
politicians, for instance, have a propensity to recall events and construct particular narratives 
in a far more overt and ideologically laden manner.  When George W. Bush refers to Pearl 
Harbour in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, this is not to offer a nuanced and multi-layered 
understanding of a past event, but to evoke an emotive memory that binds a community and 
imparts simplistic civic lessons for contemporary society.  Equally, the frequent parallels in 
elite Israeli discourse between the Holocaust and the Middle Eastern political climate in the 
build up to the 1967 Six Day was an exercise in drawing on powerful images of the past in 
fostering an expediently militaristic and under-siege mentality (Zertal 2000).  As Assmann 
(2006: 216) writes, ‘history turns into memory when it is transformed into forms of shared 
knowledge and collective identification and participation.  In such cases, “history in general” is 
reconfigured into a particular and emotionally charged version of “our history,” absorbing it as 
part of a collective identity’.  Here, then, as Nora (1989: 9) proactively contends, memory binds 
groups together, taking ‘root in the concrete, in spaces, gestures, images, and objects’. 
 
It is this idea of collective memory – that it is emotively articulated in a series of discourses and 
symbols - that is of value to this project.  It is to point to apologies as particular utterances that 
transmit ideologically laden narratives of the past that resonate in the present.  This is to say 
that the premises of collective memory can be effectively used to both illuminate and engage 
in critical analyses as to the narratives of the past that are offered through both the 
mechanisms of apologies and other parallel representations.  It is these fluctuating narratives 
and their enmeshing in processes of identity, state legitimisation and disparate political 
expediencies that are of interest here.  It is this central role of the state in mnemonic 
construction that is now explored. 
 
The state as articulator of memory 
 Thus, while memory functions in a diversity of groups, it is the nation state and its mnemonic 
efforts that are of interest to this thesis.  As Said (2000: 176) writes, ‘memory and its 
representations touch very significantly upon questions of identity, of nationalism, of power 
and authority’.  Indeed, where Anderson (1983) contemplated the nation-state as an ‘imagined 
community’, one may equally employ the term ‘mnemonic community’ (Zerubavel 1996).  It is, 
in this way, clear that states do extensively use mechanisms that are available to them – school 
curriculums, political rhetoric, national holidays, coins, public museums, statues – in forging 
particular perceptions of the past.  Moreover, the state is a forum where memories are 
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officially mediated in courts and historical tribunals, as well as in elite discourse (including 
apologies).   Such narratives serve a multitude of purposes:  They speak to group membership, 
reinforce collective identity and uphold social cohesion.  They also lend legitimacy to prevailing 
institutions and political-economic and social structures and help provide a moral code for the 
society.  Internationally, they also provide civic lessons, guidance and historical analogy (Khong 
1992) in foreign policy decisions. 
 
Given the state’s conventional ascendency as the key forum where understandings of the past 
are articulated, one can point to the preponderance of particular narrative themes that are 
propounded.  Like people and commercial organisations, ‘nations strive to make the past their 
own and remake it in a flattering light’ (Schudson 1992: 206). Concurring, Edward Said (1994: 
21) writes, ‘we are all taught to venerate our nations and admire our traditions’.  By this 
format, politicians – both democratic and authoritarian – have long recognised the political 
utility of emphasising past glories and airbrushing (sometimes literally) perceived ignoble and 
belittling events:  statues are built of heroic conquests and commemorative national holidays 
mark each anniversary.  In contrast, episodes of national shame are omitted from school text 
books and left uncommemorated and largely forgotten.  In this way, as exhibited by 
conventional colonial narratives, the state has venerated expedient and galvanising narratives 
of intrepid conquest, victory and heroism.   
 
This intimate relationship between elite representations of the past and political expediency is 
expressed most clearly by the ‘presentist’ approach to collective memory.  This presentist 
notion of collective memory emphasises an essentially top-down model of memory, whereby 
it is political elites that monopolise and purvey the selection and representation of the past in 
ways that serve their contemporary objectives.  Halbwachs, himself, is associated with this 
model, with Coser (1992: 25) writing that, for him, ‘the past is a social construction mainly, if 
not wholly, shaped by the concerns of the present’.  This is most clearly articulated in The 
Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land, where Halbwachs (1992: 192-236) 
traces the ways in which successive rulers of Jerusalem had discarded the claims of previous 
occupiers and drawn from the Holy scriptures the ‘truths’ and tenets that were most apt to 
their prevailing group interests (see Coser 1992: 27-28).  Although not referencing him, Edward 
Said builds on Halbwachs’ study through his focus on the way in which Jerusalem and its past is 
projected by the Israeli state.  He contends that the Israeli violent annexation of Jerusalem has 
been emplotted as ‘a cheerful symbol of pioneering, humane enterprise’ (Said 1995: 6).  By 
this measure, ‘Israel was thus able to project an idea of Jerusalem that contradicted  not only 
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its history but its very lived actuality, turning it from a multicultural  and multireligious city into 
an "eternally"  unified, principally Jewish city under exclusive Israeli sovereignty’ (Said 1995: 6-
7).   
 
The key academic treatise highlighting this proximate intersection between the state, 
dominant interests and memory – indeed a work that Said (1994: 15-16; 2000: 178) 
approvingly draws upon – is the book Invention of Tradition, edited by Hobsbawm and Ranger 
(1983).  In his introduction, Hobsbawm (1983) argues that traditions and customs that are 
perceived to have long standing roots are frequently invented or constructed.  These 
inventions, he argues, ‘seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition.  
Though the actual bond to the past may be largely ‘fatuous’, these traditions are ‘responses to 
novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations’ (Hobsbawm 1983: 1-2).  
Thus, elite manufacturing of traditions, according to this work, function to offer particular 
master narratives that ‘are used as a means of exercising power, to establish or legitimize 
institutions, to symbolize social cohesion and to socialize individuals to the existing order’ 
(Misztal 2003: 57).  While this thesis, in the main, sympathises with the idea that perceptions 
of the past are largely shaped by the interests of powerful actors, there is an added complexity 
at play here.  In this respect, apologies represent a certain climb down from the strident 
mnemonic master manipulators that the ‘presentist’ view would anticipate.  It is in considering 
this that the chapter now turns to examine the discursive and mnemonic constraints applied to 
political elites in their representations of the past.  
 
Dominant memory and constraints on elites 
To momentarily take stock:  thus far, the state has been located as a crucial location where 
dominant representations of the past are articulated and employed in the service of political 
expediency.  To this end, elites have a propensity for espousing aggrandising notions of the 
past that underscore galvanising triumphs, while eschewing and negating moments of 
perceived national shame.  The animating dilemma herein is that political apologies do not 
easily fit into this formula and, conversely, emphasise the very ignoble events that one might 
expect to be readied for amnesia.  Observing this dilemma, the goal here is to provide an 
analysis that conceptualises the limitations that elites experience in the proffering of memory.  
It is to follow Schudson’s (1992: 209) analysis as to highlighting ‘the incompleteness of the 
hegemonic process’ of state elites imbuing their desired past.  In emphasising the following 
constraints that state elites face, it is contended that apology operates at the intersection of 
this dilemma; that it both recognises a vulnerability within dominant narratives of the past, 
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and a project at reclaiming elite credibility.  Thus, the following passages offer an analysis of 
the processes through which, in mea culpa, elites are constrained in their articulation of 
dominant narratives.  Concurring with Schudson (1992: 208), this is not to claim dominant 
memories do not exist.  Clearly ‘dominant groups (like other groups) do try, intentionally or 
intuitively, to make their own ideas common property and common sense’ (Schudson 1992: 
209).  Rather, it is to show that they must compete and vie with alternative articulations of the 
past.  As the following points explore, political elites are constrained by contestation to their 
narratives by competing groups, an incomplete command over the past episodes selected for 
commemoration and an inability to will amnesia on ignoble events. 
 
1. Contesting and rupturing dominant narratives 
As Foucault (1979: 95) famously observed, ‘where there is power, there is resistance’.  In this 
way, the constructs articulated by powerful groups inescapably meet resistance and cannot be 
‘monolithically installed or everywhere believed in’ (Popular Memory Group 2011: 255).   
Indeed, while different groups and people have unequal access to the levers that shape 
memory, such narratives are contested and struggled over:  ‘dominant memory is produced in 
the course of these struggles and is always open to contestation’ (Popular Memory Group 
2011: 255).  To this end, Zerubavel (1995: 10) speaks of ‘counter memory’, which, like the 
postcolonial project, seeks to overturn and discredit hegemonic narratives and instil 
alternative notions of the past.  To apply this analysis to the colonial past, the narratives 
propelled by dominant state institutions and largely perpetuated by conservative historians, 
media images and so forth - claims of progress, civilisation, rationality, science and ‘white 
man’s burden’ – must inevitably be contested in the public sphere. 
 
Of course, colonialism and its associated discourses have always provoked resistance, 
ambivalence and mimicry (Bhabha 1984) (as well as collusion), be it from those who are 
themselves colonised, critical movements within the metropole or from within the military 
apparatus itself.  However, while resistance may be continuous, clearly there are particular 
geographies and temporalities where counter-narratives experience differing degrees of 
latency, prevalence and potency.  One can, for instance, point to particular periods and polities 
where there have been profound ruptures and crises to elite narratives of the day – late 18th 
century France, 1917 Russia, 1968 France, 2011 North Africa.  These, are particularly extreme 
examples and this is not to suggest that apologies arise in circumstances of such severe 
ruptures.  Nevertheless, the empirical chapters of this thesis all point to societal conditions and 
circumstances that have provoked increased discord with meta-narratives in general (progress, 
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modernity, the state, capitalism/socialism) and colonial narratives in particular.  In some 
respects, such resistance has originated exogenously to the colonising state – from demands 
by the victims (and their relatives/descendants) for reparations or renewed inquiries.  Perhaps 
more importantly,46 however, there have also been demonstrable ruptures in the narratives 
from within the colonising state itself; not only have the ‘victims’ received increased coverage 
in the metropolitan media, but so too have there been increased voices of domestic dissent, 
ranging from domestic historians, questions in parliament, civil society movements and so on.  
As Zerubavel (1995: 10) writes, at certain junctures ‘a fragile coexistence between divergent 
interpretations breaks down, and the myth can no longer contain those tensions.  At such 
points the past becomes openly contested, as rival parties engage in a conflict over its 
interpretation’.  To adopt Zerubavel’s (1996: 283) phrase, it seems that apologies arise in 
circumstances of such ‘mnemonic battles’. 
 
In other words, it seems that apologies (most obviously in the British, Belgian and German 
cases, but also in the Italian case) arise in circumstances where conventional dominant 
narratives of particular episodes are no longer credible to vast swathes of the metropole’s civil 
society:  The apologies occur where there is renewed and critical examination at such episodes 
as the Herero genocide, the Lumumba assassination and the Bloody Sunday massacre; 
contrition occurs when the orthodox official narratives of these are widely considered 
implausible.  In remarkably similar ways, the four empirical chapters of this thesis point to the 
break down or rupture of particular narratives of the past that have now become discredited.47  
It appears, then, that apologies and the prior and subsequent texts, are exercises in elite 
discursive pragmatism and dexterity; they are examples of elites enmeshing in mnemonic 
contestation and, to differing degrees, appropriating, accommodating, modulating and ceding 
to competing memories in ways that begin to reconcile official and counter memories.  
 
In this apparent ceding to competing memories, it is important to recognise that patterns of 
domination and inequality remain central.  As pointed to throughout the thesis, in articulating 
their revised narratives, clearly political elites are not making a wholesale renunciation of the 
mentalities, ideologies and hierarchies that enabled both colonialism and contemporary 
patterns of capitalist domination.  Equally, these new perceptions of the past do not point to a 
                                                             
 
46 Importantly, that is, from the perspective of this thesis. 
47 Although still perceivable, in some respects, this rupture is not so abrupt in the Italian case study.  See 
pages 166-168 for a wider discussion on this. 
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genuine egalitarianism in access to the facilities of mnemonic creation.  In this respect, it 
appears that the dominant meta-narratives of the colonising state (and the West) continue to 
be transmitted – narratives of a benign past, paternalism, rule of law, liberal conceptions of 
human-rights and so forth.  Indeed, in engaging in mea culpa for events that can no longer be 
credibly incorporated into these meta-narratives, it may be that these larger narratives might 
in fact be temporarily bolstered, albeit problematically.  In metaphorical terms, it may be 
amputating a limb to save the patient. 
 
2. Selecting the past 
It is not only the plotline over past episodes that are open to competition and mnemonic 
battles.  What is at stake is more than whether a particular event is portrayed as ‘noble’, 
‘progressive’, ‘evil’ or ‘shameful’.  At stake is also whether the event in question, for instance 
Lumumba’s assassination, the Herero genocide or Bloody Sunday, are even selected for official 
commemoration.  To develop this point: In the context of World War I, Van Wyck Brooks 
(1918) wrote an article entitled “On Creating a Usable Past”.  In this paper, Brooks elaborated 
on the necessity for the American literary scene to emphasise particular past episodes so as to 
be expedient to the necessities of the day (see also Blake 1999; Olick 2007).  In a critical rather 
than normative context, Eric Hobsbawm (1983: 1) strikes a similar chord, writing of the 
invention of ‘a suitable historic past’.48  Problematising this, it is clear that the events for which 
politicians apologise are not self-evidently ‘usable’.   As Zertal (2005: 2) writes, ‘victories and 
great achievements require neither explication nor sophisticated interpretative structures; self 
explanatory, they speak for themselves’.  In this way, states, especially hegemonic ones 
(Assmann 2006: 217), reflexively turn to episodes of conquest and perceived achievement in 
their choices for commemoration.  Conversely, it is perceptible that states also actively 
incorporate losses and defeats into their collective memory, ‘provided they are emplotted in 
the martyriological narrative of the tragic hero’ (Assmann 2006: 217).  In this vein, the British 
evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940 is recalled not as a military failure, but is evoked, as Churchill 
framed it, as a ‘miracle of deliverance, achieved by valour, by perseverance, by perfect 
discipline, by faultless service, by resource, by skill, by unconquerable fidelity’ (quoted in 
Levine 2010: 3).  Likewise, in Israeli memory, the Warsaw Ghetto resistance fighters are 
commemorated not as a scattering of a defeated, under-resourced, under trained and 
                                                             
 
48 By way of example, Hobsbawm (1983: 1-2) points to ‘the deliberate choice of a Gothic style for the 
nineteenth century rebuilding of the British parliament, and the equally deliberate decision after World 
War II to rebuild the parliamentary chamber on exactly the same basic plan as before’.  
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famished individuals, but as emblematic of a transcendent, heroic and embattled new Zionist 
spirit (see, for example, Gutman 1994; Zertal 2005).  Thus, while conquests, victories and even 
gallant defeats can be incorporated into a state’s positive self image, moral violations and guilt 
do not lend themselves so easily to such constructions.  By way of this observation, then, one 
may venture that state elites do not commemorate atrocities (and hence apologies) so much 
because they are ‘usable’ in the sense that, out of unlimited past events, it is these episodes 
that are most conducive to glorifying the state.  Rather, they seemingly turn to these events 
out of pragmatic necessity; they are contentious and ‘hot topics’ within society that the 
government is impelled to address. 
 
To clarify this point:  In his analysis of Watergate in U.S memory, Schudson (1992: 70) pointed 
to Jimmy Carter and, more interestingly, William Safire’s (Nixon’s chief speechwriter, later New 
York Times columnist) frequent evocations of the scandal in their subsequent careers.  He 
contends that Safire ‘did not randomly choose Watergate as a theme to embroider’.  Instead, 
his proximity to the President meant that he ‘surely realized that he could not escape 
identification with Nixon – and confrontation with Watergate – even if he wanted to’.  In this 
sense, Watergate became a usable mnemonic touchstone for Safire, not out of its glorifying 
capacity, but more out of unavoidable circumstance.  Applying a similar argument to colonial 
apologies, it appears that these events are not chosen by elites out of a grand plan of an 
engineered ideal past.  Conversely, they are responses to contemporary topics and 
contestations within civil society.  As demonstrated in the empirical chapters, the apologies 
arise in contexts where there is particular societal focus on these events.  In this respect, the 
usable past, at least to some extent, is not simply chosen by politicians, but also chosen for 
politicians.  Thus, while elites are still inclined to sugar coat and appropriate undesirable 
events as best they can, at certain junctures they are impelled to address thorny issues that 
they would probably rather avoid.  It is at these moments, at least in this thesis’ case studies, 
that mea culpa arises.   
 
3. The hopelessness of forgetting 
According to Milan Kundera’s (1980: 4) character Mirek, ‘the struggle of man against power is 
the struggle of memory against forgetting’.  In the opening chapter of his novel, The Book of 
Laughter and Forgetting, Kundera evokes the familiar picture of Czechoslovakian Communist 
leader Klement Gottwald standing on a balcony of a palace with his comrade Clementis.  
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Following Clemintis’ hanging for treason, ‘the Propaganda section immediately made him 
vanish from history and, of course, from all photographs’ (Kundera 1980: 3-4).49  Certainly 
democratic states have also attempted to will amnesia around certain events; they have 
blocked access to historical records, banned particular art and media representations50 and 
vilified critical historians.  Perhaps politicians are also under the illusion that apologies are a 
mechanism of forgetting, using platitudes of ‘closing chapters’, ‘coming to terms with the past’ 
and ‘moving on’.  However, just as Nietzsche’s (1983) imploration as to the human necessity of 
forgetting is, to some extent, a reminder to forget (Zehfuss 2006: 218), so too are apologetic 
politicians engaging in equally paradoxical behaviour.  In other words, the nature of apologies 
(as explored in chapter 1) demands that the agent narrate the transgression.  Therefore, rather 
than obliterating the transgression, the political apology publicly recounts and draws attention 
to the events, garnering heightened media reports and societal introspection.  This, in turn, 
has the capacity to lead to increased contestation with potentially acrimonious responses from 
conservative groups (Lind 2008) as well as new demands for redress from other groups that 
have suffered historical violations.  Indeed, as seen since the early 1990s, the process of 
apologising has become a self-perpetuating norm whereby the more it is exercised the more it 
becomes an accustomed and expected practice in diplomatic relations.  The salient point to 
this is in regards to the particular limitations that elites in democratic societies operate in:  
politicians cannot wield monopolistic control over what is remembered and denying the past 
can only hold water for so long, sometimes exacerbating the contestation.  Thus, though 
apology may temporarily sedate the past, it cannot will societal forgetting.   
 
In recognising some of the constraints that European elites face in articulating the past, one 
can accrue a more nuanced picture as to both the privileged and yet precarious hold that elites 
have in this domain.  This contested authority to narrate the past is intricately tied up in power 
dynamics in the present and is illuminated vividly in the commemorative ritual of apology.   
Indeed, this concern with the nexus of power, discourse and the past is one that is shared with 
within postcolonial studies.  Not least, the projection and struggle over the past is an issue that 
Said (1995; 2000) returns to repeatedly in several works and essentially provides the point of 
departure in the classic text Culture and Imperialism (1994: see especially 3-18).  In this way, 
                                                             
 
49 Ambivalently, Kundera intimates that not all traces of Clemintis were purged, pointing to the 
remaining hat on Gottwald’s head that Clemintis had given him just prior to the photo.  
50 As explored in the Belgian and Italian case studies, both these governments have placed obstacles to 
TV and cinematic representations that are unflattering of their colonial pasts. 
71 
 
the concept of collective memory intersects and compliments postcolonial studies’ focus on 
the intimacy between struggles over the past and enduring asymmetric contemporary 
relations.  It is bearing this in mind that the chapter now turns to explore the theoretical 
underpinnings of postcolonial studies and its analytical examination and normative critique of 
the lexicons of imperial domination.   
 
Postcolonialism and the narratives of the past 
The field of postcolonial theory is ‘far from being a unified field’ and is extraordinarily 
heterogonous (Chrisman and Williams 1993: 5).  Such heterogeneity can extend to the point 
that it seems as if, in Jacoby’s words, even ‘its enthusiasts themselves don’t know what is’ 
(quoted in Loomba 1998: xi).  While this disorientation may be a welcome aspect of a theory 
that often seeks to subvert the very premise of theory,51 it is compounded by the contrasting 
uses across multiple academic disciplines and media formats.  This resistance to a clear set of 
parameters is also indicated and perpetuated in the mushrooming of numerous, often 
conflicting, ‘introductory’ books on postcolonialism and postcolonial theory (for example, 
Childs and Williams 1997; Gandhi 1998; Ray and Schwarz 1999; Ashcroft, Griffiths et al. 2000; 
Young 2001; Forsdick and Murphy 2003; Young 2003; Innes 2007; McLeod 2007; McLeod 
2010).  Most conspicuously, a particular confusion seems to have centred upon the prefix 
‘post’.  This has raised esoteric and sometimes convoluted debates about the appropriate use 
of the prefix, and even the question of the use of the hyphen (McClintock 1992; Ashcroft 1996; 
Medovarski 2002).52  Notwithstanding these debates, it seems that it is widely accepted that 
‘post’ connotes more than merely a temporal term, to be after colonialism. This has elicited 
largely unanswered questions such as those posed by Childs and Williams (1997), asking ‘when 
is the post-colonial?’, ‘who is the post-colonial?’, ‘what is the post-colonial?’ and ‘where is the 
post-colonial’.   
 
The oft quoted and frequently criticised definition offered in the classic text The Empire writes 
back is that the term covers ‘all the culture affected by the imperial process from the moment 
of colonization to the present day’ (Ashcroft, Griffiths et al. 2002: 2).  However, alongside this 
                                                             
 
51 On this point, Young (2001: 64) writes, ‘there would be a particular irony in assuming that is possesses 
a uniform theoretical framework given that it is in part characterized by a refusal of totalizing forms’. 
52 This has led to works entitled What is Post (-) Colonialism (Mishra and Hodge 1991), On the Hyphen in 
post-colonial (Ashcroft 1996) and Unstable post(-)colonialities: Speculations through punctuation 
(Medovarski 2002).  
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definition, Ashcroft, Griffiths et al. (2002: 2) appear to recognise that there is a subverting and 
dissenting element to this whereby it is literary texts which emphasise ‘their differences from 
the assumptions of the imperial centre […] which makes them distinctively post-colonial’.  
More closely following the normative rather than geo-temporal nexus, Slemon (1991: 3) writes 
that, for him, the concept of postcolonialism is 
 
most useful not when it is used synonymously with a post-independence historical 
period in once-colonized nations,  but  rather  when  it  locates  a specifically anti-or 
post-colonial discursive purchase in culture, one  which begins in  the moment  that  
colonial power inscribes itself  onto  the body and space of  its Others  and  which  
continues  as  an  often  occulted tradition  into  the  modern  theatre  of  neo-
colonialist  international  relations. 
 
Young (2001: 58) also emphasises the normative disposition of critically engaging with 
colonialism, stating that postcolonialism ‘seeks to combat the continuing, often overt, 
operation of an imperialist system of economic, political and cultural domination’.  While this 
thesis is not about to offer its own definitive definition of postcolonialism or postcolonial 
theory, it should be noted that, for the purpose of the research parameters of this project, it 
plugs primarily into postcolonialism as both an analysis and critique of the discourses and 
representations of imperial authority.  In this sense, given that Said’s analysis of the 
representational and cultural aspects of imperialism remains ‘de rigeur’ (Ashcroft, Griffiths et 
al. 2002: 193) and, in many respects, the foundational work of postcolonial theory, it is this 
emphasis on the discursive and textual aspects of the field that also concern this thesis.  Most 
pressingly, though this project obviously has far narrower parameters than the work of Said, it 
shares with this thread of postcolonial study a desire to locate, decipher and critically 
challenge the discourses of imperial domination.  It is, as such, that the following passages first 
look at the persistent themes of colonial discourse in a broad sense, before then pointing to 
the continuities and discontinuities of these sentiments within colonial apologies.  The section 
culminates by exploring postcolonial studies’ unearthing of ambivalence, contradiction and 
frailty within the language of empire.  These contradictions are again applied to the 
vocalisation of mea culpa. 
 
On colonial discourse   
‘Imperial relations’, as Tiffin and Lawson (1994: 3) observe ‘may have been established initially 
by guns, guile and disease, but they were maintained in their interpellative phase largely by 
textuality’.  Moreover, just as inequality and Western authority did not melt away in the 
course of formal decolonization in the 1950s and 60s, neither did the lexicons of domination.  
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It is this project of comprehending these fluctuating discourses that inform both postcolonial 
analysis and, indeed, this thesis.  In terms of ‘official’ narratives of colonialism, it is pertinent to 
recognise that official discourses were not and have not been identical through space and 
time.  Clearly, legitimising tenets altered in accordance to the peculiarities of each nation’s 
projected self image, their disparate circumstances, geographies and administrative systems 
(Young 2001: 17).  In one sense, as Young (2001: 17) recognises, such heterogeneity ‘troubles 
the possibility of any general theory’ of colonial discourse.  This speaks to the question raised 
by Slemon (1994: 20) as to whether ‘discursive colonialism always look structurally the same, 
or [if] the specifics of its textual or semiotic or representational manoeuvres shift registers at 
different historical times and in different kinds of colonial encounters?’  Indeed, at diverse 
junctures, Native Americans, for instance, have been portrayed alternately as good and 
mystical characters or as party to ‘sacrifice and cannibalism’ (Tiffin and Lawson 1994: 5).  In 
this sense, like memory, colonial representations are kinetic and shift at different junctures in 
according to different circumstances.  
 
Despite such apparent representational diversity, one of the core contributions of postcolonial 
thought has been to explore and dissect the idea that ‘at a discursive, ideological level, 
colonialism also constituted a system of sorts that can be discussed, assessed and criticised – 
or could be resisted – according to general theoretical and discursive principles’ (Young 2001: 
17-18).  In this sense, as Spurr (1993: 1-2) writes, ‘colonial discourse is neither a monolithic 
system nor a finite set of texts; it may more accurately be described as the name for a series of 
colonizing discourses, each adapted to a specific historical situation, yet having in common 
certain elements with the others.’  There is, in this way, a sense that European empires, even 
in rivalry, ‘imitated each other’ (Said 1994 : 8).53  To put it in Sartre’s (2001) terms, ‘colonialism 
is a system’.  In particular, the writings of Sartre, Fanon, Spivak, Bhabha, Spurr and Said, among 
others, have been pivotal in establishing an intellectual body of work that locates systemic and 
general themes in the ideologies and vocabularies that underpin the Western led subjugation 
(Young 2001: 18). 
 
In building on this recognition, the objective here is not to outline in minute detail with fine 
nuance every aspect of colonial discourse.  Rather, the goal is to gear such an analysis towards 
the issue of apologies and their adjoined discourses.  Sitting with the wider argument of the 
                                                             
 
53 Said draws on V. G. Kiernan for this point. 
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thesis, this task is to point to particularly pertinent aspects of colonial discourses that are 
reflected and reproduced in both apologies and their parallel discursive formations.  It is to this 
end that the following taxonomy locates and critically assesses key intersections between 
these conventional and contemporary narratives. 
 
A people without history 
In Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, Marlow relates a series of observations in regards to what he 
sees as the apartness or otherworldliness of Africa.  Encountering the River Congo is ‘like 
travelling back to the earliest beginnings of the world’ (Conrad 1995: 59).  Geographically, 
Marlow depicts an alien and ‘prehistoric earth’, just as anthropologically he describes how ‘the 
prehistoric man was cursing us, praying to us, welcoming us’ (Conrad 1995: 62).54  The 
juxtaposition of a prehistoric ‘people without history’ (Wolf 1982) and a progressive, 
enlightened and historic West is a familiar trope that has straddled both Western academia 
and colonising narratives.  In Hegel’s dialectic unfolding of history, for instance, it is clear that 
it is in Europe that history is advanced, in opposition to Africa, which ‘has no history’ (cited in 
Young 1990: 2; see also Klein 1995).  Even Hegelian Marxism, the purported adversary of 
domination and enslavement, is, to some degree, complicit in this narrative, contending that 
Western imperialism accelerates the incorporation of territories into the class struggle that 
ultimately oversees its own demise (Young 1990: 2-7).  Deeply problematic claims are also 
apparent in Huntington’s (1993: 25) seemingly ambiguous opinion as to whether Africa exists 
as a civilisation on equal footing with the rest of the world55 and British historian Hugh Trevor-
Roper’s position that ‘there is only the history of Europeans in Africa.  The rest is darkness’ 
(cited in Mazrui 1977 1).  In contrast to the supposed absence of African history, the West is 
imbued with a sweeping, linear and progressive genealogy, ‘according to which ancient Greece 
begat Rome, Rome begat Christian Europe, Christian Europe begat the Renaissance, the 
Renaissance the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment political democracy and the industrial 
revolution’ (Wolf 1982: 5).  As Wolf (1982: 5) writes, such a narrative ‘turns history into a 
moral success story’ which validates the European self and underpins the monocentric 
narratives of imperialism.  It bestows the idea that ‘Europe has “agency” while the rest of the 
world is passive.  Europe makes history; the rest of the world has none until it is brought into 
                                                             
 
54  For contrasting interpretations of this, see Achebe (1978) and Hampson (1995). 
55 Huntington (1993: 25) discusses how the world is increasingly shaped by ‘seven or eight major 
civilizations.  These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin 
American and possibly African civilization’.   
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contact with Europe’ (Marks 2007: 8).  It is this binary and narcissistic conception of European 
historical exceptionalism that, along with parallel discourses, discursively legitimised colonial 
and neo-colonial projects.  
 
In one respect, there is an important disjuncture between this narrative and that proffered by 
the apologies of this thesis.  For one, as explored in the previous chapter, there is a sense in 
which apology (potentially) begins to recognise the transgressed as moral interlocutor (Smith 
2008: 65), worthy of recognition as both human beings and for their suffering.   In this respect, 
the apologies reflect a memory of a past that is comparatively more inclusive of subaltern 
perceptions – a past that begins to recognise, articulate and renounce particular experiences 
that the colonised underwent at the hands of European colonialism.  However, in important 
respects there are modes by which the Eurocentric and monocentric narratives are 
reproduced.  Firstly, though a certain narrative of the subaltern’s past is articulated, it remains 
exclusively in direct relation to the West.  In other words, the apologies, perhaps inadvertently, 
reproduce a narrative of the colonised history that both commences and is principally defined 
by its encounter with the European.  There remains, at least in this narrative, no space in 
which a past is articulated that precedes or even supersedes the encounter with Europe.  In 
line with this, the apologies replicate the monocentric plotline in rearticulating the active-
passive configuration of the colonial narrative.  This is to say that the apologies depict dynamic 
Western agents that impose their violence on to largely passive victims.  In the German 
apology text, for instance, ‘General Trotha commanded that every Herero be shot – with no 
mercy shown even to women and children’ (Wieczorek-Zeul 2004).56  Likewise in the Bloody 
Sunday apology, ‘one person who was shot while crawling away from the soldiers. Another 
was shot in all probability when he was lying mortally wounded on the ground’ (Cameron 
2010).  There is, of course, a crucial difference between this discourse and the conventional 
narrative; there is now a humble, contrite and introspective stance towards these particular 
episodes, where previously they were either denied or glorified.  However, a conspicuously 
orientalist juxtaposition remains in place:  The subaltern, according to these officialised 
narratives, now have a history, but it is one of victimhood and passivism.  The subaltern’s past 
remains defined only in relation to a powerful, active and monolithic West. 
 
                                                             
 
56 Despite this, the apology text does recognise in one passage that the Herero ‘resisted’ (Wieczorek-
Zeul 2004). 
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Ventriloquism:  The European elite speak 
This passive/active conjecture is reinforced by the format of apologies.  One of the 
peculiarities of apologies is, in important respects, they require the transgressor speaking, 
narrating and accounting for the past (see chapter 1) while the recipient listens.  In this regard, 
just as subaltern history was conventionally narrated and negated by the coloniser, so too in 
the case of apologies is the narration undertaken by Western political elites.  As already 
recognised above, this does not mean that the elites have a freehand in constructing any 
memories of the past that they so wish.  Indeed, colonial apologies both arise within and are 
constrained by counter-narratives.  As such, contrite politicians must tread carefully so as to be 
seen to incorporate aspects of subaltern sentiments.  However, even in taking into account the 
import of subaltern contestation, the apologies remain a platform by which European 
politicians articulate particular stories about colonised people’s past.  In so far as subaltern 
memories are articulated, this remains a form of ventriloquism whereby they are filtered, 
modulated and sanitised through the prism of elite discourse.  This pertains to Spivak’s (1988) 
eminent question: Can the Subaltern speak?  Of course, in a literal sense, the subaltern can 
speak and can respond to the apology - accepting it, refusing it or advancing further contesting 
memories.  However, political apologies are proffered by politicians in formal and solemn 
settings, bolstered by the trappings of officialdom and with wide-ranging media access (see 
pages 51-54).  In this sense, though the subaltern can speak, even in apologising it is the 
Western political elite whose voice, narrative and constructed memories are 
disproportionately voluble.  
 
The burdened, benevolent and paternal foreign policy 
In his poem, The White Man’s Burden, Kipling (1899) sheds light on one of the central self-
validating narratives of colonialism; that the conquest and administration of other people’s 
land is not born out of narcissistic self grandeur or resource appropriation, but constitutes a 
selfless project of bestowing European gifts of progress on ‘wild’ and ‘sullen peoples’.57  This 
supposed benevolent aim of colonialism, according to this narrative, is ‘to seek another’s profit 
/ And work another’s gain’.  It is to bring peace (‘the savage wars of peace’), infrastructure 
(‘the roads ye shall not enter, the roads ye shall not tread’) and enlightenment (‘(Ah, slowly!) 
toward the light’).  Again, it is not appropriate to say that this mythology is completely 
                                                             
 
57 Although Kipling’s poem serves as a valuable tool in capturing colonial discourse in general, it should 
be noted that this poem was addressing U.S. policy towards the Philippines. 
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replicated in contemporary discourse; clearly the apologies are examples of politicians publicly 
evoking and renouncing episodes of colonialism that are not compatible with the altruistic and 
benign narrative.  However, the empirical chapters of this thesis do point to important ways in 
which these mind-sets of paternalism and the essential rectitude of historical and present 
foreign policies are maintained.  In his apology, Cameron (2010), for instance, emphasises the 
role of British soldiers who ‘have served with such distinction in keeping the peace and 
upholding the rule of law in Northern Ireland’, while simultaneously portraying a colony that, 
in opposition to the British rule of law, was characterised by such Orientalist tropes as 
disorderly and chaotic (see chapter 5).  Likewise, in the Belgian and Italian case studies, one 
can point to adjacent rhetoric by cabinet ministers which celebrate colonial and civilisational 
contributions made by their state in the colonial enterprise.  In comparison, the German 
apology places a greater emphasis on highlighting the congeniality of its contemporary foreign 
policies, pointing to it being a ‘committed member of the United Nations, working for world-
wide peace, human rights, development and poverty reduction’, providing sustained 
assistance to the people of Africa’ and looking to help Namibia ‘tackle the challenges of 
development’ (Wieczorek-Zeul 2004).  It is thus, that, even in mea culpa, states reaffirm the 
essential righteousness of their interactions with the formerly colonised.  Indeed, these 
narratives of the burdened Western state may actually be temporarily bolstered through the 
renunciation and distancing of episodes that can no longer be incorporated into this story. 
 
Speaking about the West:  The universality of European normative thought 
As noted in chapter 1, apologies, it seems, illuminate ‘normative principles’ of social life 
(Tavuchis 1991: 4).  While Tavuchis is largely analysing apologies from an interpersonal 
perspective, one may broaden this and posit that international apologies illuminate normative 
principles of international relations.  This, in turn, begs the question as to just whose moral 
standards are being offered.  Of course, in colonial times it was clearly explicitly Western 
normative principles that discursively legitimised policy.  This is to say that it was Western 
conceptions of ‘Christianity’, ‘civilisation’, ‘progress’ and so forth that underpinned the 
imperial ideology.  By a similar token, one can suggest that the apologies are couched in 
contemporary Western normative assumptions.  To be specific, this discourse is located in 
ideological assumptions of conceptions of human rights and ‘development’.  It has already 
been noted that the German apology explicitly advocates development assistance, while the 
Italian apology advocates infrastructure projects.  In similar ways, both the British and the 
Belgian apologies are entwined in policies of metropole led peace initiatives on behalf of 
Northern Ireland and central Africa respectively.  To turn to the concept of liberalism, it is to 
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suggest that these apologies are seemingly self-conscious pronouncements of one’s liberal 
sentiments and respect for human rights.  It is, thus, that the apologies, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, are again stories more about the metropole than the colonised.  There are, of 
course, multiple audiences for the apologies and these messages function differently in 
accordance to one’s own position.   However, though the apologies involve the recounting of 
actions committed against the colonised, it seems that the apologies are principally about the 
Western state’s contemporary identity.  In this sense, in many ways the colonised remain only 
as indistinct characters who are adopted so as to impart a story that remains about Western 
identity.  
 
The political and social ramifications of enduring colonialist memories    
The explicit and tacit associated socio-political ramifications of these persisting colonial 
narratives are explored in far more detail in the empirical chapters of this thesis.  However, it 
is, at this juncture, necessary to recognise that these enduring narratives are not simply quirks 
that are academically interesting, but essentially without import to the contemporary social 
world.  Instead, as contended throughout the thesis - memory, narrative and discourse speak 
simultaneously to both the past as well as existing and future policy identities and power 
configurations. In this sense, just as patterns of inequality and subordination have outlived the 
temporal parameters of official colonial rule, so too has the grammar of colonial discourse 
(Spurr 1993: 5).  In other words, the enduring colonial narratives pertain to how Western 
states (especially their political elites) continue to construct their identity in relation to the 
formerly colonised:  It entails specific and ideologically laden constructions and civic lessons as 
to the apologising state’s contemporary normative foreign policy imperatives in relation to 
their former colonies.  Moreover, it fosters enduring ideas as to the subaltern being objects 
that necessitates Western authority and oversight.  In this way, prevailing discursive 
representations of the active-passive conjecture, the universality of Western values and the 
essential benevolence of the state’s colonial/foreign policies continue to inform, shape and 
legitimise particular impositions on the subaltern and corresponding (though problematised) 
patterns of domination.   
 
It is, for instance, perceptions of the passive and victimised ‘Third World’ that underpin 
contemporary policies of aid, ‘development’, structural adjustment and humanitarian 
intervention.  Likewise, ideas of knowledge and the universal applicability of Western ideas 
correlate with the more recent hegemonic premises of neo-liberal capitalism.  To relate this 
concretely to the empirical findings of this thesis, one can point to particular policies that are 
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conjoined with the apologies that relate to political and economic policy that reproduce the 
unequal relationship.  In the case of the Bloody Sunday apology, the text seemed to, utilising 
the memories of the victims, reaffirm a particular constitutional status quo that privileges 
devolution and Westminster sovereignty.  The German apology arose analogously with 
patterns of aid and land reform that assist in the continued asymmetry of European 
descendants’ land holdings at the expense of indigenous peoples.  The Italian apology and its 
adjoining Treaty of Friendship reproduced and enshrined aspects of both resource 
extrapolation and, without irony, Italian led ‘basic infrastructure projects’.  Equally, as shown 
in Chapter 6, the Treaty of Friendship makes provisions for racialised and securitised policies 
against North African immigrants. 
                                           
Postcolonial analysis and spaces for resistance 
In the previous section, the thesis drew upon postcolonial theory for the purpose of locating 
particular syntaxes and vocabularies of Western domination.  To this end, postcolonial theory 
provides a useful doorway to apprehending and analysing such fluctuating discourses.  
Postcolonial thought, however, supplies more than simply an analytical yardstick: it also offers 
a normative rallying cry to subverting, resisting and decentring both the discourses and 
material apparatus of imperial domination.  Like other adjacent academic fields, this educes a 
certain dilemma in regards to the meeting point between analysis and normative aspiration.  
Marxism, for instance, encounters the quandary of both highlighting the intricacies and 
supremacy of capitalist modes of production, while simultaneously aspiring to dislodge it.  
Feminism points to the endurance of patriarchy in the process of seeking to overcome it.  
Postcolonialism, too, wrestles with the problem of tracing the morphing and increasingly 
sophisticated logistics of imperialism, while simultaneously attempting to overthrow it.  In 
some quarters this has led to - perhaps unfair - criticism that Said’s (1978) depiction of 
unwavering European  Orientalist representations is too monolithic and all pervasive, thereby 
ironically reproducing the very clichés and inequities that it disparages (Behdad 1994: 11).  
Similarly, Spivak’s final assertion that the subaltern is without voice has been criticised by Parry 
(1987: 33-35) for its undue pessimism and for its failure to locate space and articulations in 
which dissent can be, and is, audible (see also McBratney 2002: 114).  Notwithstanding these 
criticisms, postcolonialism does, in Bhambra’s (2007: 15) words, work ‘to challenge dominant 
narratives and to reconfigure them to provide more adequate categories of analysis’.  In doing 
so, it seeks to critically assess, dislodge and subvert the Eurocentric assumptions, ideologies, 
mindsets and discourses that collude in the imperialist projects.  In Chakrabarty’s (2000) terms, 
it seeks to ‘provincialise’ Europe and open space for counter ideas and discourses.  
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Chakrabarty (2000), in particular, is concerned with critiquing the Eurocentric concept of linear 
time and notions of subaltern resistance as somehow ‘prepolitical’.  Such provincialising entails 
countering ideas of the ‘continued privileging of the West as the ‘marker’ of universal history’ 
(Bhambra 2007: 2).     
 
Thus, as well as providing a formidable critique of imperialism, postcolonial critique also 
provides powerful analyses as to the insubstantial and crumbling edifices of imperial discourse.  
Rather than perceiving colonial discourse and coercive subjugation as an all pervasive and 
unassailable entity, it points to the discourse’s own internal inconsistencies, fallibilities and 
contradictions.  In Sartre’s (1961) words, it is under the strain of its own weight that that 
‘Europe is taking in water everywhere’ (Sartre 2001: 84).  Such paradoxes, for instance, are 
that it must simultaneously debase ‘the colonized to exalt themselves, denying the title of 
humanity to the natives, and defining them as simply absences of qualities – animals not 
humans’, while, on the other hand, “were the colonized to disappear, so would colonization – 
with the colonizer’.  In this way, ‘the system wills simultaneously the death and the 
multiplication of its victims’ (Sartre 1974 xxvi).  In a similar vein, Homi Bhabha (1984) points to 
the subversion of what he calls ‘mimicry’; that colonial discourse implores the subaltern to 
resemble the coloniser (Christian, civilised, democratic), yet any success in this (flawed) 
premise would undermine the very basis and necessity of the West’s endeavour.  Moreover, 
where the subaltern does impersonate the coloniser, there is a sense by which this mimicry 
subverts and mocks the rigid protocols and self consciously pompous formality of the colonial 
discourse.58  Perhaps the most astute and devastating critique is that the colonial enterprise is 
destructive not only to those that it conquers, but also to the colonisers themselves; that ‘it 
binds the colonizer to the colonized’, and that the dehumanisation and alienation of the 
coloniser inescapably dehumanises and alienates the coloniser (Sartre 1974: 24). 
 
In the same way, one can point to similar paradoxes and ambivalences in the processes of 
colonial apologies.  For instance, as already suggested, the apologies are acts of political elites 
grappling to reclaim command of particular ‘memories’ of colonialism; that articulating 
negotiated, but still sanitised narratives shift the elites back into credible positions wherein 
their mnemonic constructs are once more plausible.  Yet such negotiated narratives do not 
                                                             
 
58 While clearly a classic work, Bhabha’s text is notoriously dense and indecipherable.  For a brilliant and 
lucid exposition of the idea of mimicry and mockery, see Spurr (1993: 185-7).  
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and cannot remain as new monolithic and unbending ‘memories’.  Indeed, the more the 
narratives are ceded, the more challenges they will entice and the more other aspects of the 
‘official’ narratives will be challenged.  In other words, in apologising and seemingly 
neutralising and absorbing competing memories into a new ‘official’ narrative, this process, 
paradoxically, can only initiate further contestations and subversions of the newly moderated 
colonial discourse. This is just as the very notion of politicians ‘closing chapters’ with apologies 
inadvertently invites only more peoples to demand recognition of the colonial injustices they 
suffered.  Gordon Brown (cited in Kearney 2005) may say that ‘we should move forward’ and 
that ‘the days of Britain having to apologise for its colonial history are over’, but the dynamic 
interplay between official and contending memories render the issue of how a society engages 
with its colonial past, to some degree, out of the hands of metropolitan elites.  Perhaps, 
though, the most important frailty of state apologies (at least of this thesis) relates to their 
scope.  As shown throughout the thesis, there is an impulse towards apologising for, and 
hence remembering, specific egregious acts,59 while sanitising and celebrating wider colonial 
endeavours.  Again, it seems that, in one sense, such a narrative becomes only harder to 
sustain through apologies.  This is to say that the official memorialisation of such acts as the 
Herero genocide, the Lumumba assassination and the Derry massacre, can only elicit more 
cracks, ambivalence and contestations to the already compromised edifice of colonial official 
memory. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored and developed the theoretical foundations of the thesis, namely 
collective memory and postcolonialism.  Collective memory is deployed to advance 
understanding of how apologies and their adjacent rhetoric enmesh in societal conceptions of 
the past.  It has been recognised that the ways in which groups – particularly states – 
represent the past has resonance as to contemporary power configurations and policy 
imperatives.  Given the overlap between mnemonic construction and political authority, it is 
typically assumed that powerful elites articulate heroic notions of the past that venerate and 
exalt their political community, its hierarchy and its historical foreign policy endeavours.  
However, while still recognising an intimate relationship between power and perceptions of 
the past, this chapter has sought to critique the excessively ‘top-down’ notion of collective 
memory.  Pointing to the largely ignoble and humbling process of mea culpa, this chapter has 
                                                             
 
59 The exception to this is the Italian case study.  See page 171-172 for a discussion on this. 
82 
 
postulated that apologies represent a political elite that has a compromised grasp of dominant 
historical perceptions and must negotiate and mediate with contesting memories.  Conjoined 
to this, the political elite have an incomplete monopoly over the historical episodes that it 
selects for representation, thereby requiring engagement with pasts that, at least at first sight, 
have little immediate political utility.  
 
It is collective memory’s recognition of the proximity between representations of the past and 
contemporary hierarchies of power that intersects with many of the key animating concerns of 
postcolonial study.  In this way, the second part of the chapter drew on the postcolonial 
project of locating, dissecting and critically subverting the discourses of imperial authority.  In 
highlighting some of the persistent themes of colonial discourse, one could bring into focus 
these lexicons that reappear in colonial apology.  Such enduring tropes include speaking for 
the colonised; presumptions of the active European and the passive subaltern; the essential 
benevolence of the state’s foreign endeavours and the continued universality of Western 
ideological assumptions.  It has been finally contended that such enduring sentiments, like 
conventional colonial discourse, are replete with the internal contradictions and incongruities 
that make such notions problematic to sustain. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE GERMAN APOLOGY FOR THE HERERO GENOCIDE  
 
A century ago, the oppressors – blinded by colonialist fervour – became agents of 
violence, discrimination, racism and annihilation in Germany's name. The atrocities 
committed at that time would today be termed genocide – and nowadays a General 
von Trotha would be prosecuted and convicted. We Germans accept our historical and 
moral responsibility and the guilt incurred by  Germans at that time. And so, in the 
words of the Lord's Prayer that we share, I ask you to forgive us our trespasses.60 
 
Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (2004) 
 
Introduction 
The above apology was offered by the German Minister for Development and Economic 
Cooperation at a ceremony in Omahakari commemorating the centenary of the 
commencement of the genocide of the Herero and Nama peoples within what was formerly 
known as German South-West Africa (now Namibia).  In accordance with the overall goal of 
the thesis, this chapter situates the apology within processes by which societal recollections of 
the past feed into both identity construction and the political expediency.  In line with this, 
identities and political imperatives are multiple and shift in accordance to both the given 
audience and pragmatic objectives.  As such, it is contended that the apology emerges within 
the context of a multitude of different societal contestations and political expediencies that 
exercise pressure on the Berlin government in quite disparate ways.  For instance, as is 
unravelled in this chapter, the apology was simultaneously a response to such seemingly 
incongruent factors as high profile Herero reparation claims, shifting reflections on colonialism 
within domestic German society through to contemporary international normative 
expectations. 
 
In order to make sense of these complex and multi-dimensional facets of apology, this chapter 
is divided into three sections.  Initially, the realpolitik considerations of the German 
Government are analysed; it is demonstrated that the apology must be understood as a 
political-economic measure to neutralise reparation claims against the German government 
and pursue Berlin’s interest in the welfare of German descendants within Namibia (Jamfa 
2008: 207).  The second section analyses the apology within the process of the German state 
                                                             
 
60 It should be recognised that Zimmerer (2008: 323) also uses this quote to commence his chapter 
Colonial genocide: The Herero and Nama War (1904-1908) in German Southwest Africa and its 
significance. 
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rhetorically reemphasising its normatively liberal complexion.  This is to say that - under the 
spotlight of recent contestation as to its colonial past - the mea culpa serves to discursively 
underscore the state’s aversion to gross human rights violations and genocide (although not 
colonialism in its entirety). The final section situates the apology within a slowly evolving 
narrative within domestic society in relation to German colonialism, genocide and the 
Holocaust.  It is asserted that these currents within German societal memories of the past, 
especially among the left, created an intellectual environment and public audience that was by 
2004 more receptive to and, in some quarters, even expectant of state contrition for the 
genocide of the Herero people.       
 
In line with the overall argument of the thesis, the chapter points to modes by which, even in 
apology, there is a reconfiguring of colonial-like sentiments.  In this manner, the chapter 
analyses how Wieczorek-Zeul’s attempted marginalisation of Herero reparations is tied with 
the endurance of patterns of land ownership that mirror colonial disparities.  Equally, the 
German state’s restated ‘special responsibility’ to Namibia, combined with Wieczorek-Zeul’s 
emphasis on orchestrating aspects of ‘development’ and aid to Namibia reveal a paternalistic 
aspect to the apology.  Finally, while this chapter does recognise that there has largely been a 
societal reassessment of the overt violence of the colonial past, notions of an exotic and 
romanticised Africa are still replete within German popular culture.  It is posited that this 
relates to the apology’s renunciation of the genocide, together with its continuing lack of 
reassessment in regards to the wider colonial past.     
 
Political and economic self interest 
To recall, one of the core arguments of this thesis is that apologies are frequently couched in 
self interest.  In line with this, this section of the chapter situates Germany’s apology within 
quite conventional state political and economic expediency.  This self interest manifests itself 
in two senses: Firstly - and most importantly - the apology appears to be a device that both 
rhetorically and temporally serves as an extension of the German government’s unrelenting 
political and economic stance of refusing Herero demands for reparations.  Stemming from 
this, it is secondly argued that the refusal to pay reparations, combined with the continued 
emphasis on aid - is a means to temper the threat of radical land reform within Namibia – a 
threat that, if carried out, would conflict with the German government’s continued political 
and economic affinity with the white settlers of the erstwhile colony.  Evidencing this 
argument, the following section unravels the political and economic context in which the 
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apology arose and points to the government’s perceived intentions through both a 
deconstruction of the textual apology and the quite candid accompanying discourse of 
members of the German government and its ambassadors.  Despite pointing to the economic 
self interest of the apology, it should be noted, however, that this is not a portrait of an all 
powerful German government that is oblivious to Herero demands for reparations.  Rather, it 
is a German government who is on the back-foot and must vie with competing historical 
narratives and legal challenges in an attempt to stem the tide of increasingly robust 
contestations.  
 
Apology within the context of reparation demands 
Significantly, the apology arose within the context of ongoing court proceedings whereby in 
2001 The Chief Hosea Kutako Foundation instituted a legal claim in a US court against the 
German government for $2 billion in reparations and a further $2 billion against three German 
companies for their role in the genocide (see Cooper 2007: 113).  In order to understand the 
peculiarity of these proceedings being launched by a private initiative in a US court, one must 
explore the positions of both the Namibian and German governments.   German governments 
comprising of varying political parties have consistently, before, after and during the apology, 
ruled out the possibility of reparations.  Moreover, the Namibian government on their part 
have taken a reticent and deeply ambivalent attitude to the prospect of Herero reparations.  
For instance, this position is illustrated by the following exchange in an interview with 
Namibian President Sam Nujoma: 
   
Interviewer: Herero Chief Riruako has started a court case for reparations from 
Germany, which the Berlin government rejects, What... 
Nujoma: Well, you go ask him.  You know where he is 
Interviewer:  is your point of view as a government. 
Nujoma: Ask him.  I was in Germany in June.  We had a very good meeting, the 
Chancellor and I and other representatives of the government.  There were also 
meetings of businessmen and women from Germany and Namibiah.  So, you know 
where the Herero Chief lives. 
 Interviwer: But you, as a government, from what I’ve heard and read, you reject this, 
the way he has done it. 
Nujoma: That is your interpretation.  I was in Germany in June.  So we talked to the 
Chancellor.... (quoted in Melber 2008: 262). 
 
Later in the interview: 
 
Interviewer:  Once more.  What is your position with regard to historical reparations? 
Nujoma:  We never spoke about reparations.  We talked about cooperation (quoted in 
Melber 2008: 262). 
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Not until 2006, five years after the initial claim to reparations, did the Namibian parliament 
endorse Riruako’s bid for reparations.  By this time it was clear that this bid was gaining less 
than fruitful results.  In this sense, it appears that the Namibian government has, to some 
extent, been in collusion with the German government regarding Herero reparations.  The 
Swapo led Namibian government, largely consisting of members of the Ovambo community, 
have a vested interest in continued aid for the entire Namibian state, and have no desire for 
this to be compromised by reparations for a minority people or upsetting the ‘special 
relationship’ on which German aid is built.  Without the support of the state, and acting as a 
private institute, the Chief Hosea Kutako Foundation lacked the standing to submit its case 
before the International Court of Justice in The Hague (Cooper 2007: 115). As such, the 
foundation has pursued a civil liability case under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) of 1789 
(Cooper 2007: 115), a section of the US Code that enables violations of the law of nations to be 
brought before a US court.  This statute has a background of enabling non-US citizens to seek 
redress for human rights violations through US courts (Cooper 2007: 116).  
 
In regards to this claim for reparations, in many respects, the German government’s position 
and the Namibian’s have been correlated:  The German Ambassador to Namibia, Wolfgang 
Massing, explained that: ‘it would not be justified to compensate one specific ethnic group for 
their suffering during colonial times, as this could reinforce ethnic tensions and thus 
undermine the policy of national reconciliation that we fully support’ (Melber 2011: 256). The 
Namibian government’s position at the time of the apology was virtually identical to this 
(Jamfa 2008: 208).61  Indeed, in a letter to a Namibian newspaper published just five days after 
the apology, Massing underscored this position, asserting that ‘for the German Government, 
the Government of Namibia is the only partner for any negotiations with regard to 
development assistance’ (Massing 2004).  This rhetorical stance perfectly illustrates the 
parameters in which the German government operates; despite Wieczorek-Zeul’s (2004) 
commitment in her apology to ‘listen’ to the Herero, this does not include a dialogue 
concerning reparations.  In this sense, the demand for reparations is hamstrung: The German 
government refuses to negotiate with any partner other than the Namibian government; the 
                                                             
 
61 In June 2007, joining Kuaima Riruako on a trip to Berlin, Namibian ambassador to Germany, Peter 
Katjavivi, maintained that ‘because of Namibia’s colonial history, the genocide is a matter that affects 
everybody and touches all the Namibian people’.  Moreover, ‘it was the duty of the Namibian 
government to help facilitate a process that contributes to reconciliation and harmony firstly among the 
Namibians themselves, and secondly with its partners in the Federal Republic of Germany’ (cited in 
Kössler 2007).   
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Namibian government itself is content with the status quo of aid without reparations.  
Moreover, this pertains to one of the central themes of the thesis, whereby the European 
orator of the apology has disproportionate voice and sets the parameters for discussion 
through the apology.  In this way, the Herero community’s voice is, to some degree, negated in 
the process of apology and the parameters of debate (the marginalisation of reparation claims) 
are established by state elites with minimal consultation of the apparent recipient of the 
apology. 
 
Considering this, it is therefore essential to understand this apology as arising within the 
context of the aforementioned court case.  In one respect it may seem odd to argue that the 
apology was part of a process of neutralising the Herero claim to reparations.  There is, as one 
can observe in other cases, an entanglement between political apologies and reparations.  This 
is evident in such cases as US Presidential apologies to interned Japanese Americans in World 
War II and Germany’s apology to Israel, both of which were accompanied with reparations.  
Indeed, it is clear that the Herero community explicitly linked an apology to reparations, as 
evidenced by such Namibian newspaper headlines as ‘Hereros insist: apology must come with 
Compensation’ (Kuteeue 2004a) and ‘No apology, no payout for Herero’ (Kuteeue 2004b).  Not 
only did German officials repeatedly refuse to discuss reparations, but it is clear that they 
made a conscious effort both before and after the apology to delink contrition from 
reparations.  For instance, in October 2003 Foreign Minister Joseph Fischer candidly indicated 
the government’s intentions, saying ‘there will be no apology with relevance for 
compensation’ (quoted in Kössler 2006).  Likewise, Wieczorek-Zeul herself just three months 
after the apology affirmed that, rather than having any legal import, it was meant in a ‘biblical 
sense’ (Jamfa 2008: 211). 
 
Given that the Herero themselves, like other subjugated groups, utilised the rhetoric of 
apology demands as a conduit to reparations, there is a sense that, by offering an apology and 
explicitly delinking it from reparations, the German government could partially negate the 
Herero claim.  By steeping the apology within grammar and language that was legally savvy 
(explored below) and by making it clear that reparations were not within the parameters of 
discussion, the German government could disarm part of the Herero’s claim.  This is to say 
that, by offering the apology and appearing to at least rhetorically recognise the injustice and 
restore honour to the victims, the Herero claim to reparations was subsequently left to appear 
as merely a financial claim.  This would, at least from a certain point of view, render the Herero 
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claim to reparations as a nakedly opportunistic financial incentive, rather than a movement for 
historical justice. 
 
Deconstructing the apology text: A savvy evasion of legal responsibility 
On top of the candid disassociation of apology from reparations, it is clear from the content of 
the apology that the claim to reparations was upmost in the mind of the German government.  
This is revealed by the careful legal caveats, grammar and phrasing of the apologising speech.  
As such, in order to demonstrate how the apology carefully evades legal accountability, the 
following section undertakes a deconstruction of this text. 
   
As noted in chapter 1, it is common for formal apologies to explicitly detail the transgressions 
that occurred.  In this case, at least according to the official text of the German Embassy62, 
Wieczorek-Zeul (2004) recognises that ‘the atrocities committed at that time would today be 
termed genocide’.  Significantly, the use of the English second conditional gives a hypothetical 
quality to the sentence; by way of example, ‘if I were a millionaire I would buy a Ferrari’.  As 
such, Wieczorek-Zeul refrained from explicitly labelling the atrocities genocide by attaching the 
temporal hypothetical caveat of it happening today.  Such a conditional has particular legal 
implication, given that genocidal wars against indigenous peoples waged before 1948 are 
understood by most legal scholars not to have violated international law as they occurred 
before the UN Convention on the prevention and punishment of genocide (Anderson 2005: 
1155).63  Consequently, by activating the conditional, Wieczorek-Zeul could recognise the 
crime, while succinctly disconnecting it from contemporary legal accountability (cf. Jamfa 
2008; Romanowsky 2009).  Indeed, this legal position is reinforced by former German 
president, Roman Herzog, himself claiming in 1998 that the Herero had not been covered by 
International Law at the time of the genocide (Jamfa 2008: 203).  It is, however, interesting 
that video footage of the apology reveals a slightly different nuance to the Embassy’s official 
text.  The BBC footage reveals the statement that ‘the atrocities, the murders, the crimes 
committed at that time are today termed genocide’ (Olusoga 2005).  This would suggest that 
this shift to the second conditional has been carefully edited for the official text of the 
Embassy. 
                                                             
 
62 In fact, video footage shows that she said ‘the atrocities, the murders, the crimes committed at that 
time are today termed genocide’ (see Olusoga 2005). 
63 Despite this, Jeremy Sarkin (2009) convincingly argues that International law at that time does provide 
a basis for legal action. 
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In addition, when recounting the transgressions, Wieczorek-Zeul used extraordinarily vague 
language and made repeated use of the ‘passive voice’ (cf. Romanowsky 2009).  The passive 
voice is a useful grammatical device when the agent that undertook the verb is unknown, 
unimportant or purposefully excluded.  For instance, ‘the window has been broken’ is a phrase 
that excludes the agent (and by extension the agent’s responsibility), unlike the active voice – 
‘I broke the window’.  An analysis of Wieczorek-Zeul’s speech reveals an extensive use of this 
grammatical device.  For instance, she declared that ‘the survivors were forced into the 
Omaheke desert’, ‘they were denied any access to water resources and were left to die of 
thirst and starvation’, ‘the surviving Herero, Nama and Damara were interned in camps and 
put to forced labour’ (Wieczorek-Zeul 2004).  This use of the passive voice evades directly 
linking these crimes to the direct strategy of the highest echelons of the German state.  
 
In areas where Wieczorek-Zeul utilised the more common active sentence structure, there are 
several mechanisms by which she, at least grammatically, divorced the atrocities from the 
direct orders of the state.  One such mechanism was to propel Von Trotha as the architect of 
the genocide:  ‘General von Trotha’s troops embarked on a war of extermination against them 
[the Herero] and the Nama’, and ‘General Trotha commanded that every Herero be shot’ 
(Wieczorek-Zeul 2004).  Undoubtedly, these statements have historical veracity and there is 
extensive evidence that documents Von Trotha’s role as a key agent in the genocide.  
However, excessive focus on Von Trotha as the sole agent ignores the wider structural forces 
that propelled the genocide.  It is to ignore the German state’s direct role in instigating 
colonialism – a process that by its nature entails the violent dispossession of ‘other’ peoples.  It 
is also to ignore the German state’s strategic goals in relation to the Herero and Nama peoples 
as well as Von Trotha’s accountability to the German state and his appointment by Kaiser 
Wilhelm II.  Moreover, it is to ignore the fact that the concentration camps continued to 
function for several years after  Von Trotha left the region in November 1905 (Olusoga and 
Erichsen 2011: 359).  Indeed, though the concentration camps are estimated to have killed as 
many people as the initial two months following Von Trotha’s extermination order, Wieczorek-
Zeul did not mention them in her apology at all (Olusoga and Erichsen 2011: 359-360).  As 
Wieczorek-Zeul (2004) said in her speech, ‘nowadays a General Von Trotha would be 
prosecuted’ – this is true, but undoubtedly so too would numerous others, including the 
highest governmental officials (cf. Romanowsky 2009). 
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There are two passages in the text where Wiczorek-Zeul (2004) does more directly allude to 
Germany’s role:  ‘I want to acknowledge the violence inflicted by the German colonial powers 
on your ancestors’.  Again, later:  ‘the German colonial powers drove the people from their 
land’.  However, if one is to situate this sentence within the wider text, then it is possible to 
discern an apparent difference between the actions of the colonial power and the actions of 
Von Trotha.  As such, this wider passage reads that ‘the German colonial powers drove the 
people from their land.  When the Herero, when your ancestors resisted, General von Trotha’s 
troops embarked on a war of extermination’ (Wieczorek-Zeul 2004).  In other words, Wiczorek-
Zeul concedes that the German colonial powers carried out violence and forced dispossession, 
but it was Geneal von Trotha who carried out the genocide – a crime that is obviously more 
legally explosive.  Again, this is an aspect of reducing the responsibility of the genocide to the 
sole agent of von Trotha. 
 
Similarly, another passage where Wiczorek-Zeul evokes the role of Germany is in her 
statement that ‘A century ago, the oppressors - blinded by colonialist fervour – became agents 
of violence, discrimination, racism and annihilation in Germany’s name’.  The caveat ‘in  
Germany’s name’ is distinct from under the German state’s orders – it creates an ambiguity in 
which the active role of the German state in the genocide is distorted, and the German state 
becomes only a banner under which the colonialists fought, rather than a legally accountable 
entity that was instrumental in the genocide.  Finally, Wiczorek-Zeul requested forgiveness ‘in 
the name of our common father’.  Indeed, Wieczorek-Zuel reaffirmed just three months later 
that the apology was requested ‘in the biblical sense’.  As Jamfa (2008: 211) interprets, ‘such 
an apology is not meant to have any legal import.  Probably, the minister presented the 
“apology” in the name of our “common father” in order to avoid words or expressions which 
could serve as a legal basis for financial reparations’. 
 
The political economy of apology 
Pointing, then, to the ways in which the apology employs legally savvy phrases and grammar, 
one might infer that there are hard-headed political economic reasons that sit at the heart of 
the apology.  Certainly, as all German governments have continually pointed out, the Federal 
Republic is a ‘generous’ giver of aid to Namibia.  However, the semantic differences between 
‘aid’ and ‘reparations’ are not trivial hair-splitting.  Most importantly, there are considerable 
economic disparities between the two:  The Chief Riruako Foundation’s claim for $4 billion in 
reparations dwarfs the $500 million in German aid paid between 1990 and 2004 (Deutsche 
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Welle 2004).  In this sense, one may perceive that Germany’s aid is a calculated preference to 
the more costly reparations.  
 
Perhaps of equal importance, however, are the political leverages attached to ‘aid’.  In contrast 
to reparations, which are morally or legally obliged on the terms of the victims, ‘aid’ has 
generous or philanthropic overtones.  In this sense, unlike reparations, aid is at the behest of 
the benefactor and can be overtly or implicitly based upon certain conditionals on behalf of 
the recipient.  Indeed, seemingly one of the core concerns for the German government has 
been the aversion of radical land reform, as seen under Mugabe in neighbouring Zimbabwe.  
Concurring with this, Jamfa (2008: 207) writes that ‘Berlin is preoccupied with land reform in 
Namibia, since it directly concerns German interest in protecting Namibian citizens of German 
descent’ (indeed, Chancellor Kohl commenced a speech on a visit to Namibia in 1995 by 
exclaiming “my dear fellow countrymen”64 (Melber 2006)).  This concern is underscored in the 
text of the apology, with Wieczorek-Zeul (2004) reaffirming ‘in particular’, the German state’s 
‘assistance for the necessary process of land reform’.  When directly asked if such assistance 
pertained to concerns over white ownership of farm land being expropriated by the Namibian 
government, Wieczorek-Zeul replied that she expected that reform would ‘proceed in line with 
the Namibian constitution and relevant laws’ (Integrated Regional Information Networks 
2004).  Here, then, one can glean a further expediency to Germany’s refusal to pay 
reparations, even beyond crude cost-benefit calculations to the cost of aid.  Aid, in contrast to 
reparations, can be given on German terms.  It enables a continued wielding of influence 
within Namibia, and can provide implicit leverage over matters of the German government’s 
concern.  In this case, the focus of aid on land reform assists in continuing to shape land 
ownership patterns that mirror the complexions that were forged through the violent 
dispossessions of colonialism.  To return to the core argument of the thesis: this is not to say 
that Germany’s contemporary policies on land reform are identical to the violent dispossession 
of indigenous peoples in the colonial period.  However, these policies do serve, at least in part, 
to uphold a contemporary land ownership complexion in Namibia, whereby in 2010 6,123 out 
of 6,292 farms are currently owned by white people, amounting to approximately 95% of the 
commercial farming sector (Mufune 2010: 19).  Obviously a significant aspect of this enduring 
inequality derives from the dispossessions of the colonial period. 
                                                             
 
64 Melber (2006) further shows the German government’s concern for the ‘German’ community in 
Namibia, by referring to President Herzog’s criticism in 1998 of Namibian policies that had a perceived 
negative impact on the status of the German language in the country.  
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Memory and reparations: The expediency and fragility of apology 
Thus far, this section has situated the German apology within the economic context of Herero 
legal demands for reparations and Germany’s ongoing self interest in withstanding such 
claims.  As such, an analysis of the apology suggests that the structure, grammar and content 
of the text demonstrate a concerted manoeuvre to negate or neutralise these claims to 
reparations.  This observation, then, sits with the wider argument of the thesis that mea culpa 
is utilised in the service of governmental expediency.  However, again pertaining to the thesis’ 
central contention, this is not to display the German government as an all pervasive and 
monolithically powerful actor that, through apology, can unquestionably bend policy outcomes 
to meet its strategic goals.  Indeed, the very fact that the German government apologised is 
testimony to the metropolitan power now shaping its discourse in accordance to subaltern 
contestation, primarily in the form of Riruako’s court proceedings.  Moreover, it should be 
noted that Wieczorek-Zeul and her script writers’ carefully constructed caveats and 
conditionals do not amount to an all commanding and unassailable position.  In this respect, 
even in refusing to pay reparations, the apology actually moves the German government’s 
position closer to some of the central claims of the Herero’s case – that the events amount to 
genocide and that the crimes are ‘rightly’ worthy of prosecution.65  Thus, one can observe a 
central contention of the thesis; in order to maintain the credibility of ‘official’ narratives (and, 
in this case, legal positions), governments, in apology, make concessions and cede ground to 
competing historical perceptions.  While the apology text contains certain caveats that seem 
to temporarily hamstring the demand for reparations, it is not clear whether such manoeuvres 
necessarily indefinitely temper Herero claims.  Indeed, it seems that they cause increased 
contestation, whereby there are further claims to reparations, for instance subsequent claims 
to restitution for violence committed against the Damara and San communities (see Kössler 
2007).  In this sense, the apology does reflect a metropolitan government that has seen a 
destabilisation of its entrenched position and had to enmesh and wrangle with subaltern 
contestations, ultimately leading the metropole to modulate its constructed discourse.   
 
                                                             
 
65 To recall, Wieczorek-Zeul claimed that ‘nowadays a General von Trotha would be prosecuted and 
convicted’.  Although not appearing in the official text of the German Embassy, in the BBC footage, she 
is seen adding the phrase ‘and rightly so’ (Olusoga 2005). 
93 
 
So as to further compound this line of argument, it is necessary to turn the reader’s attention 
back to observations on collective memory in chapter 2.  Here it was suggested that politicians 
frequently cannot select memories of their choosing, but must instead contend with episodes 
that are of contemporary societal salience.  As considered previously, politicians have a 
propensity for seeking out pasts that self evidently enunciate flattering aspects of national 
character, such as innovation, bravery and so forth.  To this end, clearly the genocide of the 
Herero is not an aspect of German history that Wieczorek-Zeul or other politicians are 
reflexively inclined towards.  Conversely, Wieczorek-Zeul did not recollect the genocide 
because of its self evident political or economic expediency, but rather because of its position 
in contemporary contestation.  To clarify this point, it seem that Wieczorek-Zeul’s apology was 
not born out of a pre-emptive brick wall to reparations, but rather constitutes a reaction to the 
Herero legal contestation.  Here, then, one makes a curious observation; that the apology both 
reaffirms particular modes of domination (resistance to reparations/resistance to land reform), 
while also bespeaking a government that is not sure footed in its position and must enter into 
these uneasy and contrite discursive exchanges. 
 
Apology and contemporary identity:  Reinforcing the state’s liberal and 
benign complexion 
As explored in more detail later in the chapter, there are certainly relics within the Federal 
Republic that continue to celebrate German colonialism.  For instance, there remain road 
names, statues and monuments that, as yet, have not been replaced or removed.  However, 
unlike the other case studies of this thesis, there is a discernible absence of mainstream 
political discourse that consciously actively glorifies colonialism.  Though the German state 
certainly seems to minimise or trivialise the colonial past, where Belgian, British and Italian 
politicians still have a propensity for occasional moments of exaltation, it appears that this 
largely does not exist outside of fringe right wing circles in Germany.66  In contrast to the other 
case studies that reveal an inclination to the glorification of the past, the German case study 
speaks to a political discourse that is far more strident and assertive in terms of parading its 
contemporary liberal identity67 and its current ‘progressive’ role in Africa.  In this way, this 
                                                             
 
66 Despite the general absence of this political rhetoric, there remain clichéd and orientalist 
representations of Africa in the mediums of literature, film and documentaries.  See pages 101-102 for a 
wider discussion on this.   
67 While all the case studies show politicians parading their state’s contemporary liberal identity, it 
seems that this impulse is magnified in the Germany case study. 
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section positions the German apology within processes of affirming a particular contemporary 
identity.  Speaking to both domestic and international audiences, it is contended that the 
apology underscored contemporary socialised normative international expectations of human 
rights through renouncing racist and genocidal violence, while emphasising contemporary 
liberal characteristics.  As such, the apology meets the evolving custom and international 
expectation of formally commemorating and, where appropriate, apologising on significant 
anniversaries of mass conflict.  Finally, there is the expectation of rebuilding and rhetorically 
solidifying relationships with erstwhile colonies. 
  
Renouncing ‘excessive’ violence 
As discussed in chapter 1, apologies serve a variety of ends beyond the simple consolation of 
victims:  They openly condemn the transgression and thereby publicly reinforce and 
strengthen the rule or norm that prohibits it (Bilder 2008: 24-25).  Moreover, they assist in 
creating the transgressor’s image anew, disavowing the offending deed and fostering an image 
in opposition to the action.  More specifically, this pertains to two issues in relation to 
apologies/apologia that have been explored in chapter 1:  Firstly, to recall, Gofmann (1971: 
113) postulated that ‘an apology is a gesture through which an individual splits himself into 
two parts, the part that is guilty of an offense and the part that disassociates itself from the 
delict and affirms a belief in the offended rule’.  In this way, it seems that the recollection of 
the event is transformed, through apology, into an act of disavowing genocide and reaffirming 
Germany’s concurrence with the international community’s normative aversion to genocidal 
violence.  Indeed, as explored in more detail later in the chapter, this is particularly significant 
owing to the Federal Republic’s ideological liberal constitution in opposition to the fascist and 
genocidal Third Reich. 
 
In a similar vein, this secondly relates to Ware and Linkugel’s (1973) concept of bolstering – the 
idea that, in apologia, the speaker frequently attempts to align themselves with ‘something 
viewed favourably by the audience’.  For instance, in the speech to the audience at Okakarara, 
Wieczorek-Zeul (2004) pointedly affirmed that Germany is now ‘multicultural’, has achieved 
peaceful reunification, is a member of an enlarged European Union, is ‘a committed member 
of the United Nations, working for world-wide peace, human rights, development and poverty 
reduction’ as well as providing ‘sustained assistance to the people of Africa’ and supporting the 
NEPAD initiative.  Much of this exhaustive list has little relevance to the descendants of the 
victims (Romanowsky 2009), instead appealing to an international audience.  In this way, this 
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rhetoric can be couched within a discursive reaffirmation of Germany and the Social 
Democrat’s commitments to accepted normative liberal processes. 
 
The apology’s rhetorical exposition of the Federal Republic’s liberal normative complexion 
relates to the central of argument of the thesis in important ways:  In particular, the apology 
reflects a curious ambivalence to the wider colonial past, as well as conspicuous 
reconfiguration of particular Eurocentric ideological mindsets.  In terms of the ambivalence to 
the colonial past, it is clear that the apology is for the genocide, rather than the wider colonial 
process.  As such, like the Belgian and British case studies, the German apology amounts to an 
expression of mea culpa for just one particularly egregious episode, while neglecting the 
broader context in which this transgression arose.  That is, beyond Wieczorek-Zeul’s vague 
allusion to ‘colonialist fervour’, the genocide is scripted as a particular outcome of a renegade 
general (Von Trotha), rather than an outcome of a wider process of racism, imperial fantasy, 
displacement and settler violence.  
 
In this manner, the apology affirms the democratic West’s potent aversion to genocide, while 
reproducing its more anaemic stance on Europe’s colonial past.  This observation may, in part, 
account for the incongruity of the Federal Republic’s disavowal of the Herero genocide, while 
not offering introspection as to – for instance – the crushing of the Maji-Maji rebellion; a 
conflict that led to far more deaths than in South West Africa, despite not normally being 
termed genocide.  It is this lack of introspection into this broader colonial past that implicitly 
establishes the more mundane practices of colonial domination as not worthy of renunciation.  
Here, then, one can highlight one of the peculiarities or ambivalences of the liberal reproach of 
the past; that it may call attention to the worst excesses of the state’s violence, yet does not 
repudiate the central mentalities that sustained the colonial projects.  
 
By a similar token, the rhetorical affirmation of Germany’s liberal and developmental stances 
bespeaks a form of ideological complacency that privileges Eurocentric normative mindsets.  It 
is to underscore Germany’s ideological configuration as a universal good that is to be 
appreciated by both the Namibian and international audiences.  Of course, in one way, this 
liberal normative turn does represent a shift from the mindsets of colonialism; it does not bear 
the same overt racial prejudices or stringent hierarchical overtones.  However, the flaunting of 
Germany’s contemporary ideological complexion that is replete in Wieczorek-Zeul’s speech 
does represent a certain swagger in terms of affirming a superior form of contemporary 
German governance.  Indeed, in this sense, the German apology, though ostensibly for atrocity 
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committed against colonised peoples, becomes a text that dwells heavily on celebrating the 
features of contemporary Germany.   This is also evident within the developmental discourse 
of Wieczorek-Zeul (2004) underscoring Germany’s ‘sustained assistance to the people of 
Africa’ and the aforementioned commitment to Namibian land reform.  It is this accentuation 
of Germany’s current ‘benign’ policy that indicates a certain paternalism and sense of 
righteousness that is, through the apology’s process of ‘boosting’, highlighted in a speech 
about genocide.  This sense of unilateral paternalism was most vividly illustrated in May 2005 
when, subsequent to the apology, Wieczorek-Zeul announced, without consultation, the 
initiative to set aside $25 million over the next 10 years for development as a ‘process of 
reconciliation’ (quoted in Hintze 2005).  This benevolence did not win favour with the 
Ovaherero Genocide Committee and Marco Hausiku, the Namibian Foreign Minister, to 
Wieczorek-Zeul’s surprise, stated that ‘the Namibian government first had to consult those 
affected before signing’ (quoted in Sarkin 2009: 136-7).  It is such interactions that enable one 
to observe a paternal relationship whereby, with comparatively little consideration for 
Namibian concerns, both the apology and the aid are constituted by Germany as supposedly 
benevolent gestures.  In this sense, the Namibians and the colonial violence inflicted appear as 
a backdrop to stories about a transcendent Germany that is both liberal in its political 
complexion and generous in its developmental practice. 
 
The normalisation of relations with Namibia 
To recall, political apologies do not happen in a vacuum; they are often a culmination of a 
myriad of rhetorical interchanges, water testing and confidence building.  Moreover, there is a 
kind of implicit negotiation of the apology among a plurality of actors, including both the 
recipient and the apologiser, whereby perceptions and understandings of the past are 
exchanged, contested and forged, albeit within the confines of an unequal relationship of 
power.  To this end, Kössler (2007: 2) writes that dialogue between Namibia and Germany 
functioned ‘as sounding boards, throwing back and forth impulses and themes’.  In agreement 
with Kössler, it is clear that one can situate the apology within a spectrum of increasingly 
friendly exchanges that were part of a process of building bridges and normalising relations 
with post-Independence Namibia.  On its independence in 1990, owing to its ideological 
position and perhaps as a slight to the Federal Republic, Namibia’s ruling SWAPO party entered 
into what one East German minister described as a ‘love match’ with the GDR (cited in Melber 
2008: 264).  Indeed, it is not coincidental that shortly before the GDR’s demise, the world’s last 
East German Embassy was opened in Namibia on 21st March 1990 (Melber 2008: 264). 
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 On its part, the Federal Republic was faced with a far more uncomfortable relationship with its 
erstwhile colony, the first West German ambassador candidly conceding that it would be 
mistaken to expect ‘a relationship that was particularly friendly or noted for its warmth’ 
(quoted in in Melber 2008: 264).  Nevertheless, on 15th March as Namibia approached 
independence, the Bundestag passed a resolution that recognised Germany’s ‘special 
responsibility’ to Namibia (Melber 2008: 265); a highly euphemistic phrase, that along with 
‘special relationship’, is frequently used by German officials and pertains to the 
aforementioned enduring paternalistic mindsets.  This rhetorical commitment to the special 
responsibility was reinforced, despite some setbacks, by quite considerable diplomatic 
exchanges between the two states - with 120 official delegations travelling from Germany to 
Namibia between May 1991 and April 1992 (Melber 2008: 265).  In 1995 Helmut Kohl became 
the first Chancellor to visit Namibia, yet refused to meet a delegation of Herero elites and did 
not utter a single word concerning the genocide (Jamfa 2008: 202).  In 1998 German president 
Roman Herzog recognised unspecified German crimes, but contended that ‘too much time has 
passed for a formal apology to the Hereros make sense’ (Jamfa 2008: 203).  Not directly 
referring to Namibia or the Herero genocide, after the 2001 Conference Against Racism in 
Durban, Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, recognised the necessity for Germany to accept 
guilt and responsibility for its participation in colonialism (Schäfer-Wünsche 2005: 195).  In 
2004, shortly before the apology, the German ambassador to Namibia, Wolfgang Massing, 
placed a wreath at the grave of Chief Samual Maharero - a symbolic gesture that publicly 
distances the German government from the conventional narrative that the Herero-German 
war was caused by Mahareo’s warmongering, thereby suggesting that the German reprisal was 
in some way proportional (Kustaa 2004: 1-2).  While refusing to pay reparations, the German 
ambassador to Botswana expressed deep regret for ‘this unfortunate past’ just one month 
before the apology (BBC 2004).  The point of illustrating these chequered and, at times, 
blundering German overtures is to demonstrate that Wieczorek-Zeul’s apology did not appear 
out of thin air.  Rather, it was elicited within the context of a series of exchanges in which - like 
other states’ relations in terms of their former colonies - the Federal Republic’s intent of 
enhancing relations with its former colony slowly gained momentum from the point of 
Namibia’s independence. 
                
The apology within German colonial and Holocaust narratives 
George:  [Referring to the start of the First World War] The war started because of the 
vile Hun and his villainous empire building. 
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Blackadder: George, the British Empire at present covers a quarter of the globe, while 
the German Empire consists of a small sausage factory in Tanganyika.  I hardly think 
we can be entirely absolved from blame on the imperialist front (Boden 1989). 
 
In many ways, Blackadder’s retort in the eponymous BBC comedy succinctly encapsulates both 
the European and domestic conventional memory of the German empire; it was short lived, 
small and of negligible historical importance, certainly in comparison to the British, 
Portuguese, Dutch and Spanish empires (see, for example Lewis Gann’s (1987) chapter 
‘Marginal Colonialism: The German case’).  This narrative of Germany’s marginal empire has 
been reinforced by historians and politicians, and not simply those on the radical right-wing of 
German politics.  Indeed, in 2001 Hans Christian Stobele, a Green Bundestag deputy, stated 
that ‘Germany has been driven out of colonialism early on, ... Germany can now act in an 
unencumbered way and take on the role of Avantgarde in Africa’ (quoted in Kössler 2006).  Of 
course, historical memories and narratives of the past are not stable and are prone to adaption 
and partial manipulation in accordance to the socio-political forces of the day.  Moreover, as 
explored in chapter 2, historical narratives are competing, multiple and open to dissent.  
Nevertheless, by analysing the political rhetoric, media coverage and communal forms of 
memorialisation, it is possible to engage in an analysis of the tides of public and elite 
representation and perception of the German colonial experience.  In undertaking this task, it 
is argued that since the 1960s there has appeared sporadic dissent to the apparent historical 
amnesia regarding colonialism.  Building on this, in the 1990s and early 21st Century there has 
been a perceptible shift in academia, political discourse, media representation and public 
imagery that has become both more vociferous in engaging with the past and more critical in 
reflecting upon it (see Dickinson 2008).  As such, one can situate the apology within the 
context of a German society that, like certain other Western European nations, has become 
demonstrably less prone to glorifying its colonial past and more willing to express contrite 
sentiments towards it.  Indeed, this drive is especially prominent within those on the political 
left within German politics.  In this way, though there have been general trends in German 
society that critically re-evaluate the state’s colonial past, one must also bear in mind that the 
particular proponents of this are frequently situated within the Socialist-Green coalition from 
which the apology emerged.    Expanding on this, the following section analyses in more detail 
the conventional narrative of German colonialism, how it relates to broader perceptions of 
German history, especially in regards to the Holocaust, and how shifts in this narrative have 
contributed to the realisation of the 2004 apology. 
 
The conventional colonial narrative 
99 
 
While researching this chapter, this author entered into a casual conversation with a fellow 
colleague regarding our respective research.  In this discussion, the colleague, a German 
doctor in International Relations, admitted that never before had he had a conversation about 
German colonialism in Africa.  This, admittedly unscientific, anecdote illustrates the anaemic 
nature of the German colonial narrative; that is, even now, the impact on German collective 
memory seems to be relatively faint and there is not necessarily one monolithic or 
‘overarching master narrative for understanding the history of German colonialism’ (Langbehn 
2010: 22).  In Schäfer-Wünsche’s (2005: 195) words, ‘if German colonialism is mentioned at all, 
it is often declared to have been of little consequence, since it was so short-lived’.  Although, 
for the reasons explored below, it appears that this is beginning to change, conventionally 
German colonialism is not a subject that typically received abundant academic or popular 
attention.68  Despite the undoubted role of colonialism in determining perceptions of race and 
nationalism (Langbehn and Salama 2011: xxiii) one reason suggested for this neglect of the 
state’s colonial past is that it was only a short lived experiment – officially from 1884 – 1919, 
had limited role in oversees commerce and is assumed (problematically) to have minimal 
demographic consequences for the Reich itself (Gann 1987).  As such, the perceived 
significance of colonialism in the unfolding of German history is conventionally only considered 
as negligible.  In Jurgen Osterhammel’s (quoted in Dickinson 2008: 130) words, when one 
considers the historical role of the German Empire one thinks ‘understandably, at most of 
Cameroon and Samoa. But the social histories above all of Great Britain, Portugal and the 
Netherlands, and in some respects of Russia and France, must remain incomplete or 
incomprehensible if one divorces them from their imperial-colonial context’.  Reinforcing this 
point, David Blackbourn (quoted in Dickinson 2008: 130) writes ‘one could hardly assert that 
German colonies played the same central role in domestic political debates that their far larger 
empires did in British and French politics’.  Undoubtedly, another reason for this apparent 
amnesia is the overbearing enormity of the Holocaust in international and domestic concepts 
of German history that both consciously and subliminally usurps the colonial experience and 
even, in many respects, casts 1945 as a kind of ‘year zero’.  Such a stifled or limited memory of 
colonialism clearly does not lend itself to colonial contrition.  However, as conveyed in the 
                                                             
 
68 For a contrasting view on this matter, see Albrecht (2011).  Albrecht contends that through the 1950s 
and 60s issues pertaining to German colonialism did receive more media coverage than normally 
conceived.  Moreover, she argues that in the 1960s politicians still sought to cultivate a philanthropic 
image of German colonialism.   
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following passages, this apparent amnesia69 has undergone varying degrees and modes of 
contestation and revision over the decades. 
    
Remembering colonialism – Contesting the conventional narrative 
In the GDR, owing to its ideological orientation, anti-colonial discourse among political and 
intellectual elites was far more common place and correlated with the East German state’s 
supposedly anti-imperialist stance.  However, while the German Federal Republic took on a 
concerted effort at removing National Socialist insignia after the war, unlike in East Germany, 
many mnemonic sites (for example colonial monuments and street names) remained intact 
(Steinmetz and Hell 2006: 149-150).  For instance, in West Germany in 1949 the Hamburg 
statue of Herman Wissmann70 was reerected after having been knocked off its plinth in World 
War II bombings (Cornils 2011: 199)  and, indeed, other new monuments glorifying the colonial 
past were installed (Steinmetz and Hell 2006: 150).  During the 1950s, 60s and 1970s there was 
an initial phrase of largely uncohesive and sporadic resistance to this trend.  Such resistance 
included defacing and toppling monuments, most notably the 1967 toppling of the Hamburg 
statue of the erstwhile Governor of German East Africa (for interesting discussions of this, see 
Steinmetz and Hell 2006; Cornils 2011).  Likewise, this period saw the publication of several 
critical novels and historical accounts of the colonial period (Steinmetz and Hell 2006: 150).  
Such contestation arose generally from a young generation of students who had turned to 
anti-establishment and direct action politics.  
 
Since the 1980s and 1990s one can detect general trends that show certain contradictory 
attitudes in regards to the colonial past.  On the one hand, one can point to more concerted 
effort within elements of civil society to dislodge the enduring colonial complacencies.  To this 
end, this period was characterised not by the simple defacing of monuments, but organised 
attempts to critically annotate the monuments or even present them ironically, as ‘counter 
monuments’, as illustrated by the resurrection of the aforementioned Hermann Wissmann 
statue (Steinmetz and Hell 2006: 155; Cornils 2011).  Similarly, a 1932 colonial monument in 
Bremen was reframed as an anticolonial monument in 1996.  From November 2007 Von 
                                                             
 
69 One must be critical when evaluating what is ‘remembered’ and what is ‘forgotten’ in history; 
forgetting or amnesia is not necessarily a passive process of history simply slipping from memory, but 
can be an active process of tabooing or constraining certain past events.  Indeed, in some respects 
tabooing is the opposite of amnesia because it remains so prescient in the psyche. 
70 Wissman was Commissioner and Governor for the Western area of German East Africa from 1891 -
1896.  He was infamous for ruthless attacks on the African population, including burning down villages.  
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Trotha-Strasse in Munich was renamed Hererostrasse (Correa 2011: 95).  In a similar way, in 
2002 ‘Trotha House’ within the former Lettow-Vorbeck army barracks - complete with the 
portrait of the infamous general - was from 2002 referred to as ‘Tanzania Park’ and somewhat 
obliquely described as a tribute to international understanding between Germany and 
Tanzania (Steinmetz 2009: 254).   
 
This ambivalence is further illuminated by Augsburg zoo’s opening of an ‘African village’ in 
2005; the zoo’s director saying that it is the ideal place to foster an ‘exotic atmosphere’ 
(quoted in BBC 2005a).  The project was also defended in the comment section of Spiegel, with 
the reporter maintaining that ‘the hullaballoo over the Augsburg Zoo's "African Village" 
controversy is monkey business’ and calling it ‘nonsense’ (Broder 2005).  Rather more 
eloquently, Noah Sow - the founder of an institute on German race relations - captured the 
outrage at displaying supposed African culture ‘between the baboons and the zebras’ and 
indicated that it reflects a gaze where ‘there is an urge to see those who are not white as part 
of something exotic or romanticised’ (quoted in BBC 2005a).  In an excellent and robust 
critique, Schiller, Dea et al. (2005) detail how the zoo links Africans to wild animals, 
stereotypes African culture and facilitates ‘discrimination, barriers to social mobility, 
persecution, and repression’.  On the one hand, the very fact that such an ‘exhibition’ can take 
place reveals the endurance of colonialist modes of thought that see supposed African culture 
as something to be observed for European pleasure.  On the other hand, the commotion 
caused in civil society and the sustained sense of outrage from multiple pressure groups, 
academics, anti-racist campaigners and individuals shows a willingness by large parts of 
German society to critically challenge such mentalities.       
 
This ambivalence is also shown in the mushrooming of contemporary popular representations 
of the colonial period.  Pointing to recent titles such as Nirgendwo in Afrika (Nowhere in 
Africa), Eine Liebe in Afrika (A love in Africa), Kein Himmel über Afrika (No heaven above 
Africa), Afrika - Wohin mein Herz mich trägt (Africa – Where my Heart Carries Me), Mein Herz 
in Afrika (My Heart in Africa), Mein Traum von Afrika (My dream of Africa), Struck (2010: 260-
261) describes how contemporary ‘German cinema and television have widely established and 
exploited the discourse that locates Africa in the center of desire - for romance, adventure’ 
and danger.  In another essay, Struck (2011) captures how Die Wüstenrose –  a popular 
televised melodrama set in German South West Africa (the first screening receiving viewing 
figures of 12 million) shows both a brutal side of colonialism (such as whipping and hanging), 
while simultaneously overlooking more mundane and systematic forms of oppression.  
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Moreover, Struck unpacks how the programme depicts clichéd colonial fantasy in the form of 
exoticism, costume, sexual desire and macho-ruggedness.  Likewise, while the 2003 
publication of Seyfried’s novel Herero, undoubtedly created awareness of German colonialism 
in South-West Africa, as Steinmetz and Hell (2006: 153) comment, it ‘is virtually 
indistinguishable from colonial novels’ and ‘recycles colonial racist stereotypes’.        
 
The point of highlighting these developments is to emphasise the uncertain, ambiguous and, in 
many respects, ambivalent position of contemporary German society in relation to the 
recollection of the colonial past.  That is, like the recent novels and melodramas discussed 
above, there appears to be a dual position in regards to the past; a general repudiation (but, 
conceivably, voyeuristic intrigue) of the worst excesses of colonial violence, but a simultaneous 
fascination at enduring racialised stereotypes and tropes.  One may suggest that this perhaps 
feeds into the format and proffering of Wieczorek-Zeul’s apology.  That is to say that these 
impulses fit with the apology’s disavowal of genocide, but absence of any condemnation of the 
wider colonial project.  These observations also fit with the previously analysed hierarchically 
and paternally framed notions of developmental assistance and aid, as well as the notion of 
the active and overbearing General Von Trotha, in comparison to the victimised and passive 
Herero. 
   
The centenary and heightened colonial awareness 
Having discussed general developments in German colonial representations since the 1960s, 
this section now turns to specific short term trends that contributed to the 2004 apology.  In 
this regard, Schäfer-Wünsche (2005: 198) points to the Durban Anti-Racism Conference in 
2001 as being a significant moment in drawing attention to Germany’s colonial history. 
However, more than this, the societal commotion surrounding the centenary of the genocide 
played a central role in raising awareness and contestation of conventional memory both 
internationally and within Germany, thereby contributing to the apology.   
 
Within this context, the approach to the centenary of the conflict unleashed an unexpected 
mobilisation and debate within civil society (Kössler 2006).  In line with the mushrooming of 
media representations of the colonial past, on and around January 11th 2004, as the centenary 
of the start of the Herero War approached, most the German daily newspapers carried 
extensive features (Kössler 2006).  Moreover, unlike previous reporting on the matter, the 
term ‘genocide’ was now widely employed by reporters (Jones 2011: 213).  In addition, there 
was a spate of academic conferences, museum exhibitions, television features and public 
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ceremonies commemorating the centenary of the war, led by both human rights and church 
groups (Jones 2011: 213).  This surge in public interest in the genocide contributed to forging a 
German public and political class that was more inclined than ever before towards revaluation 
of the state’s colonial past and the Herero genocide. 
  
The shifting Holocaust and colonial narratives 
When deconstructing the German colonial narrative there is, inescapably, an elephant in the 
room.  The memory of the Holocaust, to a lesser or greater extent, pervades every aspect of 
German political and cultural life.  In Olick and Levy’s (1997: 921) words, ‘virtually every 
institutional arrangement and substantive policy is a response, in some sense, to Germany's 
memory of those fateful years’.  So, too, does this memory pervade narratives of colonialism, 
colonial genocide and debates regarding apology.  Indeed, in deconstructing Wieczorek-Zeul’s 
(2004) speech, it is clear from the words ‘Germany has learned the bitter lessons of history’, 
that the Holocaust hangs heavily over her apology.  Moreover, her phrase ‘we German’s 
accept our historical and moral responsibility’ resonates strongly with one of the most famous 
speeches in German history when-upon President von Weizsäcker declared on the 40th 
Anniversary of the end of the war that Germans must accept their ‘responsibility before 
history’ (quoted in Olick and Levy 1997: 932).  Indeed, it is no coincidence that the 
emotionalised and politicised weight of the Holocaust was invoked by the plaintiffs in the 
Herero community’s legal and moral bid for reparations.71 
 
It is indisputable that the Federal Republic draws legitimacy as a polity in opposition to 
National Socialism and its genocide.  Indeed, banning extremist parties, prosecuting war 
criminals and paying reparations to Israel were key elements in legitimising the Federal 
Republic (Moses 2007: 4).  As such, given Germany’s willingness to ‘learn the lessons of 
history’, so to speak, it is perhaps not surprising that Germany became the first state to 
apologise for a colonial genocide (Zimmerer 2008: 323).  Moreover the emotive response to 
                                                             
 
71 The Herero’s court statement reads that ‘foreshadowing with chilling precision the irredeemable 
horror of the European Holocaust only decades later, the defendants [the three German companies] and 
Imperial Germany formed a German commercial enterprise which cold-bloodedly employed explicitly 
sanctioned extermination, the destruction of tribal culture and social organization, concentration 
camps, forced labor, medical experimentation and the exploitation of women and children in order to 
advance their common financial interest (quoted in Schaller 2011: 53-54).  Likewise, in a motion before 
the Namibian parliament, Riruako (2006) has pointed to the ‘payment of reparation to the Jews for 
similar crimes committed by the Hitler regime’, saying that ‘such an attitude on the part of the German 
government is nothing but a naked act of Racism against black people in general and the Ovaherero in 
particular’.  
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genocide contributes towards explaining the disparity in Germany apologising for the genocide 
of the Herero, rather than the wider atrocities of colonialism in general. 
 
However, it is not enough to simply argue that Germany’s strong rhetorical aversion to 
genocide explains the apology.  Firstly, it does not explain the peculiarity of the apology 
emerging in 2004, when an apology could have been offered in any of the preceding years.  
Secondly, it does not take into account the ‘unresolvable cross-pressures’ generated by 
Germany’s historical relationship with the Holocaust (Olick and Levy 1997: 933).  This is to say, 
that the ‘lessons’ of the Holocaust are not always self evident for the German state:  For 
instance, on the one hand the historical legacy may instruct Germany to offer unequivocal 
support for Israel, on the other hand it may tutor against the illegal occupation and 
ghettoisation of ‘other’ peoples.  Such a tension also relates to the issue of the historical 
footing of the genocide of the Herero people:  On the one hand there is the drive to renounce 
genocide, on the other hand there is the concern that apologising for a comparatively small-
scale massacre may in some way trivialise the enormity of the Holocaust.72  Bearing this 
tension in mind, the argument of this section is that accompanying the gradual shift in the 
colonial narrative has been a small, but perceptible revaluation of the role of the Holocaust in 
the continuum of German History.  This shift, led by the German left, has created an 
environment in which there is less focus on the historical singularity or ‘uniqueness’ of the 
Holocaust, and therefore more willingness to recognise and express contrition for alternative 
atrocities.   Related to this, there has been a move away from the idea that the Nazi period 
occurred in a kind of historical vacuum in isolation from the continuum of German and 
European history.  As such, one can understand the apology as occurring in an intellectual 
space where analysis of colonial atrocities no longer contaminates the idea of Germanness or 
national identity in quite the same way. In order to sustain this argument, it is necessary to 
illustrate the conventional positioning of the Holocaust within German history and how this is 
intertwined with the colonial narrative. 
 
National Socialism as an anomaly in German history 
Moses (2007: 8) writes that owing to its reflections on the Holocaust, the German Federal 
Republic is ‘constituted as an anti-genocidal community and inheritor of positive German 
                                                             
 
72 Bridgett Lau (1989), for instance, infamously argued that terming the colonial massacre ‘genocide’ 
trivialises the South African occupation of Namibia.  
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traditions’.  This, like most legitimising myths, requires some mental acrobatics to sustain – to 
simultaneously reconcile both the moral integrity of a nation’s traditions and the recognition 
of a state orchestrated genocide.  Such a reconciliation was partially managed through 
adopting an ultra-intentionalist interpretation of the National Socialist history.  In other words, 
the crimes of the Nazis were cast as the exclusive responsibility of carefully considered 
planning on behalf of Hitler and his inner-circle of henchmen.73  More than this, National 
Socialist rule was frequently portrayed as a kind of meta-physical evil, where Hitler and his 
inner circle were endowed with almost other worldly wickedness.  In this endeavour it became 
common to refer to the Nazi period as a ‘catastrophe’ (Nolte 1993: 3), thereby suggesting the 
Nazi era was, like an earthquake or tsunami, a misfortune that befell the German people 
without prior warning or cause.  Through this process, the Third Reich was presented as what 
Zimmer (2008: 324) critically terms ‘12 ‘dark years’’ and a ‘derailment from an in other 
respects positive track’.  In this way, the period was consciously severed from the continuum 
of German history.  This point is illustrated when attacks on the Cologne synagogue and a 
wave of anti-Semitic vandalism in the late 1950s were zealously attributed by German 
Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, to delinquent ‘hoodlum[s]’, while maintaining that ‘the German 
people have shown that these thoughts and tendencies have no foundation in it’ (Olick and 
Levy 1997: 927).  Likewise, to sustain the discontiuum of the Third Reich from German 
traditions, it is also necessary to maintain that previous periods were basked in benevolent 
tradition.  To this end, the intentional destruction of a people and the use of concentration 
camps in German South-West Africa do not sit comfortably with this legitimising myth.  It is 
within this context that one can comprehend the political expedience and, in some respects, 
necessity of the narrative of Germany’s marginal empire.  In such circumstances colonial 
apology is not politically feasible.       
 
Central to maintaining the marginal empire narrative, then, is the preservation of the idea of 
the singularity of the Holocaust.  Maintaining this ‘uniqueness’ serves to disconnect the 
Holocaust from colonialism in two important respects:  Firstly, it maintains an almost other 
worldly or theological impression regarding the destruction of the Jews; as Bauer (1978: 31) 
describes, there is an impression by which ‘it took place outside of history, it becomes a 
mysterious event, an upside down miracle, so to speak’.  This impression preserves the 
                                                             
 
73Likewise, in the context of the onset of the Cold War, the U.S. found it politically expedient to delimit 
the number of prosecutions to only the most zealous Nazis.  
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absolute evil of Hitler and his inner circle, thereby largely divorcing wider German society’s 
responsibility in the genocide.  Moreover, it curtails any idea that any entrenched anti-Semitic, 
fascist or racist attitudes among German society contributed to the Final Solution.  Secondly, 
and in a similar way, the discontinuum from history dislodges any perception that the 
mechanisms of the genocide, both in terms of its sustaining ideologies, but also its application 
– concentration camps, bureaucratic ruthlessness – grew out of Germany’s colonial practice.  
Indeed, any attempts to dislodge any of these pillars of the National Socialist singularity were 
fiercely censored.74  Illustrative of this, historian Fritz Fischer’s thesis highlighting a continuity 
between the Kaiserreich and the Third Reich led to the public refusal of some prominent 
historians to shake his hand and a seemingly connected withdrawal of a government grant 
enabling him to lecture in the U.S. (Evans 1987: 761).  Likewise, the attempt by Bundestag 
President Philipp Jenninger in a 1988 speech to account for Hitler’s appeal led to the storming 
out the chamber by several deputies and his resignation.  In Olick and Levy’s (1997: 931) 
words, ‘his focus on how Hitler had made sense to some people violated the absolute 
demonization of Hitler, and focussing in German problems violated the long-standing 
avoidance of attention to ordinary people as supporters of the Third Reich’.  This strong focus 
on the singularity of the Holocaust and the apparent anomaly of National Socialism placed 
constraints upon any public consideration of colonial atrocities and genocide that may bear 
any resemblance to those committed in the Third Reich.  Such constraints played a prohibiting 
role in the realisation of introspection or apology for German colonial genocide.  This lack of 
introspection was further compounded by the enduring shackling of Herero contestation due 
to apartheid South African occupation of Namibia until 1990. 
 
Shifting memories – challenging the singularity of the Holocaust 
Nevertheless, upon entering the new millennium, there has been, especially among the left, 
both within and without Germany, a gradual loosening of the perceived singularity and other 
worldliness of the Holocaust.  This process, interlinked as it is with the changing colonial 
narrative, has opened up a space in which alternative genocides may be explored and 
analysed.  Where Arendt and Fischer were previously lone voices, there has in recent times 
been an emerging literature which either directly connects or draws tentative parallels 
between colonialism, the Herero genocide and the Nazi orchestrated genocide (for example, 
                                                             
 
74 Not censored in the sense that they were legally prohibited.  Rather, as the proceeding examples 
suggest, they were censored in so far as those challenging such assumptions risked social and political 
alienation.  
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Kössler 2005; Madley 2005; Zimmerer 2005; Haas 2008; Olusoga and Erichsen 2011).  This 
intellectual environment, especially with a left leaning government at the helm, enabled a 
space where, unlike in previous decades, colonial introspection and apologies are possible.  
This argument is explored through an analysis of the altering perceptions of the Holocaust by 
the third generation since 1945 and societal developments since the infamous Historian’s 
debate of the 1980s. 
 
The full complexity of the Historikerstreit, or historians’ debate, is too broad to be considered 
at length in this chapter.75  However, one of the key facets of this - at times heated - debate 
surrounded the singularity of the Holocaust.   The debate entailed conservative historians 
attempting to exonerate and normalise German history so as to no longer be held hostage to 
Auschwitz, so to speak.  Ernst Nolte, for instance, highlighted the Soviet Gulag as an 
instrument in class genocide comparable to the Nazi racial genocide (see Evans 1987: 765).  
Likewise, Hillgruber situates the Holocaust within the context of mass resettlement of peoples 
throughout the 20th Century; he points, for instance, at the expulsion of Germans from East –
Central Europe and ‘the first genocide – that of the Armenians in Turkey’ (quoted in Evans 
1987: 772).  The goal here was to manufacture a historical consciousness within Germany that 
is not tied with shame, at least beyond the transgressions that all states have committed, but, 
like other states, draws on proud traditions.  In opposition to this were liberal historians who 
were dismayed at what they perceived as the trivialisation of the Holocaust by conservative 
and nationalistic sentiments.  As Zimmerer (2008: 335) also points out, there is an irony at the 
heart of this debate in that both groups implicitly downplay colonialism and colonial genocide; 
the conservatives because of the desire to uphold the dignity of wider German history, the 
liberals because of fear of eliciting comparisons with the Holocaust.  The point here is that this 
debate, which ‘ended with an implicit ban on comparative research on mass violence’, seemed 
to further entrench the genocide of the Herero people as a marginalised episode in public 
consciousness (Zimmerer 2008: 335).  Within these intellectual parameters, public and 
academic awareness of colonialism was marginalised and even tabooed, thereby prohibiting 
contrition.  Nevertheless, though the challenge to Holocaust singularity emerged from the 
German right, one may contend that this highly publicised challenge did lay the foundations 
for a debate within German society regarding the historical relationship of the German state, 
                                                             
 
75 For recommended reading, see the edited book by Knowlton and Cates (1993) entitled Forever in the 
shadow of Hitler?: Original documents of the Historikerstreit, the controversy concerning the singularity 
of the Holocaust.  See also Low (1994). 
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past and present – with the Holocaust.  As explored below, this is a debate that contorted in 
new directions in the 1990s, this time driven by those on the left of the German political 
spectrum.  
            
The generational shift  
Bearing in mind its malleable and contested nature, one can point to inter-generational 
variances in memories of the past.  Indeed, as the temporal distance between National 
Socialism has increased, it is possible to discern alternative perceptions of how the generations 
since 1945 have perceived their parents’ and their respective grandparents’ roles in National 
Socialism, World War II and the Holocaust.  By extension, this also has consequences for  
German society’s perceived placement of colonialism within the spectrum of German history.  
Though trading in generalisations, Axel  Körner (2000: 61) succinctly sketches the divergences 
between the inter-generational perceptions: 
  
The first generation of postwar Germans was, in the famous phrase, “unable to 
mourn”, unable to accept personal responsibility for what it had happened, unable to 
express sorrow.  The second generation of postwar scholars constructed a complex 
system of structural and social explanations for the Holocaust and the Nazi crimes.  
The third generation took an important step further and embraced the work of a 
young scholar as a new way to deal with Germany’s “unmasterable past”. 
  
In other words, Körner points to the much rhapsodised ’68 generation and highlights how in 
the accompanying social changes of the 1960s there was the start of a move, at least in 
academia, away from the ultra-intentionalist perceptions of the Holocaust being the sole 
product of Hitler’s unwavering plan.  However, though this new emphasis on structural 
accounts may have been uncomfortable for their parents’ generation, the emphasis on ‘the 
structure of the regime, the clinical quality of the death camps, the impact of institutions like 
industry and bureaucracy on the Holocaust’ remained impersonal and enabled the narrative of 
virtuous German historical (colonial) traditions largely untouched (Körner 2000: 70). 
 
The ‘young scholar’ that Körner refers to is Daniel Goldhagen.  This pertains to his infamous 
‘Hitler’s Willing Executioners’ thesis in which he contends that, far from simply being passive 
puppets of Hitler’s fanatic world-view or clogs in a bureaucratic  machine, large swathes of 
ordinary Germans knew about and enthusiastically participated in the Final Solution because 
of their latent anti-Semitism (Goldhagen 1996).  In terms of this project, the importance of this 
thesis does not lie in the debate over the book’s historical veracity or methodological quality, 
of which both German and international academics have, on the whole, been extraordinarily 
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critical,76 but rather in how the book’s enormously popular reception in Germany speaks to the 
wider society’s perceptions of the past.  The book received enormous popular attention within 
Germany, with Goldhagen attaining an almost rock-star like status.  Indeed, the first printing of 
the book in Germany sold-out within just five days and Goldhagen appeared on numerous talk 
shows and panel discussions (Eley 2000: 3-4).  Despite the academic criticism, Goldhagen was 
received by enthusiastic German audiences and the debate caught the imagination of young 
German’s in particularly apt ways.  As Ash (1997: 405-6) writes, ‘while older Germans attacked 
Goldhagen for using collective nouns like "the Germans" to describe the killers of the Shoah, 
[...] younger ones seemed largely immune to such language. Rather, many of them appear to 
feel the need for a confrontation with real existing grandparents in order to make them 
account for their deeds, and with parents for keeping silent or failing to enact this 
confrontation with their own parents’.   
 
To situate the Goldhagen debate within the context of colonial apology:  To be clear, Daniel 
Goldhagen and his book are not in themselves important to eliciting an apology for the Herero 
genocide.  Their significance lies in illustrating important shifts in popular perceptions of the 
past that facilitated and enabled the apology.  Goldhagen’s book is less a prophetic academic 
revelation, than a well timed intervention that spoke to the already present and evolving 
sentiments among younger German citizens.  In other words, unlike the preceding generations, 
the generation coming of economic and political age at the turn of the century was more 
willing to uncover and be directly accusative of ‘ordinary’ Germans and German history.  
Whether historically accurate or not, this sentiment debases the idea that the Holocaust was 
the sole result of Hitler’s inner circle and, moreover, destabilises the concept of Germany’s 
virtuous historic traditions.  By extending the responsibility of the destruction of the Jews to 
the ‘everyday’ German, one can dispense with the aforementioned metaphysical evil, the 
‘catastrophe’ of the ‘12 dark years’ and the Holocaust’s historical discontinuum.  It is to show 
the pervasiveness of the idea that genocide was not immune from the German people before 
Hitler.  This illustrates a popular audience, especially amongst the young and the left, that is, 
unlike their previous generations, receptive to more critical reflections of the past, 
revaluations of historical orthodoxy and historical contrition.  In the context of the 2004 
                                                             
 
76 Scathing attacks include Raul Hilberg (2007), for instance, declaring the book ‘wrong about 
everything.  Totally wrong.  Exceptionally wrong’.  Eberhard Jäckel’s review in Die Zeit was entitled 
‘Simply a Bad Book’ (see Kershaw 2000: 255).  
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apology, this reflects a political landscape where evaluating and assigning guilt is no longer 
limited to the narrow National Socialist clique, but can be broadened to evaluate the wider 
actions of the German public in its history.  Thus, in the midst of wider contestation into the 
colonial past (legal demands for reparations, renewed academic interest, awareness created 
by the centenary of the genocide), the Holocaust is no longer the same obstacle to contrition 
that it was several decades ago.  Indeed, memories of the Jewish genocide may now help 
facilitate introspection into other genocides. 
    
Conclusion 
This chapter has positioned the 2004 German apology for the genocide of the Herero 
community amongst a plurality of political, social and economic pressures, none of which can 
be understood in isolation.  The first part of this chapter examined the impact of Chief 
Riruako’s challenge in the form of legal demands for repartitions for the Herero community.  
As evidenced by the text, its timing and the accompanying rhetoric, it seems that an important 
aspect of the apology was addressing and attempting to neutralise such reparation demands.  
Beyond the demands to reparations, the chapter has also positioned the apology within 
contemporary liberal states’ normative compunctions of disavowing ‘excessive’ human rights 
violations.  The final section situated Wieczorek-Zeul’s speech within a context of heightened 
awareness within Germany of the state’s colonial legacy, combined with a displacement of the 
conventional narrative of a marginal or benevolent German empire.  In particular, such 
renewed introspection into the colonial past sits within shifting contemplations of the 
Holocaust within German society.  It has been suggested that the gradual loosening of the 
Holocaust as a unique or metaphysical event has enabled further introspection into colonial 
atrocities committed by the German state, particularly the Herero genocide.  
 
Correlating with the core arguments of the thesis, this chapter has also pointed to modes by 
which, even in mea culpa, there are persisting colonial and Eurocentric expositions within the 
German apology.  In regards to the refusal to pay reparations, the apparent political and 
economic expediency of stifling Herero reparations represents a more typically self-interested 
ambition than a genuine disavowal of colonialism.  Moreover, the decoupling of apology from 
reparations and the continuing policy of aid facilitate conditions whereby the land owning 
patterns of Namibia continue to be dominated by farmers of European descent.  Similarly, one 
can highlight sentiments of aid and ‘assistance with land reform’ (Wieczorek-Zeul 2004) that 
represent a paternalistic discourse that appears rather more self congratulatory than contrite.  
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In the same way, the apology’s emphasis on Germany’s contemporary liberal complexion 
represents a certain conceit, whereby the apology for genocide becomes an exhibition of the 
Republic’s current benign character.  Finally, like other case studies in this thesis, it is pertinent 
to note that the apology was limited to the genocide of the Herero community, rather than 
representing a disavowal of the wider colonial mentalities and political and economic modes of 
governance that facilitated it. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE BELGIAN APOLOGY FOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
ASSASSINATION OF PATRICE LUMUMBA 
 
This attitude, which can be described as insensitive neutrality and apathy to the fate of 
Patrice Lumumba, can be considered as a serious breach in terms of good 
management and respect for the rule of law. In light of the criteria today, some 
members of the then government and some Belgian actors of the time bear some 
irrefutable responsibilities in the events that led to the death of Patrice Lumumba.  
 
The Government believes, therefore, it is appropriate and suitable to present to the 
family of Patrice Lumumba, the families of Mr Mpolo and Okito and the Congolese 
people its profound and sincere regrets, together with its apologies for the pain that 
has been inflicted by this apathy and cold indifference.  
               
              Louis Michel (2002: 50-51) 
 
Introduction 
In 2002, Belgian Foreign minister, Louis Michel, offered the above apology in the aftermath of 
the Lumumba Committee’s77 findings into its investigation into the 1961 assassination of 
Patrice Lumumba, the first elected Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo 
(Léopoldville).78  Accompanying the apology, Michel announced the establishment of a Patrice 
Lumumba Foundation, worth an initial EU3.75 million.  As recognised by the committee itself 
(Chambre des Représentants 2001a), the investigation was established following debates and 
ministerial questions regarding the 1999 book De moord op Patrice Lumumba  (The 
assassination of Patrice Lumumba), a book which lay the responsibility for the Prime Minister’s 
death with Belgian authorities (De Witte 2001).  While De Witte’s book was undoubtedly a 
catalyst for the commission and subsequent apology, like the other case studies, clearly the 
mea culpa emerged within a wider social environment of political expediencies, societal 
pressures and mnemonic contestations.  Exploring this nexus of pressures, this chapter is 
divided into three sections. 
 
The first section dissects the party political expediencies that cut across the apology.  In a 
manner comparable to the British case study (see chapter 5), it is contended that the mea 
                                                             
 
77 Fully titled the ‘Parliamentary Committee of enquiry in charge of determining the exact circumstances 
of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and the possible involvement of Belgian politicians’, this 
chapter refers to this body as the committee or Lumumba committee.  
78 After previously being named Zaire under the leadership of Mobutu, Lumumba was the first post-
independence Prime Minister of what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
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culpa buttressed political advantage in rhetorically distancing the governing VLD party (Open 
Flemish Liberals and Democrats) from the previously discredited conservative leaning 
coalition.  In particular, following recent societal turmoil and perceptions of corruption, the 
apology sat with the new coalition’s strides to reinvigorate the polity and enhance their image 
as one of progressive change and transparency (cf. Kerstens 2008: 190-191).  The second 
section explores the processes by which the contrition parallels the geopolitical stances of the 
coalition.  It is posited that the apology corresponded with a shifting foreign policy agenda that 
was more vociferous in its professions for human rights, regional peace processes and, by 
extension, Belgian proactive diplomacy within the region.  From one perspective, at least, it 
might be thought that apology for past transgressions facilitated this more interventionist 
stance (cf. Kerstens 2008: 191-194). 
 
The final section explores the central role of the colonial narrative as a unifying memory 
amidst Belgium’s complex identity politics.  It is demonstrated that, in recent years, the 
narrative of a benevolent Belgian colonialism has become increasingly contested and under 
strain.  In this manner, the apology represents a concession or a disavowal of an episode of the 
state’s dealings with its former colony that no longer sits with this conventional overarching 
narrative.  Nevertheless, even in apologising for this particular episode, this chapter highlights 
modes by which Michel (the apologiser) himself continues to revere the colonial past and 
discursively reproduce its conventional legitimising tenets.  Beyond the apology text, the 
chapter also points to mnemonic sites (museums, school curriculums) that revive recognisable 
and enduring colonial complacencies.       
 
The electoral expediency of introspection 
As explored in Chapter 1, apologies simultaneously offer stories that inform the audience 
about both the victim and the orator.  That is, in apologising, the orator is engaging in a form 
of remedial work that, subsequent to an offence, seeks to bolster their impression among 
others.  Indeed, in terms of intergenerational state apologies, such remedial work can have 
additional expediency to one’s image, as it is clear that the apologising politician is not actually 
himself/herself guilty of perpetrating the offense.  In this way, apology can serve as an 
expedient impression management device for distancing oneself from both those who are 
actually guilty of the past atrocity and, moreover, adjacent conservative politicians who have 
often been perceived to have stiff-collared   and increasingly awkward stances towards past 
indignations.  By extension, as elaborated on in more detail in chapter 5 in the British case 
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study,79 the 1990s and early 20th century witnessed the rise to power of a number of 
supposedly ‘progressive’ politicians who cultivated a new aesthetic or style of politics that 
appeared to be more flexible, colloquial and ‘in touch’ than that of the orthodox political class.  
It is this reflective style of politics that, it is argued, sits more comfortably with the offering of 
contrition (Cunningham 2004a: 80).  It is here, then, that one can observe an electoral utility to 
the mnemonic reshaping of Lumumba’s death.  As explored in the following passages, it is in 
the context of the episode’s renewed controversy within society that the truth commission 
and subsequent apology offered a means for the new government to exhibit these traits and, 
in turn, rhetorically and illustratively distance themselves from the former government that 
had been perceived as discredited and out of touch. 
         
The party political and societal context 
Locating the apology within the orbit of domestic party politics requires an understanding of 
the societal turmoil that led to the 1999 rise of the VLD Party at the expense of the long 
governing Christian Democrat Party.  Symbolic of this crisis was the Dutroux affair (Kerstens 
2008: 191), whereby, subsequent to his arrest in August 1996, it became apparent that there 
had been severe inadequacies in the police investigation into Detroux’s kidnapping and 
murder of several young girls.  This exposed the police and judiciary as bungling or even 
potentially fraudulent (Hooghe and Rihoux 2000: 132).  Such systemic failures ‘were to a large 
extent attributed by public opinion and the national media to the judiciary’s close links with 
the political establishment’ (Gies 2003: 260).  It was this sense of dissatisfaction that led to the 
‘White March’, whereby over 300,000 people converged for the biggest protest in Belgian 
history (Walgrave and Manssens 2000: 217).  As well as protesting against child abuse, there 
was also a demand for a renewed transparency and political accountability in Belgian 
governance (Kerstens 2008: 191).  This anger was only heightened by Detoux’s brief escape 
from court in 1998 and a series of financial and ecological80 scandals that forced resignations 
from both the Flemish Socialist Party and the Christian Democrats, thereby further reinforcing 
the impression of elite incompetence (Hooghe and Rihoux 2000: 132).   
 
It is within this context that the 1999 general election took place, with the VLD party riding the 
ticket of a ‘New Political Culture’ (Kerstens 2008: 190).  The election saw substantial losses for 
                                                             
 
79 See pages 144-148. 
80 It was exposed that dioxin had contaminated poultry feed, thereby poisoning the entire food chain.  
This led to the removal of products from shops and another blow to Belgium’s international reputation.  
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both the Socialist and Christian Democrats,  entailing the latter’s removal from office for the 
first time in over forty years (Hooghe and Rihoux 2000: 140-1) and ensuring for the first time 
since the 1920s that the Christian and Socialist parties no longer held a majority in Parliament 
(Fitzmaurice 2000: 178).  The necessity of recognising the electorate’s message was seized 
upon with the Liberal Party entering into a ‘rainbow’ coalition with the Socialist and Green 
parties at the expense of the Christian Democrats. 
 
The Lumumba Commission and the ‘New Political Culture’ 
Given the prevailing currency of the ‘New Political Culture’, one can situate the Lumumba 
Commission within the context of a multitude of exploits that manufactured clear water 
between the new government and the discredited orthodox political establishment.  To do so 
requires a brief consideration of the increasing global norm and prevalence of Truth 
Commissions. 
 
Truth Commissions are, at least in premise, designed to carry out a variety of functions.  At the 
most basic level, they aim to investigate unknown or contested past events and establish and 
disseminate the ‘truth’81 as to what occurred.  In doing so, they establish individual 
accountability and identify the perpetrators (Crocker 1999: 49).  Indeed, this basic function of 
exposing the ‘truth’ is acknowledged in the Lumumba Commission, wherein the Foreign 
Minister noted that he could not answer parliamentary questions regarding the assertions of 
Ludo de Witte’s The assassination of Lumumba, ‘based on a book’.  Therefore ‘in order to 
reach conclusions from an official Belgian instance, it was decided to create a parliamentary 
investigation committee’ (Chambre des Représentants 2001a).  However, beyond 
disseminating ‘official’ truth, Commissions are designed to have a cathartic and healing 
societal effect; in Rotburg’s (2000: 3) words, they aim ‘to reconcile the old with the new, and 
to move forward in effective harmony’.  In this sense, Commissions frequently occur after civil 
wars (Kosovo) or the fall of authoritarian regimes (South Africa, Cambodia).  Much like 
apologies, Truth Commissions attempt to provide a kind of closure to traumatic pasts wherein 
a mutual recognition of the past and the victims’ experience has a therapeutic effect on both 
victims and perpetrators. 
 
                                                             
 
81 There is a critique of the concepts of ‘truth’ and the commission’s supposed scientific rigour on pages 
129-131.  
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Unlike the examples above, Belgium did not undergo a civil war or a transition from an 
authoritarian regime.  However, one can point to the party political advantages of utilising 
such a format to evoke a positive transition to a seemingly more progressive form of politics.  
Firstly, such a Commission sits easily with the ‘New Political Culture’ emphasised by the Liberal 
party, in that it represents an apparent openness, transparency and truthfulness that appeared 
to be lacking in the previous government.  Clearly, the epoch defining fall of South African 
Apartheid and the adjoined rise of the ANC and its Truth and Reconciliation Commission are in 
no way comparable to the Liberal Party’s victory over the Christian Democrats in Belgium.  
However, there is a sense in which Belgium’s progressive ‘Rainbow Coalition’ could bask in the 
new political currency of South Africa’s ‘Rainbow Nation’ (Verdoolaege and Kerstens 2004: 84).  
Likewise, the format of a Commission and ensuing apology enabled the Liberal Party, including 
Prime Minister Verhofstradt and Foreign Minister Michel, to trade in a style of politics that 
they could capitalise on.  Interestingly, a similar commission in the form of the Rwandan 
Commission82 in 1997 had been politically costly for the conservatives, while allowing Guy 
Verhofstradt, leader of the VLD, to enhance his reputation as an untainted and upstanding 
figure (Verdoolaege and Kerstens 2004: 80).  Indeed, whereas the outgoing Christian Democrat 
Party could often appear stuffy and elitist, this form of political discourse, in line with other 
social democrats in the late 90s and early 21st century (one thinks of Blair, Clinton et al), 
allowed for a more reflexive, amiable, almost idiomatic style of government.  This 
presentational mode appeared to come more naturally to the Verhofstadt government and 
seemed to generate political capital through a further departure from its discredited 
predecessors. 
 
The format of a Commission into Lumumba’s assassination was also politically expedient for 
the Liberal party in so far as it clearly had less to lose than the Christian Democrats.  This is to 
say that, though most of those implicated in the Commission were by then dead, those 
responsible for the murder were invariably on the conservative arm of Belgian politics.  
However, though the perpetrators themselves are mostly dead, there remains in Belgium a 
sizable minority of people who worked in the Congo and spent their formative years there.83  
Many of these people suffered or were forced to flee in decolonisation and some continue to 
                                                             
 
82 Fully titled the Parliamentary commission of inquiry into the events in Rwanda, it was established 
after over 200,000 petitioners demanded an enquiry into the killing of ten Belgian Paratroopers in Kigali 
in 1994 (Verdoolaege and Kerstens 2004: 80) and the societal shock into the subsequent genocide. 
83 For an overview of some of the reflections and attitudes of former Belgian officers in the Congo, see 
Dembour (2000).   
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both perceive Lumumba as a criminal and glorify Leopoldian colonialism.84  Thus, the format of 
a Commission provided, though limited, a certain insulation from Lind’s (2008: 35) ‘backlash 
phenomenon’.85  In other words, the format of the commission superficially delegated the 
historical and moral judgement of Lumumba’s murder away from the minister himself and 
towards this Commission.  Rhetorically empowered by the language of officialdom and ‘truth’ 
it is almost as if Michel’s subsequent apology were not loaded with political opportunism or a 
particular ideological or historical world view, but were merely a neutral and unavoidable 
outcome of an investigation into truth.  This enabled Michel, to some extent, to both satisfy 
the ‘New Political Culture’ of transparency, while neutralising claims to historical revisionism 
from the former colonials.  Indeed, in his apology text, Michel (2002: 49) made palpable 
overtures to the former colonials, saying that ‘the powerful images of compatriots returning to 
Belgium having left everything behind in Congo have greatly contributed to shape the image it 
was felt happening in Congo. We must of course express our emotion to the Belgian victims. 
The pain of our compatriots cannot be ignored here’. 
 
The enduring Eurocentrism of the ‘New Political Culture’ 
To return to one of the core arguments of this thesis; rather than radically empowering the 
previously colonised, apologies represent certain reconfigured, yet enduring, Eurocentric 
complacencies, assumptions and power complexions.  It is, in pointing to the presentational 
and electoral expediencies of the Commission and apology, that one can detect such lingering 
sentiments.  Firstly, in relation to the style of politics, one can ascertain that there is a sense by 
which the apologies, like the British case study, mnemonically draw on past episodes of 
colonial violence so as to cultivate the politicians’ own manufactured image.  In this sense, 
Lumumba and the consequences for the Congo become almost a backdrop by which European 
politicians flaunt and enhance their own constructed persona.  
 
Likewise, one can make similar arguments in regards to the supposed cathartic societal effects 
of the Truth Commission.  To recall, an important objective of Truth Commissions is its 
supposed curative social effects; Desmond Tutu, for instance, spoke of the need ‘to assist in 
the healing of a traumatized, divided, wounded, polarized people’ (quoted in Andrews 2000: 
                                                             
 
84 Hochschild (2006: 311) points to the existence ‘two dozen organizations of Belgian “old colonials,” 
with names like the Fraternal Society of Former Cadets of the Centre for military training of Europeans 
at Luluabourg’.  He also points to websites that have defended Leopold against his recent criticisms.     
85 Lind points to the empirical phenomenon whereby apologies can untowardly elicit more vociferous 
denial and glorification of the past from conservatives. 
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84).   Indeed, though not to the same scale as post-apartheid South Africa, there is, as explored 
above, a sense in which the Commission was fashioned to symbolise a healing effect from the 
turmoil within Belgian society in the 1990s. To this extent, the Lumumba committee itself 
spoke of the need to come ‘to terms with the past’ (Chambre des Représentants 2001a).  
However, when discussing coming to terms with the past, it is necessary to question who this 
is designed for.  It would appear that this catharsis, this social healing, is forged for a Belgian 
audience, rather than the contemporary DRC.  That is, the apparent dealing with the past and 
reassuring of conscience seem to be rather more blithely accomplished in contemporary 
Belgium than in the DRC, where contemporary inequalities frequently remain rooted in the 
legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism.  
     
The geopolitical dimension of apology        
Beyond these narrow party political expediencies, one can, like the other case studies of this 
thesis, sketch an intersection between the process of mea culpa and a fluctuating foreign 
policy position on the international stage.  In this regard, this section locates the apology 
within the context of a shifting foreign policy agenda that, subsequent to the foreign policy 
retreat of the mid 1990s, sought to reposition Belgium for playing a more interventionist role 
in Central Africa (Kerstens 2008: 191-193).   This foreign policy retreat followed the death of 10 
Belgian paratroopers in Rwanda in 1994 and the government’s immediate withdrawal of its 
forces, contributing to the perception that the Belgian military played a causative role in, or at 
least failed to halt, the Rwandan genocide.  This ordeal manifested itself in the government’s 
decision to no longer send troops to former colonies, even under the auspices of the UN 
(Kerstens 2008: 192).  To this end, Smis and Oyatambwe (2002: 421) describe a situation 
where, by ‘1998 the government coalition in Belgium had almost no African policy ’.  As 
explored in this section, it is the rise of the Verhofstradt government that signposted the more 
assertive geo-political policy.   
 
The contention that the truth commission and apology overlap with a more strident foreign 
policy is not based merely on tenuous inference, but is plainly stated in the Committee’s 
Summary of Activities (Chambre des Représentants 2001a), reading that ‘the incompletely 
explained past inhibits collaboration with a number of countries from Central Africa.  This 
obstacle needs to be removed now that it is clear that Belgium together with its partners in 
the European Union, intend to take initiatives in order to make amends to that region and 
contribute to the well being of the population by closer international collaboration’.  
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Correspondingly, in his parliamentary speech immediately before Michel’s apology, Geert 
Versnick (2002: 44), President of the Lumumba Commission and member of the VLD, 
advocated apology and remarked that ‘this government has implemented a new African policy 
but it must start its collaboration with Congo on a good foundation’.  In a similar vein, Michel’s 
(2002: 49) parliamentary apology speech opined that it ‘is likely to positively influence our 
relationship with Congo, as well with the Congolese population’.  He additionally utilised the 
platform accorded to him in his mea culpa to herald the more assertive role, saying 
  
Last year, the government announced an action program for regional stability in the 
Great Lakes region and in particular, for the Democratic Republic of Congo. (…) 
Moreover, our country has devoted its European presidency to the theme of greater 
European attention and greater cooperation with the countries of this region. 
Currently, we are involved in diplomatic activities to the success of the imminent inter-
Congolese dialogue and resolution the issue of militias and foreign troops on 
Congolese territory (Michel 2002: 52). 
 
Thus, as explored below,  the apology intersected with the government’s foreign policy 
agenda, both in terms of making symbolic overtures to the DRC leadership and in exalting 
Belgium’s role in peace brokering and human right advocacy (Kerstens 2008: 194). 
 
Forging cordial relations with a strategic partner 
As seen to different extents in the UK and Italian case studies, one of the core political 
expediencies of political apologies is that they bolster relations with strategically significant 
partners.  To this end, the Lumumba Commission can be understood as a symbolic mode of 
belatedly renegotiating Belgian foreign relations following Mobutu’s overthrow from office 
and the subsequent rise to power of Laurent-Désiré Kabila in 1997.   This relates to the work of 
Nobles (2008), who contends that political apologies function by ratifying another’s 
interpretation of history, thereby bringing previously marginalised groups away from the 
political wilderness and into mainstream membership.86  Through this rhetorical mode, the 
Lumumba Commission served as expedient for winning favour in post-Mobutu DRC, and 
fostering partners that the new Belgian government could work with in its new proactive 
stance in supporting the Lusaka Agreement, assisting conflict resolution and establishing co-
operation with Kinshasa (Smis and Oyatambwe 2002: 422).   
                                                             
 
86 It should be made clear that Noble’s (2008) thesis is based upon ‘national membership’.  The 
argument posited here stretches this from membership of a national polity to membership of the 
international community. 
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Reflecting this shifting relationship with significant actors, upon entering office Congolese 
President L.D Kabila was largely marginalised and treated with disdain by Belgian elite circles: 
On his only official visit to Belgium under the previous government, he was symbolically 
shunned; the Belgian King refused to shake his hand in public and he was accused of 
massacring Tutsis (Smis and Oyatambwe 2002: 422).  However, the fact that L.D Kabila 
portrayed himself as a descendant of Lumumba (Kerstens 2008: 194), enabled the new 
Belgium government to begin forging closer ties with the Congolese leader through the 
tentative rehabilitation of Lumumba’s character.  As such, the Lumumba Commission enabled 
Belgium to make the transition from routinely portraying Lumumba (and, by extension, Kabila) 
as a communist, towards a more measured approach.  Indeed, the committee’s conclusions 
recognised that Lumumba was ‘called a Satan by some and honoured as a true people’s hero 
by others’ (Chambre des Représentants 2001b).  Furthermore, the establishment of the 
3.75million Euro Lumumba Foundation could be understood as a device to resurrect 
Lumumba’s reputation and acknowledge Kabila’s (and, more generally, the DRC’s) mythology 
of the leader.    As such, the commission seemingly functioned, at least on a symbolic level, to 
shift the footing with which Belgium was dealing with Kabila; it moved him from outcast to 
potential ally.  Though this appears to be an important overture by the Foreign Minister, in 
actuality the consequences were largely negated by L.D Kabila’s assassination in 2001, almost 
exactly forty years after Lumumba’s assassination.87 
 
Guilt in a negative sense: the paternalistic lessons for contemporary foreign policy 
As already alluded to, beyond forging closer ties with the DRC leadership, the apology was 
entangled with Belgium’s increasingly assertive roles in peace brokering within the central 
African region.  As pointed to by Michel’s aforementioned statements in the apology, this 
entailed a larger diplomatic role for Belgium within the region.  As Verdoolaege and Kerstens 
(2004: 85) write, Michel did not necessarily ‘need the commission for his Africa policy, but he 
could use it as an illustration of his commitment’.  Indeed, far from providing a narrative that 
forewarned European powers against intrusion into the affairs of previously colonised states, a 
reading of the apology indicates the imparting of a cautionary tale that advocates a larger role 
for Belgium in central Africa.  Illustrating this, the acceptance of responsibility and the offering 
                                                             
 
87 Despite being shot by his bodyguard, the motives and the identity of the wider orchestrators of the 
assassination remain unclear. 
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of mea culpa for Lumumba’s death was not because the government or the commission 
accepted, as de Witte (2001: xxii) convincingly contended, that ‘it was Belgian advice, Belgian 
orders and finally Belgian hands that killed Lumumba’.  In contrast, the apology emphasised 
the committee’s findings that ‘the parliamentary investigation committee has found no 
indication or evidence to demonstrate that the Belgian government of the day would have 
required the physical elimination of Patrice Lumumba’ (Michel 2002: 50).  Instead, Michel 
underscored Belgian guilt in a negative sense; pronouncing that the government of the time 
‘revealed a lack of consideration for the physical integrity of Patrice Lumumba, a physical 
entity clearly subordinated to other interests’ and that the apology was offered for the 
‘insensitive neutrality and apathy to the fate of Patrice Lumumba’ (Michel 2002: 50).  It is this 
narrative that draws on a past assassination to weave a paternalistic lesson for contemporary 
Belgian foreign relations: That transgression occurs, not through military endeavours in foreign 
lands or a particular racist, expansionist or civilisational worldview, but a lack of empathy or 
protection for the formerly colonised.  It is this paternalistic narrative that emphasises 
Congolese dependence upon Belgium and intersects with Belgium’s more contemporary 
‘peace building’ policies in its former colonial territories. 
 
Advocating human rights and ‘good governance’ 
By extension, just as the apology is laden with paternalistic foreign policy lessons, one can 
observe that, like the British and German case studies,88 it is also pregnant with universalistic 
and complacent assumptions of ‘good governance’.  In particular, this is manifested by 
Michel’s announcement (within the apology speech) to ‘fund a Patrice Lumumba foundation 
up to 3,750,000 EUR, supplemented by a minimum annual amount of 500,000 EUR’ (Michel 
2002: 52).  ‘The purpose of this foundation’, Michel (2002: 52) explained, was ‘to seek 
democratic development in Congo by financing of projects for prevention of such conflicts, 
strengthening the rule of law and training of youth’.  Even looking beyond this rather 
parsimonious figure – a figure that Gibney (2002: 281) terms ‘intolerable’ and bordering ‘on 
the obscene’89 – there remain important conundrums with this discourse:  Given the 
                                                             
 
88 As explored in chapter 3, the German government emphasised its role in facilitating Namibian land 
reform.  Chapter 5 analyses Britain’s self appointed role in the consociational Northerern Ireland peace 
process and its mediating between the supposed ‘two traditions’.  
89 As Gibney (2002: 281) writes, ‘a price tag of $U.S.3 million for assassinating a national and world 
leader of this talent and magnitude is itself intolerable’.  He later adds that ‘three million dollars and a 
Patrice Lumumba Foundation in a country where war continues unabated and where AIDS will claim the 
lives of millions seems like a very good bargain for assuaging the Belgian guilt’ (Gibney 2002: 282). 
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aforementioned various scandals among political and judicial elite circles in the preceding 
decade, there is a sense that Belgium is in no position to preach good governance.  More 
pressingly, Leopoldian ‘governance’ of the Congo Free State entailed some of the worst crimes 
in human history, including causing approximately 10 million deaths and innumerable 
amputations (see Hochschild 1998).  In more contemporary times, 1980s Belgian aid to Zaire 
under President Mobutu exceeded $100million (Willame 1998: 27), a figure dwarfing that of 
the Lumumba fund and presumably not contributing to democratic development.  It is this 
ideological complacency that sits with the overriding argument of the thesis:  Despite the 
hypocrisy, there nevertheless remains, even in the apology itself, an enduring discourse that 
seeks to impose a Western hegemonic world view onto the erstwhile colony. 
  
Exploring the Belgian colonial narrative 
One MEP recently described Belgium as ‘a non country’ and ‘an artificial construction’ (quoted 
in BBC 2010b).  To this end, it is useful to employ Benedict Anderson (1983) and remind 
oneself that all states are ‘imagined’.  However, beneath the ranting of the fringe right-wing 
UK Independence Party, there is an element of truth:  Belgium has historically had difficulty 
manufacturing a national consciousness, particularly considering its multilingual make-up.  
Thus, as explored in this section, a colonial memory based on Leopold’s divine rule and a 
compassionate Belgian civilising mission had become, even up to the 21st century, a central 
component of an otherwise weakly constructed Belgian identity (Ewans 2003; Vanthemsche 
2006).  Consequently, this section argues that the apology must be understood as a means by 
which Belgian elites responded and attempted to reappropiate (or at least attempt to carry 
out damage limitation on) central pillars of the state’s identity that had, in recent years, come 
under sustained contestation.  
 
 Like the German and British case studies,90 the Belgian apology arose amidst increasing media 
and civil society awareness and critical examination of the colonial past.  As explored in the 
previous chapter, German colonialism entered into the public spotlight through the publicity 
surrounding a relatively high profile reparations claim and the centenary of the start of the 
German-Herero War.  In Belgium, colonial introspection reentered public discourse primarily 
through the explosive effects of two books: Adam Hochschild’s 1998 ‘King Leopold’s Ghosts’ 
                                                             
 
90 As illustrated in chapter 6, there is a sense in which the Italian apology also arose amidst increased 
societal introspection regarding the colonial past.  However, it seems that this did not emerge under the 
same intensity as the other case studies of this thesis.   
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and Ludo De Witte’s 1999 ‘The assassination of Lumumba’.  Both these books generated 
enormous public attention, contestation and debate.  In order to comprehend the impact of 
these books and the ensuing public debate, it is first necessary to explore the conventional 
state constructed memory of Belgium’s colonial past. 
 
The conventional narrative 
As discussed in other chapters, there are inevitable problems with discussing a nation’s 
constructed narrative as if it were one monologue.  In Belgium this problem is even more 
pronounced as there are clear divergences in historical memory amongst the complex and 
pluralistic fabric of cultural, linguistic and political identities within the nation (see Labio 2002).  
Nevertheless, one can point to clear attempts among political elites to use the levers available 
to the state – public statues, education, museums and so forth – to manufacture a monolithic 
state crafted colonial narrative.  Indeed, as explored below, it is the very heterogeneity of 
Belgian society and its absence of strong unifying myths that led the state to so forcefully forge 
such a unifying central colonial narrative.  
 
Though the public were not initially enthusiastic colonialists, the colonial project was later 
seen as a valuable means by which to engineer this absent sense of national identity.  Thus, 
despite being unpopular in his lifetime, on his death Belgian elites set about creating a 
Leopoldian cult, the purpose being to provide justification for colonialism and imbue the 
population with a patriotic ‘colonial spirit’ (Vanthemsche 2006: 92).  The simple message, as 
Ewans (2003: 170) writes, was ‘one of patriotic fervour, that their country, in the persons of 
brave and self sacrificing individuals, had brought the light of Christianity and civilisation to a 
savage and heathen continent’.  Importantly, this ‘official narrative’ of a wise and pioneering 
Leopold and a benevolent Belgian project remained largely intact in mainstream discourse 
until the 1990s and even beyond (Vanthemsche 2006).  Indeed, on writing a foreword to a 
1999 edition of his book The King Incorporated: Leopold the Second and the Congo, Ascherson 
(1999: 10) observed that  ‘In my 1963 introduction, I remarked that the Belgians had avoided 
any real reassessment of the Congolese past, and that Leopold II was still honoured as a 
national hero for his mission civilsatrice.  It never occurred to me that this would remain the 
case more than thirty years later’.  
 
This lack of real assessment is reflected in education.  In a Belgian schoolbook for 12 year olds 
in 2006 for instance, Belgian colonialism was presented in the following terms: 
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When the Belgians arrived in the Congo, they found a population that was victim of 
bloody rivalries and slave trade.  Belgian civil servants, missionaries, doctors, 
colonialists and engineers civilized the black population step by step.  They created 
modern cities, roads and railroads, harbours and airports, factories and mines, schools 
and hospitals.  The work greatly improved the living conditions of the indigenous 
people (quoted in Vanthemsche 2006: 90). 
 
In this respect, the reproduction of civilising narrative remained largely unchanged from 
Leopoldian times.  Nevertheless, there is another sense in which the narrative may have 
altered from outright glorification to becoming a taboo (see Braembussche 2002) or subject to 
amnesia:  Castryck (2006: 76-80), for instance, points to the amnesia within Belgian education 
where African studies are at the periphery of education and academia.  Illustrative of this is 
how, in 2006, in the Flemish community net schools (the former state schools in Flanders) only 
one hour out of the entire school curriculum is allocated to ‘The Belgian colonial adventure in 
the Congo’ (Castryck 2006: 85).91  In the words of Guido Gryseels, Director of the Royal 
Museum for Central Africa, ‘my generation was brought up with the view that Belgium had 
brought civilisation to the Congo, that we did nothing but good out there...I don’t think that in 
my entire education I ever heard a critical word about our colonial past’ (quoted in Ewans 
2003: 170)  The overall effect is, at least until recent contestation, a peculiar mix of taboo and 
glorification; taboo at the vast murders, slave labour and atrocity, glorification at Leopold’s 
civilising endeavour.  
 
 Beyond education, the colonial patriotic message was also transmitted through the media 
and, most overtly, through the Royal Museum for Central Africa in Tervuren.  In Castryck’s 
(2006: 2) words, ‘the museum is part and parcel of this history and is without doubt the single 
most important relic or witness to Belgian Colonialism’.  In this sense, the museum is both 
‘exhibitioner’ and ‘exhibited’ – in many respects more illuminative about Belgium and its 
constructed identity than about Africa (Castryck 2006: 2).  It is therefore a useful exercise to 
explore the Belgian colonial narrative through the Royal Museum. 
 
Colonial memories as located in the Museum for Central Africa 
The museum was established by Leopold II as an ‘ideological tool’ (Rahier 2003: 61) through 
which to communicate a powerful propaganda message at the 1897 World Exhibition in 
                                                             
 
91 Castryck (2006:15) also points out that in the other three educational nets there was no provision for 
studying Belgian colonialism at all.  This is not to say that school students receive no education in this 
history – individual teachers may choose to study this subject with their students.  
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Brussels.  Indeed, the museum website states that the showcase was ‘to give the development 
and ‘civilization’ of Congo a higher profile, and also to give the Belgian public a better idea of 
the economic possibilities of the area, Leopold decided to establish a kind of museum to 
‘showcase’ his Congo.’ (Royal Museum for Central Africa n.d.a).  In terms of analysing the 
colonial narrative, it is significant that such jingoistic sentiments have largely remained.  As  
Rahier (2003: 62) wrote just after the apology, ‘the propaganda message that Leopold II 
wanted to convey at the time is still there, displayed without subtlety, despite the superficial 
or cosmetic changes brought to the permanent exposition at various occasions’.  Indeed, the 
director of the museum himself conceded in 2002 that ‘the museum itself hasn’t changed for 
44 years’ and ‘has a colonial spirit to it’ (Osborn 2002).  This colonial spirit has been widely 
deconstructed and critiqued by several authors (Rahier 2003; Hochschild 2005; Hasian and 
Wood 2010).  However, to give a few examples of how these messages are conveyed one can, 
for instance, point to placards reading ‘“La Belgique apportant la civilization au Congo” 
[Belgium bringing civilization to the Congo], “La Belgique apportant le bien-etre au Congo” 
[Belgium bringing well being to the Congo], “L’esclavage” [slavery]92 and “La Belgique 
apportant la securite au Congo” [Belgium bringing well-being to the Congo]’ (Hasian and Wood 
2010: 136).  Equally, Rahier (2003: 59) writes that 
 
While some statues are made in what looks like shiny copper – the ones in which white 
bodies are displayed – others, representing exclusively African people, are made in a 
dark material that appears as secondary vis-a-vis the shiny copper.  Most of the dark 
statues were installed in a lower position than the shiny copper ones, as if to suggest 
to the visitors that they represent people in a naturally lower position than the white 
bodies, which are the focus of the golden-like sculptures.  When there is, in the latter, 
a black body accompanying the white character, it is almost always either a child or an 
adult in a subaltern position’. 
 
In unravelling this conventional narrative, it is clear that even at the time of the 2002 apology 
and into the 21st Century, this officialised mnemonic site continued to reproduce an account of 
colonialism that celebrates Belgium’s civilising role, venerates Leopold and omits the mass 
atrocities committed in the Congo.  Under these conditions, an apology and disavowal of 
colonialism seems quite infeasible.  In many respects this is similar to the preceding chapter 
where it was demonstrated that in the 1980s and 1990s the narrative of a benevolent German 
                                                             
 
92 To be clear, the reference to slavery refers to Arab slavery.  This is reinforced by depictions of ‘an Arab 
slave trader forcing an African woman into slavery after having killed her companion’ (Rahier 2003: 59).  
Indeed, Belgium liberating the Congolese from unscrupulous Arab slave trading was an important 
element of the Leopoliand propaganda message.   
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state (excluding the historical derailment of the Third Reich) prohibited an apology.  Like the 
German case study, the Belgian apology arose in a context whereby this conventional narrative 
had come under sustained challenge. 
 
Contesting the colonial narrative 
As already alluded to, the catalysts for the robust challenge to the aforementioned colonial 
narrative was the publication of two books – Hochschild’s King Leopold’s Ghosts and De 
Witte’s The Assasination of Patrice Lumumba.  However, one might refine this observation:  
The cause of this challenge was not so much the books themselves, but the public reception of 
these books.  Certainly, the content was oppositional to the typical Belgian presentation of the 
past; Hochschild (1998) emotively used the word ‘holocaust’ in his discussion of events of the 
Congo Free State and the estimated 10 million death toll.  Like the impact of Goldhagen’s 
thesis in the German case study, the public reaction to these books cannot simply be explained 
as occurring through the exposure of sensational revelations of previously unknown events.  
Indeed, the gross human rights abuses in the CFS had been infamously publicised a century 
ago by, amongst others, Morel, Twain and Conrad and the Congo Reform Association (see 
Ascherson 1999: 12).  Moreover, Belgian researchers including Jules Marchal, Danny 
Vangroenweghe, Jean Strengers, Jan Vansina and Jean-Luc Vellut had already previously 
exposed much of the information that Hochschild drew on (Castryck 2006: 5-6; Vanthemsche 
2006).  These books were compounded by the 2000 commercial release of the Raoul Peck 
(2000) film Lumumba, dramatising the final months of the Prime Minister’s life.  As such, the 
enormous public reaction to these books must be couched within underlying trends in Belgian 
society.  As explored more extensively in the first section of this chapter, one can point to a 
particular turmoil within Belgian society, perhaps creating a social context in which these new 
revelations enmeshed with a public mood that was increasingly hostile to the orthodoxies of 
the political class. 
 
Within the context of these releases, like the German case study, the previously tabooed93 
subject of the state’s colonial history became a topic of popular and academic discussion.  
Where previously academic work challenging the core tenets of the official narrative was 
marginalised and received little public attention, the University of Ghent held a conference 
entitled ‘Belgium’s Africa Conference:  Assessing the Belgian legacy in and on Africa: the social 
                                                             
 
93 For a wider discussion on Belgian colonialism as a ‘taboo’, see Braembussche (2002). 
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sciences’ in which de Witte was a participant (Ewans 2003: 177).  Hochschild himself addressed 
audiences in Antwerp and Brussels, with listeners ‘concerned about human rights’ and, as he 
writes it, ‘uniformly apologetic that they had learned nothing at school about their country’s 
past in Africa’ (Hochschild 2006: 311). Also contesting the official narrative, in 2004 Ostend’s 
reverential statue of King Leopold II had one of the hands cut off of an adjacent Congolese 
figure that gazes admirably at the King.  The anarchist group responsible demanded that the 
statue be critically annotated (Licata and Klein 2010).94  More recently, in 2008 an artist 
smeared red paint onto a statue of Leopold at the Place du Trône in Brussels (Stanard 2011).   
 
One can get a measure the impact of the immediate contestation on the colonial narrative by 
the Belgian state’s defensive posture.  The Belgian foreign minister released secret advice to 
Belgian diplomats around the world as to how to handle tricky questions regarding 
Hochschild’s book; the premise being that ‘a proactive public relations effort would be futile; 
instead, change the subject to Belgium’s work for peace in Africa today’ (Hochschild 2006: 
312).  Similarly, on the announcement that the RMCA would consider alterations to its 
exhibitions an official maintained that this was ‘absolutely not because of the recent 
disreputable book by an American’ (quoted in Hochschild 2006: 312). 
 
Apology as a defence of the colonial narrative: ‘How to pretend to acknowledge something 
without really doing so’ 
In the 2006 Afterword of King Leopold’s Ghost Hochschild comments on some of these 
alterations to the RMCA in response to the recent challenges to the conventional colonial 
narrative.  The museum website bills the ‘Memory of Congo’ exhibition as ‘a new look at the 
colonial past in which not only the European, but also the African players take their part’ 
(Royal Museum for Central Africa n.d.b). In other words, the new exhibition was a means in 
which a public forum for Belgian memory could respond to its recent challenges.  Certainly the 
new exhibition did provide counter examples to the overarching-narrative; for instance, four of 
Morel’s pictures of mutilated victims of the rubber harvest were displayed (Hasian and Wood 
2010: 139) and there was a painting of an African man being whipped (Riding 2005).  However, 
while these representations remain at the periphery of the exhibition, the overwhelming 
emphasis reiterates ‘that the Congolese desired colonialism’ and that, despite some 
                                                             
 
94 Licata and Klein (2010: 55) write that such a critical annotation ‘would change the monument’s 
identity-related assertion from “We are a nation that colonized another for its own good” to “We are a 
nation that unfairly colonized another, but we have learned the critical lessons of that experience.”’       
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uncontrolled excesses, the Congo remained a model colony (Hasian and Wood 2010: 138).  
Hochschild (2006: 312) terms these representations – that is the interweaving of negative 
images within a larger picture of positive imagery – as an example of ‘how to pretend to 
acknowledge something without really doing so’. 
 
The point here is that the technique of pretending to acknowledge something without really 
doing so is also central to understanding the narrative weaved in Michel’s apology.  This is to 
say that the Lumumba Committee and the entailing apology can be, as communicated by Louis 
Michel, framed as part of ‘a transparent attempt to cast light, without taboos, on the African 
past’ (Persdienst Buitenlandse Zaken 2004).  As such, the Lumumba Committee is presented 
almost as if the Belgian state has now lain to rest its misdemeanours with Congo.  Of course 
the assassination of Patrice Lumumba is a significant crime for which it is appropriate to 
acknowledge culpability.  However, as Gibney (2002: 281) also argues, ‘these events were 
simply manifestations of much larger phenomena and much deeper wrongs’.  In this case, like 
the British and German apologies, offering mea culpa for one aspect of Belgian colonialism is 
to isolate the incident and, at least by implication, detach it from the wider structural 
mechanisms, ideologies and mindsets that provided the context.  In this sense, apologising for 
the Lumumba assassination is to portray certain events as ‘over-stepping the mark’ or ‘out of 
character’, while negating the more comprehensive and firmly rooted injustices of which this 
murder was symptomatic.   
 
Where the wider colonial project was not subject to mea culpa, sitting with the methodology 
of the thesis, an analysis of governmental rhetoric outside of the apology text provides an 
insight into the broader narratives proffered regarding the colonial past.    An illuminating case 
of point was the response to the airing of the BBC documentary White King, Red Rubber, Black 
Death (Bate 2003), a documentary that repeats many of the core tenets of Hochshild’s book.  
After apparent opposition to the documentary from the Royal Family, state television allegedly 
agreed to censure any comparison to Hitler and any reference to the sources of the current 
Royal Family’s wealth (The Flemish Republic 2004).  Moreover, Michel took the unusual step of 
releasing an official statement through the Foreign Affairs Press Office condemning the 
programme as ‘partisan’ and failing to recognise a ‘set of positive contributions that our 
Congolese partners do not fail to recognise’ (Persdienst Buitenlandse Zaken 2004).  More 
recently, in his later position as an MEP, Michel, the very politician who offered the apology, 
labelled Leopold II as ‘an ambitious visionary’ and ‘a hero who had ambitions for a small 
country like Belgium’.  Against accusations that Leopoldian colonialism turned Congo into a 
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labour camp, he contended that it was ‘a false accusation. Leopold II does not deserve such a 
reproach. The Belgians built railways, schools and hospitals and stimulated economic growth in 
Congo. A labour camp? Not at all’.  Although conceding that ‘some things did go wrong’, he 
maintained that ‘eventually civilisation was introduced’ (quoted in Flandersnews.be 2010).   
Coming from a liberal leaning, human rights advocate, such rhetoric correlates with the central 
arguments of the thesis:  There is a sense in which apology does impart revised and penitent 
aspersions on a particular aspect of the past; yet, adjacent to the mea culpa, there endures 
clichéd assumptions of civilisation, progress and veneration of leadership that are reminiscent 
of the conventional colonial discourse.  In this sense, it seems that the proffering of apology 
for narrow aspects of the past is not a matter of radically overhauling prevailing colonial 
mindsets.  Instead, in conceding some limited aspect of the past, it is a discursive act of 
preserving, in so far as possible, the larger architecture of the colonial narrative against further 
contestation. 
 
Speaking for the Subaltern:  The Eurocentric narrative of The Lumumba commission  
There is equally a sense in which the Commission investigating Lumumba’s death, in its very 
establishment and structure, is itself pregnant with Eurocentric assumptions and 
complacencies.  Such assumptions are couched in the enquiry’s positivistic and methodical 
language.  For instance, the commission speaks of ‘experts’ for ‘content related and historic-
scientific work’ as well as the ‘scientific objectivity of this commission’ (Chambre des 
Représentants 2001a).  Likewise, Michel employs a similar discourse in the actual apology, 
esteeming the ‘reliability and quality of work’ and its ‘pleasing contribution of scientific, 
cultural, historical, political and even therapeutic character’ (Michel 2002: 52).  It seems, then, 
that there is a certain triumphalism in the committee’s methodological process and findings, 
almost as if it is only the scientific rigour of the commission that could uncover such past 
events.  Of course, like the British governmental Inquiry into Bloody Sunday (see chapter 5), 
the idea that this was an act of violence by a colonial power had long been understood by the 
colonised.  Yet, the implications of the proceedings are that such findings can only be validated 
or authenticated under the auspices of the metoropole’s state apparatus. To recall (see 
chapter 2), postcolonial thought is sceptical as to the existence of one ‘objective truth’ and 
posits that such discourse is inextricably concurrent to the vocabulary of domination and 
imperialism.   Linked with the central argument of this thesis, this comprises a discernible 
process by which the mechanics and trappings of a European state narrate and authorise a 
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particular officialised subaltern past, in this case, ‘the exact circumstances of the assassination 
of Partrice Lumumba and the possible involvement of European politicians’.95 
 
Additionally, this self-appointed and rather pious solemnity and scientific rigour was extended 
to illuminative degrees in the committee’s investigative process.  As recorded in the report, 
‘during the appointment of experts, candidates were not only assessed on their scientific 
qualities but emphasis was also placed on their independence and neutrality’ (Chambre des 
Représentants 2001a).  In this regard, it is interesting that the ‘experts’ did not include any 
African historians in the composition of the Commission.  In the interest of objectivity, four 
domestic historians were picked from different language and ideological groups within 
Belgium (Castryck 2006: 77).  However, though Belgians could seemingly be impartial, as 
(Castryck 2006: 83) writes, ‘Belgian paternalism decided that no Congolese historian was able 
to be neutral in this matter’.  Instead, there was one Congolese historian, Jean Omasombo, 
who ‘assisted’ the experts ‘in a number of specific assignments’ (Chambre des Représentants 
2001a).  Omasombo later recorded that his role amounted to ‘window dressing’ (quoted in 
Bustin 2002: 546), saying 
 
I was officially part of the team with the ambiguous denomination of ‘ad hoc’ and/or 
‘deputy’ expert.  As far as I was concerned (...) the reason for this treatment was that 
they thought that I, as a Congolese, could not be neutral.  Though I was ‘expert’, during 
the few months I was permitted to meet the ‘real experts’ I was imposed a 
‘methodology’ consisting above all of interdictions:  I could not work with the group 
and I was not permitted to ‘touch Belgian archives in order to ‘protect me’, so they 
said! (...)  It was for me the occasion to feel being a Negro, being perceived as having 
no proper personality, because of biological determinism, representing part of the 
world and being its spokesman.  I really could feel how much the colonial view was still 
heavily present in the conduct (quoted in Castryck 2006: 84-85). 
 
Beyond the omission of Congolese historians, the methodology of the commission - relying on 
the ‘factual’ data of the archives - also contributed to the omission of Congolese accounts.  In 
total only about thirty people testified before the commission, almost all of whom were 
Belgian politicians or civil servants.  ‘Only a small number of Congolese testified, and they were 
often people available in Belgium at the time’ (Verdoolaege and Kerstens 2004: 88). 
 
                                                             
 
95 To use the full title of the committee. 
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Unsurprisingly, this methodology and composition of the Commission manifests itself in the 
positivist, clipped and authoritative findings that the Commission narrates.  To take just two 
examples: 
 
With regard to the exact circumstances of the murder of Patrice Lumumba: after a 
thorough analysis it is highly probable that Lumumba was executed in the jungle on 17 
January 1961 between 9.40pm and 9.43pm’ (Chambre des Représentants 2001b). 
 
And 
 
The execution occurred in the presence of Katangan ministers and was carried out by 
Katangan gendarmes or police officers, in the presence of a Belgian police 
commissioner and three Belgian officers who were under the authority, leadership and 
supervision of the Katangan authorities’ (Chambre des Représentants 2001b). 
 
As Bustin (2002: 547) writes, the text ‘strikes a middle-of the road, ‘adult’ prose’’, akin to 
‘settling an argument between children’.  Such discourse reflects the rhetoric of the ‘objective’ 
mechanics of Lumumba’s death.  However, it negates the subjective mentalities of racism and 
superiority that underpinned both the colonial process and Lumumba’s assassination.  Such 
sentiments could not be captured in the format of the commission and, as such, are negated in 
the official narratives of Lumumba’s death. 
 
Conclusion 
In examining the 2002 Belgian apology for involvement in the assassination of Patrice 
Lumumba, this chapter has unfolded a context that straddles a nexus of social, political and 
mnemonic conditions from which the apology both arises and addresses.  The first section of 
the chapter analysed the party political environment from which the apology arose.  In a 
similar way to the British case study (chapter 5), the apology occurred under a period of 
discontent with perceived corruption within the orthodox political-class.  In this respect, the 
apology expediently intersected with the new coalition’s championing of a ‘new political 
culture’ and a construction of their own political image as trustworthy and transparent (cf. 
Kerstens 2008).  It has been suggested that such political posturing indicates, to some extent, a 
mea culpa that is rather more absorbed with domestic presentational and electoral matters, 
than a thorough examination of violence committed against the former colony.  Likewise, in 
foreign policy terms, the offering of apology for this past episode could further lubricate the 
government’s parlance of international human rights.  In this way, the contrition was in line 
with the government’s geo-political objectives of playing a more active diplomatic role in the 
region of its former colony (cf. Kerstens 2008).  In this respect, it has been contended that the 
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apology is pregnant with paternalistic overtones that underscore the merits of Belgian 
benevolence in the region. 
 
Finally, the chapter positioned the apology within the increasingly contested ‘official’ state 
narrative of the colonial past.  Certainly recognition of culpability for Lumumba’s death does, 
in one sense, represent a break from the typically aggrandising plotline of Belgium’s past 
interactions with the Congo.  Nevertheless, the analysis here underscored numerous ways by 
which, even in apology, familiar colonial discourses and mindsets circulate.  This is not least 
indicated by the apologising agent’s continued apologia and reverence for Leopold II.  
Likewise, the chapter has explored processes by which such sites as school textbooks, 
curriculums and the Royal Museum of Central Africa reproduce paternalist and, to varying 
degrees, exalting assumptions of the colonial past.  Indeed, even the very constitution of the 
Lumumba commission facilitated both a condescending stance towards Congolese historians 
and a discernibly self-congratulating approach to the metropole undertaking a ‘scientific’ 
investigation into violence committed in the former colony.   Sitting, then, with the overriding 
argument of the thesis, this chapter has examined a web of contestations and expediencies 
that intersect with the state’s mea culpa.  Inseparably from this, it has underscored processes 
by which, despite the narrow apology for a particularly egregious episode of violence, there is 
a persistence of discourses, representations and ideologies that are reminiscent of those that 
the colonialists used to legitimise their endeavours.  These discourses linger beyond, and even 
within, the apology. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE BRITISH APOLOGY FOR BLOODY SUNDAY 
  
The conclusions of this report are absolutely clear. There is no doubt, there is nothing 
equivocal, there are no ambiguities. What happened on Bloody Sunday was both 
unjustified and unjustifiable. It was wrong.  Some members of our armed forces acted 
wrongly. The Government is ultimately responsible for the conduct of our armed 
forces and for that, on behalf of the Government – and indeed our country – I am 
deeply sorry. 
  
David Cameron (2010) 
 
Introduction 
On 30 January 1972 the British army opened fire at a civil rights march in Derry, Northern 
Ireland, killing fourteen96 unarmed civilians.  In a subsequent report initiated the next day by 
the British government, the Widgery Tribunal, to all extents and purposes, exonerated the 
soldiers and army chain of command97 and stated that there was a ‘strong suspicion’ that 
some of those killed ‘had been firing weapons or handling bombs in the course of the 
afternoon’ (Widgery 2001: 100) This report is now discredited and universally regarded as 
unsafe.  Indeed, as Hayes and Campbell (2005: 145) astutely contend, the Widgery Tribunal 
was ‘from the beginning, overtly political in its function’.  By contrast, The Bloody Sunday 
Inquiry (hereafter referred to as the Saville Inquiry), which published its findings in 2010 and 
drew an immediate Parliamentary apology from British Prime Minister David Cameron, has 
been held up as a model example of a state holding itself to account (Cameron 2010).  The 
argument outlaid in this chapter is that, while the findings of the Saville Inquiry are clearly 
more palatable than that of Widgery, the Saville Inquiry’s establishment and subsequent 
apology are no less political in their function.  Like the other case studies, it is argued here that 
there is no single political expedience that elicited the apology, but rather several political 
factors that coalesced in facilitating it.  Recognising this, this chapter is divided into three 
sections.  The first section situates Saville within the context of the Northern Ireland Peace 
Process.  It is posited that a renewed introspection into the massacre operated as a means to 
facilitate the incorporation of the nationalist community within the consociational vision of the 
                                                             
 
96 Thirteen died on the day.  A fourteenth died later due to his injuries. 
97 Widgery (2001: 99-100) does write that at one end of the scale the ‘firing bordered on the reckless’.  
However, he writes that ‘there is no reason to suppose that the soldiers would have opened fire if they 
had not been fired upon first’, and moreover that ‘there was no general breakdown in discipline.  For 
the most part the soldiers acted as they did because they thought their orders required it’.  
134 
 
process.  Moreover, this renewed judicial process reinforced Britain’s posturing as an impartial 
and objective arbitrator in the process.  
 
The second section, explores the style of political discourse fostered by British Prime Ministers, 
Tony Blair and David Cameron (the key figures in offering contrition).  It is suggested that these 
Prime Ministers’ propensities for emotionalised gestures of pseudo sincerity enabled a forum 
in which the apology becomes – to some extent – a narcissistic story about the supposedly 
desirable traits of these politicians. The final section, like other case studies in this thesis, 
traces the modes by which the apology reconfigures a narrative that resembles tenets of the 
archetypal colonial discourse.  It is suggested that the apology shows a reverence for the 
armed forces that sits with idealised colonial fantasies of the heroic and chivalrous British 
soldier.  By extension, the apology advances a plotline that detaches the massacre from the 
wider colonial enterprise in Northern Ireland and, instead, discursively contextualises it within 
a Northern Ireland that is caricatured with the colonial imagery of chaos and disorder. 
   
The Saville Inquiry as a parallel to the Peace Process 
To restate; a core argument of the thesis is that state leaders draw on mea culpa in the service 
of political expediency.  In concurrence with this argument, this section situates the Saville 
Inquiry and subsequent apology within the context of London objectives in regards to the 
Northern Ireland Peace Process.  To this end, the Saville Inquiry reinforced and buttressed the 
structure and mentality of the Peace Process in two overlapping ways:  Firstly, within a 
consociational process that gives institutional eminence to the constructed communities of 
Irish Nationalists and Ulster Unionists (Gilligan 2003: 22), the inquiry functioned to symbolise 
Britain’s posturing that it could mediate between the communities in a non-biased and 
objective manner.  Secondly, by going some way towards ratifying nationalist memories of this 
pivotal and emotive event, the Inquiry served as a means to entice nationalists into the 
dynamics the peace process.  In this sense, readdressing an alienating past event sought, in the 
parlance of the process, to ‘build confidence’ and demonstrate to the nationalist community 
Britain’s benign intentions. 
     
Contesting and converging memories:  Ratifying the Nationalist narrative 
So as to grasp the mnemonic and political significance of both Bloody Sunday and the Saville 
Inquiry within the Peace Process, it is first necessary to explore the divergent ways in which 
this event is conventionally recollected, both by British elites and by the nationalist 
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community.  In undertaking this task, this is not to say that the nationalist community (or, 
indeed, British elites) is a homogenous entity, nor is it to contend that there is a single 
monolithic narrative of Bloody Sunday within this sector of society.  Indeed, as Halbwachs 
(1980: 48) recognised, each member of a group draws from societal memory from their own 
particular viewpoint.  Nevertheless, by pointing to particular mnemonic sites, it is possible to 
locate common themes within this sector of society.  Indeed, as Conway (2003: 305) 
comments (prior to the apology), Bloody Sunday traditionally evoked ‘two contesting 
memories’ – that of the ‘official’ memory encapsulated in the Widgery Tribunal, and that of a 
‘popular memory [that] has emerged in resistance to this that carries the remembrances of the 
victims’ families and of the wider Nationalist community’ in Ireland.   
 
Embodying the official British memory, the Widgery Tribunal, which was initiated the day after 
the massacre and published its findings just eleven weeks later, essentially served to hastily 
acquit British security services of any wrong-doing, while apportioning blame to the protestors 
and ‘hooligans’98 (Widgery 2001: 98).  Stand out sentences from Widgery’s rather brief 
conclusions affirm that ‘there is no reason to suppose that the soldiers would have opened fire 
if they had not been fired upon first’, and that ‘there was no general breakdown in [army] 
discipline’.  Regarding the protestors, he stated that ‘there would have been no deaths in 
Londonderry on 30 January if those who organised the illegal march had not thereby created a 
highly dangerous situation in which a clash between demonstrators and the security forces 
was almost inevitable’ (Widgery 2001: 97).  Likewise, ‘none of the deceased or wounded is 
proved to have been shot whilst handling a firearm or bomb.  Some are wholly acquitted of 
complicity in such action; but there is a strong suspicion that some others had been firing 
weapons or handling bombs in the course of the afternoon’ (Widgery 2001: 99-100).  The overt 
political function of these findings by the former army officer appear obvious:  In broad 
daylight in front of television cameras the British state had killed its own citizens who were 
attending a civil rights march.  Thus, in the mist of worldwide protest99 and the transparent 
breakdown of order within its own sovereign territory, it was thereby necessary to attempt, 
                                                             
 
98 A word that Widgery employs several times in the report.  For instance, he describes how ‘hooligan 
gangs in Londonderry constituted a special threat to security forces’ (Widgery 2001: 16)   Obviously this 
word confers on the protestors a mindless violence that is detached from a legitimate civil rights 
movement. 
99 British embassies around the world were picketed, with the British embassy in Dublin besieged and 
set on fire.  There were expressions of solidarity and sympathy from the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation and the African National Congress (McCann 1992: 206). 
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however crudely, to construct a narrative that underscored the security forces’ use of violence 
as legitimate and to cast those that dissented as illegitimate. 
 
The nationalist memory, in contrast, is conventionally represented in oral storytelling, popular 
culture (for example, the pop band U2’s song ‘Sunday Bloody Sunday’), an annual public 
commemoration in Derry (see Dawson 2005), ‘street murals, granite monuments and 
commemorative rituals’ in the town (Conway 2003: 306; see also Conway 2010). One 
permanent memorial on Rossville Street, the Bloody Sunday Monument, is dedicated to the 
memory of those who ‘were murdered by British paratroopers’.  Likewise, the Bloody Sunday 
Mural represents the iconic image of Father Edward Daly waving a white handkerchief and 
attempting to guide the mortally injured John Duddy to safety.  The mural also depicts an 
armed British soldier standing (or trampling) on a white civil rights banner.  The civil rights 
banner is blood soaked in a manner that creates a red cross against the white background so 
as to resemble the English flag.  These images, amongst others within Derry, interweave the 
memory of Bloody Sunday within the fabric and landscape of the community.  The images 
clearly contest the Widgery narrative, and portray an aggressive and murderous British military 
in juxtaposition to the unarmed civil rights protestors.  On their part, the families of those who 
died have become central carriers of this counter narrative, continually campaigning for the 
recognition of the innocence of their relatives.  In particular, this has manifested itself in civil 
society movements in the form of The Bloody Sunday Initiative, a group formed in the late 
1980s by relatives of the victims, and by the launch of The Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign, 
initiated in 1992 on the 20th anniversary of the massacre (Dawson 2005: 154).   Thus, the 
central tenets of this narrative rest on the innocence of the victims and the unchecked 
aggression of the British army. 
 
Clearly, then, the official narrative enshrined in the Widgery report is not only contradictory to 
the nationalist memory, but is also highly antagonistic to it:  Compounding the fact that British 
security forces shot those who dissented to its policies, the judicial processes of the British 
state, supposedly designed to uphold law and justice, instead served the interests of the 
British establishment in acquitting the killers and criminalising the dead.  In Walsh’s (2000: 
284) words, ‘the failure of law and justice encapsulated by Bloody Sunday is so fundamental 
that it is seared into the collective consciousness of the nationalist community.  It, more than 
any other individual incident, law or practice, has instilled in the nationalist community a 
fundamental distrust in the capacity of the law and judicial process to protect them against 
hostile forces within the province of Northern Ireland.’  Indeed, as Cameron (2010) himself 
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acknowledged in his apology, Bloody Sunday marked an escalation in IRA recruitment and a 
spiralling of violence. 
 
In this way, one must locate the apology and shifting ‘official’ memory both within processes 
of powerful contestation towards the narrative offered by the Widgery report and within 
shifting political contexts and expediencies.   In this vein, the Widgery Report was published in 
and around the context of the breakdown of the Stormont Assembly, the imposition of direct 
rule and a challenge to the monopoly of the British state’s violence.  As such, it can be seen as 
a knee-jerk act of preserving the state security forces’ immediate legitimacy, and therefore, by 
necessity, was an act of marginalising a community that it perceived (or wished to construct) 
as a threat.  In this context, it appears that the political imperative was the immediate 
preservation of state legitimacy.  Moreover, the exclusion of the nationalist and wider Irish 
Catholic community sat with both the dynamics of the political situation in Northern Ireland 
(i.e. direct rule) and the concurrent ‘othering’ of Irish migrants that was virulent within Britain 
of which, despite their white skin, reflected an enduring colonial racism (see Hickman 1995; 
Mac an Ghaill 2000).100 
 
In contrast, by the 1990s and 21st century, one can observe a shifting societal and political 
landscape in which these narratives circulate.  On the one hand, in Britain (like other case 
studies) the most overt markers of anti Irish-racism had, by the 1990s, declined, even if it had 
not entirely disappeared.  Moreover, in an increasingly multi-cultural society, alternative 
ethnic minorities had acquired the role of ‘other’ within British society.  More significantly, in 
regards to the onset of the 1990s Peace Process, where direct rule required the active 
marginalisation of the nationalist community, the shift towards devolved governance required 
the nationalist community’s active participation in the governance of the province.  To this 
end, it is useful to draw on the work of Mellissa Nobles.  In her book, The Politics of Official 
Apologies, Nobles (2008: 2) contends that ‘organised groups and state actors demand and 
provide apologies in order to help change the terms and meanings of national membership’.  
She argues that apologies are an important device through which to ratify a politically 
ostracised group’s interpretation of history.   As such, they are a means for political elites to 
register their ideological and moral support for certain minority groups, thereby bringing 
                                                             
 
100 Of the 19th and early 20th century representation of the Irish ‘other’, Mac an Ghaill (2000: 138) shows 
that ‘there was a wide range of markers of difference that juxtaposed the dirtiness, drunkenness, 
laziness and violence of the alien Irish with the purity, industriousness and civilization of the English’.   
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‘outsider groups’ in from the political wilderness and incorporating their historical struggles 
into a mainstream encompassing narrative. 
 
Considering Nobles’ insights, it is clear that the Saville Inquiry and David Cameron’s apology 
did go a significant way to ratifying dual pillars of the nationalist memory – the innocence of 
the victims and the brutal culpability of the Army.  Most significantly (through his paraphrasing 
of the report) Cameron (2010) contradicted Widgery by recognising that ‘on balance the first 
shot in the vicinity of the march was fired by the British Army’ and that ‘none of the casualties 
shot by soldiers of Support Company was armed with a firearm.’  Moreover, in contrast to 
Widgery’s account that there had been no general breakdown in army discipline, Cameron said 
‘that Support Company “reacted by losing their self, forgetting or ignoring their instructions 
and training”’ with ‘“a serious and widespread loss of fire discipline”’.  The Prime Minister also 
graphically relayed Saville’s findings that ‘one person was shot while “crawling away from the 
soldiers”, and another ‘was shot, in all probability, “when he was lying mortally wounded on 
the ground”’.  Indeed, with an obvious intimation to the nationalist audience, Cameron 
addressed his comments ‘to those looking for statements of innocence’ that ‘crucially...none of 
the casualties was posing a threat of causing death or serious injury, or indeed was doing 
anything else that could on any view justify their shooting’ (Cameron 2010).  As such, Cameron 
consciously ratified two central elements of the nationalist narrative:  Firstly, he affirmed the 
innocence of those killed.  Secondly, although he did not use such words as ‘murder’, Cameron 
utilised Saville to ratify the nationalist narrative of unjustified and unprovoked killing. 
 
It is, at this juncture, pertinent to recall insights from Chapter 2, whereby it was contended 
that societal memories cannot be reconfigured with instantaneous effect, but can only shift 
over an elongated period.  Likewise, this also sits with Yamazaki’s (2004) observation that 
apologies are not ‘standalone’ texts, but are frequently co-constructed through extended 
processes entailing a certain to-ing and fro-ing between various interested parties and their 
mediators.  In this sense, although it was the Westminster apology that garnered a high degree 
of media attention, one must consider this as an aspect of a series of political and rhetorical 
exchanges that paralleled the Peace Process and both addressed and made escalating 
overtures to the aforementioned nationalist narrative.  Evidencing this:  at the embryonic 
stage of the Peace Process, British Prime Minister John Major stated in an open letter to John 
Hume in December 1992 that ‘those who were killed on ‘Bloody Sunday’ should be regarded as 
innocent of any allegation that they were shot whilst handling firearms or explosives.  I hope 
the families of those who died will accept that assurance’ (quoted in BBC 2005b).  It is not 
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surprising that such a timid statement regarding such a violent and judicially mishandled event 
failed to appease the victims’ families.  Following 1997, a series of affairs coalesced to intensify 
the necessity for introspection.  The most significant event was the publication of Don Mullan’s 
(1997) book Eyewitness Bloody Sunday – a book that interviewed scores of witnesses and 
convincingly discredited much of Widgery’s conclusions.  In a related move, the Irish 
government announced its own commissioning of a report into the events of Bloody Sunday 
based on the recent evidence that had come to light (Herron and Lynch 2006: 72).  Finally, 
1997 saw the election of a Labour government in Westminster, thereby creating a British 
government that was arguably more reflexive and open to contrition than its predecessor (see 
pages 144-148).  According to his Chief of Staff, Tony Blair was himself willing to offer an 
apology, but was persuaded by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Irish 
government that an apology without an independent inquiry would not be sufficient (Powell 
2008: 45).  This account is corroborated by former Irish Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, who revealed 
he ‘had put a lot of pressure on Tony Blair’ because, in his words: 
 
The Irish government had done a submission, and we had put a lot at stake in building 
up nationalist confidence that we would be able to work with the British government 
and work with Tony Blair.  So to have them refuse to give us the inquiry, a full judicial 
sworn inquiry in front of judges at that time, it would have unsettled all the 
organisations that were in Derry fighting the British for a long time’ (quoted in 
McDonald 2010). 
 
The purpose of illustrating this political wrangling is to illustrate that Cameron’s overtures to 
the nationalist memory - the recognition of the innocence of the victims and the unjustifiable 
nature of the killings - cannot be understood in isolation.  In fact, Cameron simply happened to 
be the inhabitant of Downing Street on the day of Saville’s publication (although clearly 
Cameron did make the decision to respond to the inquiry by offering an apology).  Thus, just as 
the Good Friday Agreement must be located in the context of numerous developments (both 
before and since), so too must the apology.  To this end, the reorientation of Britain’s ‘official’ 
stance on Bloody Sunday did not just occur in 2010, but developed, non-coincidentally, in a 
manner that paralleled the peace process.  Indeed, subsequent to the apology, in 2011 Queen 
Elizabeth II made the first visit of the British head of state to Ireland since its independence.  
Though unspecific, she continued the theme of contrition, extending her ‘deep sympathy’ ‘To 
all those who have suffered as a consequence of our troubled past’ (quoted in Cowell 2011).   
That the various contrite stances appear over an elongated period reflects both the nature of 
shifting memory (that it cannot be instantaneously transfigured) and its concurrence with the 
logic of the Peace Process.  In other words, where a final constitutional arrangement for 
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Northern Ireland is uncertain and continually delayed, this establishes a situation whereby it 
‘provides a framework through which disagreement can be constrained without resort to 
violence’ (Gilligan 2003: 22).  In this way, the situation of perpetual conflict management and 
elongated outreaching to the two communities (in this case the nationalist community) sits 
with the nature of the Peace Process, which requires a ‘permanent process’ (Gilligan 2003). 
       
British fair play: Treating ‘both sides’ equally   
Beyond enticing the nationalist community into the Peace Process, a second aspect of the 
Saville Inquiry was in symbolising and further crystallising British elites’ unwaveringly rhetorical 
emphasis on Britain as an impartial facilitator of peace.  A central component of this posturing 
rests on the concept of parity of self esteem.  The concept of parity of self esteem ‘is grounded 
in the assumption that there are two mutually exclusive and hostile cultures in Northern 
Ireland, and that those cultures must be accommodated’ (Ruohomäki 2010: 164).  This is to say 
that the approach to the ‘Peace Process’ has been for the negotiators to deal even-handedly 
with both so called ‘traditions’ in Northern Ireland, in regards to institutional arrangements, 
but also in regards to the dignity accorded to their history and culture.  Northern Ireland 
Secretary Patrick Mayhew defined this in 1999, saying that ‘each of the main components of 
the community will be given recognition by the other, and in any settlement each must be 
accorded parity of esteem, the validity of its tradition receiving unqualified recognition’ 
(quoted in Ruohomäki 2010: 168).  Likewise, the Frameworks for the Future document 
published by the UK and Republic of Ireland governments in 1995 confirmed that 
 
Any new political arrangements must be based on full respect for, and protection and 
expression of, the rights and identities of both traditions in Ireland and even-handedly 
afford both communities in Northern Ireland parity of esteem and treatment (cited in 
Ruohomäki 2010: 169). 
 
Such outwardly equal treatment is meticulously embodied in the language regarding the 
institutional and constitutional make ups of official texts on the peace process, enabling 
‘specific procedures for the allocation of committee chairs, ministers, and committee 
membership in proportion to party strength in the assembly.’  There are also arrangements for 
parallel consent and weighted majority voting regarding key decisions (Wolff 2003: 9).  The 
assumption of such a parity of esteem is that the British government may act as a neutral 
arbitrator between the two traditions.  This supposed impartiality of the British government 
was most equivocally codified in the 1993 Downing Street Declaration that underscores that 
Britain has ‘no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland’.  Instead, according to 
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the document, Britain’s role is to ‘encourage, facilitate and enable the achievement of such 
agreement over a period through a process of dialogue and cooperation based on full respect 
for the rights and identities of both traditions in Ireland’ (Reynolds and Major 1993).  It is 
within this context of the supposed equality of the two traditions that one can situate the 
Saville Inquiry.  Indeed, in his account of the Peace Process, Tony Blair’s Chief of staff, Jonathan 
Powell (2008: 46), noted that ‘the aim [of the Saville Inquiry] had been to demonstrate to 
nationalists and republicans that we were even-handed and that the British government no 
longer had anything to hide’.  In other words, the Saville Inquiry was forged almost as a 
microcosm of the peace process; it symbolically underscored early in Blair’s premiership that 
both the British government and judicial process could operate transparently and openly in 
deeply divisive issues of the past.  
 
The idea that Britain is a neutral arbitrator in the conflict and the Saville Inquiry, rests on the 
assumption that Ireland ‘is deeply, indeed irrefutably divided between two competing ethno-
national communities’ (Taylor 2006).  This notion is not simply conjecture but is ingrained in 
the very fabric of the peace process:  Indeed, the very nature of the peace process, from the 
Downing Street Declaration, the Good Friday Agreement to elite discourse habitually uses the 
language of two ‘traditions’.  In doing so, it fosters a mentality in which Northern Irish society 
is characterised as consisting of two competing sides101 – Protestants and Catholics – who are 
uncritically assumed to be synonymous with Ulster Unionism or Irish Nationalism (Taylor 2006: 
217).  Indeed, this is inscribed in the findings of the Saville Inquiry, reading that ‘throughout 
much of Northern Ireland there were deep and seemingly irreconcilable divisions between 
nationalists (predominantly Roman Catholic and a majority in the city) and unionists (generally 
Protestant and a majority in Northern Ireland as a whole). In general terms the former wanted 
Northern Ireland to leave the United Kingdom and unite with the rest of Ireland, while the 
latter wanted it to remain part of the United Kingdom’ (Saville, Hoyt et al. 2010: Volume I 
chapter 2).  This concept of ‘sides’ within a zero-sum game is perfectly illustrated in British 
Prime Minister John Major’s reflection that ‘if one side was happy, I knew I had probably got it 
wrong.  If my proposals attracted no more than grumbling and grudging acquiescence from 
both sides, I was perhaps on the right track’ (quoted in Dixon 2001: 358)   The idea that Bloody 
Sunday, The Troubles, the Peace Process or any other euphemism are about two-sides is both 
                                                             
 
101 Blair’s chief advisor, Jonathon Powell (2005), reflected (five years before the publishing of the report) 
that, in hindsight, Saville ‘had failed to give satisfaction to either side’.  
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an oversimplification and a distortion of Britain’s colonial role in such creations.  Firstly, the 
euphemistic two ‘traditions’ or ‘communities’ are not intrinsic givens, but imagined constructs:  
They are based on the colonial and condescending mentality that Northern Ireland can only be 
understood through the lens of irreconcilable ethno-national divisions.  It is to attribute to the 
province a kind of tribalism that is frequently ascribed to other colonised territories; namely 
that the colonised society, unlike the metropole, is not stratified by class or ideology, but a 
pre-modern, irrational form of clanship. 
 
Moreover, if one is to follow the sport’s analogy of the ‘two-sides’, this is to cast Britain in the 
dubious position as officiator.  This adjudicating position is reflected in both a British Law Lord 
again residing over the events of Bloody Sunday and Britain’s rhetorical positioning as an 
‘unselfish’ party and facilitator of peace.  This is to elevate Britain above the sectarian divide 
and negate the fact that Britain and its security forces are themselves a central party in the 
conflict. As McCann (2008) writes, ‘the British Government is one of the “sides” as far as 
Bloody Sunday is concerned.  The January 1972 atrocity wasn’t perpetrated by one community 
against the other.  It was perpetrated by soldiers of the British government’.  Beyond Bloody 
Sunday, the British Army and security forces have participated in ‘counter insurgency’ 
methods, including collusion with Loyalist paramilitary organisations,102 internment without 
trial, curfew,103 mass house searches and seemingly arbitrary arrests (Campbell and Connelly 
2003).  Casting the London government as a mediating force above the sectarian divide is to 
show a negation as to Britain’s colonial role in instigating ‘the Troubles’. 
 
One must also be critical as to the political realities of any claim to neutrality embedded within 
the Saville Inquiry and the wider Peace Process.  The consociational nature of the process – 
together with Britain’s supposed neutrality – have created tensions that are ambiguous, 
contradictorily and serve to reinforce prevailing inequalities.  In the political rhetoric of the 
metropoles’ politicians, such contradictions can be demonstrated in Major’s dual remarks that 
he was ‘scrupulously fair to both traditions...It does not favour one side or the other’, while 
                                                             
 
102 Collusion refers to members of the security forces operating either formerly or informally in cohort 
with paramilitary organisations, death squads and gangs to carry out extra-legal activities such as the 
elimination of dissent.  For a discussion of collusion within Northern Ireland see Symth and Ellison (2000: 
ch 8).     
103 For an analysis of the July 1970 Army curfew in Belfast’s Lower Falls district see Campbell and 
Connelly (2003).  
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simultaneously being ‘Four Square’ behind the Union (quoted in Dixon 2001: 357-358).104  
Showing a similar contradiction and ambivalence, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo 
Mowlam, announced ‘I value the Union.  I have throughout my time in this job tried to 
facilitate an accommodation, and I have said at times therefore I am impartial.  I value the 
Union but I am not taking one side or the other, because we need in this process to pull 
together’ (cited in Dixon 2001: 358-359).  Beyond such oratory, the same contradictions are 
evident in the documents that underpin the peace process.  For instance, the Downing Street 
Declaration simultaneously recognises that 
      
The British Government agree that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by 
agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-
determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, 
to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish. 
 
And that 
 
The Prime Minister, on behalf of the British Government, reaffirms that they will 
uphold the democratic wish of the greater number of the people of Northern Ireland 
on the issue of whether they prefer to support the Union or a sovereign united Ireland 
(Reynolds and Major 1993). 
 
In other words, the Peace Process pays lip service to the irreconcilable aspirations of both 
nationalists and unionists.  It affirms Britain’s openness to a united Ireland and the nationalists’ 
right to self determination, while simultaneously making the former a virtual impossibility 
owing to the existing demographics of Northern Ireland.  Consequently, such claims to 
impartiality – as embodied in both the Saville Inquiry and the peace process more broadly – 
must be scrutinised through a critical lens.  Britain remains sovereign over Northern Ireland 
and its claim to impartiality should not be dehistoricised from colonial, judicial, military and 
economic measures that continue to impact on social relations to this day.  To relate this to 
the overriding argument of the thesis, one can point to how the Saville Inquiry and subsequent 
apology, reflect a metropole that is supposedly benign and judicious in its discourse, yet still 
reproduces conditions that resemble colonial political complexions.  In making this argument, 
one must recognise that clearly the conditions of the Peace Process are both different and 
                                                             
 
104 Almost as if there is a script that successive Prime Minister’s are compelled to follow, Thatcher was 
‘Rock Firm for the Union’, Major ‘Four-square’ behind the Union (quoted in Dixion 2001: 357).  
Cameron, referring to possible Scottish independence, said he was a ‘unionist head, heart and soul’ 
(cited in The Telegraph 2012). 
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favourable to the periods of British direct rule.  Nevertheless, the posturing of neutrality and 
‘no selfish interest’ serve the enduring configuration of Westminster sovereignty over 
Northern Ireland. 
        
Cultivating the political style of Tony Blair and David Cameron 
Chapter 4 contended that an important feature of Belgium’s foreign minister, Louis Michel, 
offering an apology was in underscoring his government’s more amiable and reflexive nature.  
In contrast to the previous administration that was considered stiff collared, contrition 
appeared as a device to show a certain humility and ‘of the people’ quality.  This section 
argues that one can apply a similar analysis to Cameron and Blair’s respective roles in the 
Bloody Sunday apology.  This is to posit that the offering of the apology was facilitated by the 
Prime Ministers’ propensities for emotive acts of public pseudo-sincerity.  In this sense, it is 
contended that the mea culpa feeds into a certain showmanship in regards to the Prime 
Ministers, whereby the apology becomes, in part, an indulgent act of utilising atrocity in the 
cultivation of a perceived political style.  This line of argument is situated within an analysis of 
the increasing inclination towards a colloquial, emotionalised and personalised style of 
contemporary electoral politics. 
     
The personalisation and emotionalisation of political discourse 
Of course, ‘personality politics’ and the political use of affected emotion is nothing new;  as far 
back as antiquity, Roman statesmen Cicero (Cicero and Watson 1986: 135) advised on the 
utility of tears in the practice of oratory.  Likewise, before Putin and the Clintons, senior 
statesmen such as Lincoln and Churchill were no strangers to welling up in public.  However, 
social changes, the growth of instantaneous multi-media platforms and the infusion of popular 
culture into politics have resulted in the emergence of an ‘emotionalized experience from 
politics’ that is more prominent than in the past (Richards 2004: 340).  In line with this, there is 
decreasingly a distinction between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ lives of political leaders, creating a 
transformative effect on the way the public ‘consume’ and the media and politicians construct 
politics.  To this end, the voting public increasingly demand that, beyond policies or ideology, 
their leaders exhibit desirable personality traits – warmth, strength and relaxed sincerity 
(Cronin 2008: 349).  In turn, politicians acquiesce and buttress these demands:  For instance, 
Cameron illustrated this trend in the run up to the British 2010 General Election, observing 
that ‘if you want to be prime minister you should open up’ and that ‘people want to know 
what makes you tick, what motivates you, and I think trying to explain a bit about your family, 
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your background, your life, what it's like, just helps people to see what you're like’ (quoted in 
Mulholland 2010).  To this end, democratic politicians are, away from ‘hard politics’, 
increasingly required to garner support on chat shows, candid interviews in glossy magazines 
and so forth. 
 
Compared to the US, in the UK there has conventionally been more constrained in the 
exhibition of the biography and personal qualities of leading politicians.  However, like other 
European leaders – Shroeder, Verhofstadt - the 1990s seem to have bucked this trend.  As 
Langer (2010: 63) writes, Blair ‘is a paradigmatic example of the politicisation of private 
persona’.  He clearly invested in and was skilled at appearing as ‘one of us’ and ‘down to 
earth’.  He was accomplished at such techniques as shifting between a vernacular and more 
formal style of language; the repetition of personal pronouns; a seemingly off-the-cuff ‘script’ 
interspersed with moments of hesitation – all of which coalesced to anchor his discourse in 
that of the ‘normal guy’ (Fairclough 2000: 7-8; Pearce 2001).  John Lancaster (2003) captures 
how Blair’s ‘dewy-eyed, slightly fumbling sincerity – his brilliantly articulate impersonation of 
earnest inarticulacy – has all along been tied to this self-projection as a Good Man’.  His 
striving to appear as down to earth is reflected in his infamous sentiment that ‘I think that 
most people who have dealt with me think I am a pretty straight sort of guy’ (quoted in 
Abrams 1997).  Likewise, a 1997 election showed Blair in his kitchen with his family, drinking 
tea and teasing his son about homework.105  Entangled in this is a propensity to permeate his 
discourse with emotionalised and sentimental enunciations that could ‘capture the mood’ of 
the public.  This is most vividly illustrated with his mournful and faltering ‘People’s Princess’ 
sound bite at the death of Princess Diana.106  
 
On his part, there can be no doubt that Cameron has adopted, even imitated, Blair’s style; 
cultivating himself the reputation as ‘heir to Blair’ (Davis and Seymour 2010: 751).   In a 
strikingly similar move to Blair, Cameron allowed cameras into his home during breakfast with 
his wife and children.  He later showed his apparent common touch by observing that ‘along 
with draught Guinness in cans, Sky+ is one of the great inventions of our time’ (cited in 
Mulholland 2010).  The purpose of illuminating the projected political style of these Prime 
Ministers is to demonstrate how it facilitates contrition.  Where previous British leaders had 
                                                             
 
105 For a detailed deconstruction of this, see Pearce (2001). 
106 For an analysis of this speech and its relationship to Blair’s rhetorical style, see Fairclough (2000). 
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shown a rather reserved and ill at ease manner in their dealing with awkward issues (to recall, 
Major’s statement that ‘those shot should be regarded innocent’ was delivered in a letter to 
John Hume), Cameron and Blair are clearly more comfortable with highly public and 
emotionalised gestures.  Indeed, one can point to numerous examples of this where this has 
led to other instances of contrition: Blair, for instance, offered high profile apologies to the 
Guildford four who spent 15 years in prison after wrongly being convicted of pub bombings in 
Guildford and Woolwich (McKittrick 2000).  If not entirely meeting the standards of apology, 
Blair also offered contrite sentiments regarding Britain’s historic role in the slave trade.  
Cameron has offered apologies for failing to foresee the 2008 banking crisis (Nelson 2009) and 
for not including the decision to cut child benefit in the election manifesto (Wintour and Watt 
2010).  In a strikingly similar speech to the Bloody Sunday apology, Cameron (2012) offered a 
parliamentary apology ‘on behalf of the Government – and indeed our country’ for both 
failings that led to the Hillsborough disaster107 and police efforts to falsely implicate Liverpool 
supporters as responsible.   Clearly, such apparent sincerity sits comfortably with mea culpa:  
Apologies are, after all, apparent expressions of empathy with another’s suffering, a public 
expression of introspection, self-awareness and ethical concern. 
 
The expedience of relaxed sincerity 
On one level, the politicisation of public persona – the music a politician listens to, the football 
team they support - is trivial and banal.  On another level, as Langer (2010: 62) writes, ‘the 
personal is not just visible or public but also politicized because it is used in the construction of 
a leader’s persona and its assessment by the media, woven into ideological commitments and 
used to infer and underwrite (or undermine) political values as well as to try to legitimize 
policy’.  This is to say that the leader’s public persona is not simply of incidental importance, 
but is constructed to set the tone for his/her leadership and contains a clear electoral 
expediency.  In this way, just as the Belgian apology occurred in the context of perceived 
endemic corruption among political elites (see chapter 4), so too did Blair and Cameron’s 
contributions.  The 1997 election of the Labour government came off the heels of ‘Tory sleaze’; 
the term ‘sleaze’ entering the lexicon of British political discourse amid financial malpractices, 
(for instance allegations that cash had been paid for parliamentary questions), assorted extra-
marital affairs and a culture of cronyism (see Farrell, McAllister et al. 1998).  Not dissimilarly, 
                                                             
 
107 The Hillsborough disaster involved 96 supporters dying at a crush at a football match in 1989.  
Cameron’s apology followed the release of the Hillsborough Independent Panel report.   
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the 2010 election was competed against the backdrop of public outrage at Daily Telegraph 
revelations regarding widespread corruption and misuse of MPs’ expenses.  In these contexts, 
both Blair and Cameron sought to position themselves as champions of transparency, and 
openness.  Blair famously proclaimed that his government would be ‘whiter than white, 
cleaner than clean’ (cited in McNair 2004: 326), while Cameron spoke of the need to ‘blow 
apart the old system.  Overthrow the old ways.  Put people in the driving seat’ (cited in 
Shipman 2010).  As such, one can situate Blair’s initial willingness to apologise and subsequent 
establishment of the Saville Enquiry amidst a range of measures designed to underscore a new 
openness and transparency at the heart of British governance.108  Likewise, Cameron’s candid 
account of the Bloody Sunday massacre spoke to an eagerness to reaffirm - early his leadership 
– a statesmen like posture; that he was a man of integrity and frankness.  Indeed, Cameron 
(Cameron 2010) was careful to underscore in his apology that he had ‘acted in good faith by 
publishing the Tribunal’s findings as quickly as possible after the General Election’. 
 
To retrace this point back to the key argument of the thesis:  it seems, indeed, that one can 
point to a certain political expediency in the establishment of the Saville Inquiry.  For both Blair 
and Cameron, these gestures provided opportune moments to exhibit electorally popular 
gestures at times of deep-seated public disquiet with the political establishment.  In particular, 
for Cameron, the apology served as a posture to further discard his party’s ‘nasty’109 image and 
continue its rebranding as a new and supposedly more compassionate and moderate 
Conservative party.  Moreover, for both Prime Ministers, the gesture suggests to both 
domestic and foreign audiences a principled statesmen-like leadership and a moral authority. 
 
Nevertheless, in observing such political expediencies of the Saville Inquiry, one must also 
recognise that this pertains to a more complex process than these elites master-manipulating 
the past to their own cynical ends.  As noted in chapter 2, politicians do not have a free hand in 
selecting past episodes for representation, but must deal with episodes that are salient and 
contested at the particular moment.  As such, it is clear that to a large extent Cameron did not 
unrestrictedly select a past episode to exhibit his cultivated self image, but rather the episode 
was selected by circumstance.  That is, the Saville Inquiry published its findings while he was in 
                                                             
 
108 Other measures include the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the reform of the House of Lords. 
109 In 2002 Theresa May, current Home Secretary in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, 
famously described in the Conservative conference that some people call the Conservatives ‘the nasty 
party’.    
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office and he, as Prime Minister, had little choice but to publicly acknowledge it.  Moreover, as 
a judicial inquiry set up before he came into office, Cameron had approaching zero input into 
the findings that Saville arrived at.  It is certainly true that Cameron and his advisors could 
underscore certain findings of the Saville Inquiry and gloss over others; he could also draw on 
the Inquiry in a way that magnifies his political style.  However, while this can be seen as 
politically opportunistic and even advantageous, it must be understood that he was acting 
within certain parameters that were outside his complete control.  A similar analysis can be 
applied to Blair’s establishment of the Saville Inquiry:  Certainly this move did fit with his 
posturing as a statesmen of integrity and frankness, but again this is not an episode entirely 
selected by him, but one that was abound within societal contestation.  The point of 
illustrating these constraints is to position the analysis within the wider argument of the thesis:  
Clearly politicians do use mea culpa in their political expedience.  Nevertheless, these 
politicians still have to wrestle with awkward contestations within society and prominent 
episodes of the past that are not entirely of their choosing. 
 
To this end, whatever the constraints and contestations placed upon Blair and Cameron, it is 
clear that these contrite stances did buttress a symbolic political expediency.  In observing this, 
it is necessary to highlight a certain narcissism that sits at the heart of this process.  That is, the 
apology becomes a story about the politician and his desirable and magnanimous traits.  By 
extension, the memory of a colonial massacre is transfigured, at least partially, into a narrative 
about contemporary leadership in the metropole.  This correlates with one of the key pillars of 
the enduring complacencies of apology:  That it is the metropolitan elite who speaks and, in 
recounting colonial violence, is aggrandising himself/herself.  In this analysis, one must 
maintain a scepticism as to any notion that the apology represented a genuine disavowal of 
colonialism.  Indeed, it seems that, more than the ravages of colonialism, the infusion of the 
private and public persona and the emotionalisation of political discourse speaks to 
presentational and electoral considerations of the contemporary media age.     
 
Apology as a defence of Britain’s wider role in Northern Ireland 
One of the key arguments of this thesis is that, in mea culpa, state elites reformulate 
narratives that resemble the core legitimising tenets of the conventional colonial enterprise.  
In deconstructing the parliamentary speeches by which Blair established the Saville Inquiry and 
Cameron apologised, it is possible to point to three key modes by which this process 
reconfigures a discourse that is reminiscent of the colonial narrative.  First, even in apology, 
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the speeches demonstrate a reverence for the armed forces that has its roots in imperial 
fantasies of intrepid, righteous and law abiding British soldiers.  Second, in contextualising 
Bloody Sunday, Cameron portrays 1970s Northern Ireland in archetypal colonial terms; as 
chaotic, violent and awash with terrorism.  Third - related to this representation of Ireland - 
there is a decipherable absence of any contextualisation of the massacre within the logic of 
British colonialism.  That is, rather than showing introspection or contrition for the colonial 
enterprise, the apology discursively divorces the massacre from  wider colonial repression and 
positions Bloody Sunday as an anomaly within otherwise seemingly favourable and benign 
British security operations.  These arguments are expanded upon below.  
       
Reverence/veneration for the army 
With some hyperbole, in his 1995 speech to the Conservative Party conference, Defence 
Minister Michael Portillo said 
 
Let us teach our children the history of this remarkable country.  I don’t mean the 
wishy-washy sociological flimflam that passes for history in many of our schools today.  
I don’t mean the politically correct, debunking, anti-patriotic nonsense of modern text 
books.  I mean the real history of heroes and bravery, of good versus evil, of freedom 
against tyranny.  Of Nelson and Wellington and Churchill….We are not ashamed to 
celebrate Britain’s military prowess. On the land.  At the sea.  Or in the skies [….].  We 
will speak of pride, of honour, of valour in battle and yes, of glory (quoted in Ball 1998: 
160). 
 
Of course, the UK is not the only state where a reverence for the army has been harnessed in 
the construction of the imagined community.  Indeed, ‘the soldier hero has proved to be one 
of the most durable and powerful forms of idealized masculinity within Western cultural 
traditions since the time of the ancient Greeks’, with this image pervading notions of 
nationhood in many polities (Dawson 1994: 1).  Yet, as Dawson (1994: 1) writes, ‘in England, 
soldier heroes such as Shakespeare’s patriot king, Henry V, and popular heroes such as Drake, 
Marlborough, Wolfe, Nelson and Wellington have historically occupied the symbolic centre of 
English national identity.’  In his book, Warrior Nation, Paris (2000) traces how an idealised and 
masculinised conception of the soldier – heroic, brave, chivalrous, loyal and honourable – has 
permeated British popular culture since Victorian times and informed policy as well as notions 
of identity and nationhood.  Such fantasies of fearless adventure remain abound in more 
contemporary popular representations of the military, such as Andy McNab’s (1993) bestseller 
Bravo-Two Zero, Michael Ashcroft’s (2008) Special Forces Heroes: Extraordinary True Stories of 
Daring and Valour and the popular soap actor, Ross Kemp’s (2010), recent book Warriors: 
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British Fighting Heroes.  Even where the legitimacy of recent wars, such as the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, have been highly contested and debated within British society, there has been 
widespread valorisation of the army, even among critics of the war, whereby any criticism of 
the serving forces is often seen as taboo.   
 
Such a reverence for the military, situated within romanticised notions of courage and duty, 
can be observed in both Blair and Cameron’s discourse in regards to Bloody Sunday.  In his 
establishment of the Saville Inquiry, Blair (1998) proclaimed that 
 
I want to place on record our strongest admiration for the way in which our security 
forces have responded over the years to terrorism in Northern Ireland. They set an 
example to the world of restraint combined with effectiveness given the dangerous 
circumstances in which they are called on to operate. Young men and women daily risk 
their lives protecting the lives of others and upholding the rule of law, carrying out a 
task which we have laid upon them. 
 
 Likewise, in his parliamentary speech on Bloody Sunday, Cameron (2010) prefixed the 
apology, saying that 
 
I am deeply patriotic.  I never want to believe anything bad about our country.  I never 
want to call into question the behaviour of our soldiers and our army who I believe to 
be the best in the world. 
 
In the same speech he later said 
 
 Our Armed Forces displayed enormous courage and professionalism in upholding 
democracy and the rule of law in Northern Ireland.  Acting in support of the police, 
they played a major part in setting the conditions that have made peaceful politics 
possible. 
 
In this way, even in dealing with a colonial massacre perpetuated by British troops, Blair and 
Cameron continue to display an unshakeable reverence and veneration for the army.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2 in regards to collective memory, pointing to the Prime Ministers’ 
continued reverence of the British military is not necessarily to attribute grand neo-colonial 
schemes on behalf of these men (although they have certainly shown a proclivity for oversees 
wars on rather negligible pretexts).  Rather, it is to show how traditional and axiomatic 
vocabularies can become obdurate and recurring in political discourse.  That is, there is a 
socialised expectation in Britain where it is anticipated and, in some respects, demanded that 
politicians venerate the army and security services.  It is in this discourse that one can point to 
persistent vocabularies that are reminiscent of the reverence of the colonial ‘heroic’ soldier.     
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 Continuing this theme, perhaps Cameron’s (2010) most striking comment in his apology was 
that ‘you do not defend the British Army by defending the indefensible’.  This is to tacitly 
acknowledge that Widgery’s exoneration of the army, while expedient at the time, could not 
be beneficial for the long term credibility of the institution.  Indeed, after such prolonged 
contestation, (in the forms of previously mentioned family campaigns, academic research and 
so on) and elite ceding (Major’s statement on the dead men’s innocence) the narrative 
fostered by the Widgery Tribunal was simply no longer credible or tenable.  Consequently, to 
refer back to Chapter 1, it is possible to see that apologies can function so as to carry out 
remedial work on one’s image by simultaneously castigating oneself and saving face; that is, by 
showing mortification for a particular act, one can forge an image whereby this act is seen as 
outside the scope of the offender’s normal behaviour and understood by the offender to be 
unacceptable.  Thus, the recognition that ‘Bloody Sunday was both unjustified and 
unjustifiable’ (Cameron 2010) was a statement that, in a sense, actually bolsters the 
impression of Britain’s security record in Northern Ireland.  Cameron underscores this with the 
observation that ‘we do not honour all those who served with distinction in keeping the peace 
and upholding the law in Northern Ireland by hiding from the truth’.  In this way, Cameron’s 
message is clear:  While the massacre of civilians in Derry was an unacceptable and isolated 
incident, the wider security operations kept the peace and upheld law.  This represents an 
enduring emphasis on the benevolent and positive role of British militarism. 
 
Representing Northern Ireland as lawless and chaotic 
Beyond the enduring reverence for the British army, one can trace a discourse proffered by 
Cameron that positions the massacre within a landscape that is imbued with characteristics 
that are reminiscent of aspects of the archetypal imagined colony.  Just as Blair (1998) 
juxtaposed ‘terrorism’ and ‘dangerous circumstances’ with the British troops ‘upholding the 
rule of law’, one can trace an almost identical discourse in Cameron’s apology.  For instance, in 
the parliamentary apology Cameron (2010) contextualised the massacre in the following terms 
 
Since 1969 the security situation in Northern Ireland had been declining significantly.  
Three days before 'Bloody Sunday', two RUC officers - one a Catholic - were shot by the 
IRA in Londonderry, the first police officers killed in the city during the Troubles. A 
third of the city of Derry had become a no-go area for the RUC and the Army.  And in 
the end 1972 was to prove Northern Ireland's bloodiest year by far with nearly 500 
people killed. 
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This depiction of Northern Ireland adheres to a classic caricature of a colony; a Hobbesian state 
of nature – chaotic, disorderly with a mindless and irrational violence.  Indeed, despite 
Ireland’s geographical location in Europe, such rhetoric is highly reminiscent of Edward Said’s 
(1978) elaboration on the construction of the Oriental ‘other’; that the colonised is 
characterised - in opposition to the metropole - as chaotic and irrational, as opposed to orderly 
and rational.    
 
While Cameron explicitly located Bloody Sunday within the well-trodden British narrative of 
‘the Troubles’, there was a marked decontextualisation of the role of  the British colonial 
enterprise and the Unionist administration in creating a context in which ‘the Troubles’ took 
hold and civilians were massacred.  There was, in other words, an absence of introspection as 
to why the ‘security situation’ had deteriorated.  In the apology there was no mention of 
systemic discrimination against Catholics: discrimination in access to public housing (Walsh 
2000: 23), internment without trial, the prohibition of protest, the precedent of RUC baton 
charges on previous Derry protests (Purdie 1990: 3) or the Special Powers Act.110  Interestingly, 
the Saville report itself actually acknowledges aspects of this context in Volume I, Chapter II, 
recognising the hostility created by the ban on marches and that ‘the nationalist community in 
particular regarded internment without trial with abhorrence, considering it yet another 
illegitimate means employed by the unionist Government’.   Indeed, though Cameron (2010) 
selectively quotes from chapter II of the Saville Inquiry in describing parts of Derry as a “no go” 
area, he omitted Saville’s finding from the exact same paragraph that states that by January 
1972 ‘the nationalist community had largely turned against the soldiers, many believing that 
the Army, as well as the RUC, were agents of an oppressive regime’(Saville, Hoyt et al. 2010 
Volume I chapter 2).  In this way, empowered by his position as Prime Minister, his 
Parliamentary address, replete with extensive coverage of the apology, afforded him the 
opportunity to modulate Saville’s findings into a more politically agreeable format.  In some 
respects, Cameron does not sanitise the bloodiest findings of the Saville Inquiry and he does 
graphically illustrate the immediate effects of the shootings.  Nevertheless, the wider context 
portrayed by the Prime Minister paints a narrative that casts Bloody Sunday as an anomaly; it 
conceals any idea that Bloody Sunday was part of the fabric – albeit a particularly grotesque 
                                                             
 
110 Section 1 of the Special Powers Act gave the minister for home affairs the power ‘to take all such 
steps and issue all such orders as may be necessary for preserving the peace and maintaining order’ 
(cited in Walsh 2000: 33).  Clearly this is an aspect of subverting the rule of law to enable extreme 
measures to combat dissent.  Such measures ‘conferred on the police sweeping powers of stop, arrest, 
detention, interrogation, entry, search and seizure’ (Walsh 2000: 33). 
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example – of a more mundane and sustained colonial repression.  Thus, while the mea culpa 
clearly shifts the narrative of Bloody Sunday from certain pillars of the Widgery plotline, 
familiar representations of the wider colonial narrative endure. 
          
Conclusion  
In line with the overall argument of the thesis, this chapter has traced the modes by which the 
elongated process of apology for Bloody Sunday has facilitated political expediency.  Most 
significantly, it has been suggested that the evolving narrative proffered by British elites and 
the process of mea culpa has paralleled the Northern Ireland Peace Process, both temporally 
and in terms of its underlying logic.  Where Bloody Sunday has conventionally been a memory 
that fostered understandable distrust of the British establishment among the nationalist 
community, the process of contrition has sought to ratify key nationalist perceptions of this 
contested and emotive event (particularly the culpability of British soldiers and the innocence 
of the victims), thereby seeking to build bridges with this community in their necessary 
inclusion into the process.  Beyond the enticement of the nationalist community, the Saville 
Inquiry has also functioned as a device to underscore Britain’s supposedly impartial and 
facilitating role in the Peace Process. 
 
The second section positioned the apology amidst the cultivated political styles of Tony Blair 
and David Cameron.  It is posited that the apology was partially facilitated by these Prime 
Ministers’ predilection for emotionalised gestures of apparent sincerity.  To this end, the 
colonial atrocities perpetuated in Northern Ireland are, to a degree, transfigured into 
narratives regarding the cosmetic personal qualities of the London politicians.  The final part of 
the chapter offered an analysis of the shifting plotline enunciated by the process of apology.  
In one sense, by unambiguously apportioning blame to the soldiers and emphasising the 
innocence of the victims, the contrition diverges significantly from Widgery’s earlier 
exoneration of British forces.  Nevertheless, despite this shift in the narrative of the events of 
the day in question, it is suggested here that many of the core colonial complacencies remain 
in circulation.  For instance, there remains a reverence of the British army where, outside of 
Bloody Sunday, the security services are venerated for their heroism, and valour.  This creates 
a plotline whereby Bloody Sunday appears as an anomaly within Britain’s otherwise 
progressive role in the province.  Moreover, while the British army is celebrated for its role in 
upholding the rule of law, by contrast, 1970s Northern Ireland is depicted in classic colonialist 
terms as chaotic and violent. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE ITALIAN APOLOGY FOR COLONIALISM IN LIBYA  
 
 
It is my duty to express to you, in the name of the Italian people, our regret and 
apologies for the deep wounds that we have caused you.  
 
              Silvio Berlusconi (quoted in Gazzini 2009) 
 
Introduction 
In the Belgian and British case studies, it has been possible to point to politicians who have 
cultivated a compassionate style of politics that sits with apparently contrite stances towards 
the past.  In contrast, Silvio Berlusconi, at least in the projected media image of him, is not 
renowned for such a style.111  Nevertheless, on 30th August 2008 Berlusconi symbolically 
lowered his head before the son of a hero of the Libyan resistance and uttered the above 
apology for the Italian colonial period in Libya (Gazzini 2009).  Accompanying this apology, 
Berlusconi and his Libyan counterpart, Colonel Gaddafi, committed their states to The Treaty 
of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya.112  As is the goal of this 
thesis, this chapter deconstructs the apology along with the adjacent treaty and accompanying 
discourse.  In doing so, the chapter interprets particular narratives conveyed by the apology 
and situates such enunciations within the context of dynamics within Italian politics and 
foreign affairs, especially in regards to bilateral relations with Libya.  Like other case studies, 
there are a multiplicity of narratives and meanings imparted by the apology, many of which 
are seemingly designed to alter depending on the given target audience.  Such discrepancy 
thereby allows for the incongruity of Gaddafi claiming the apology represented a ‘historic’ 
moment and disavowal of Italy’s ‘killing, destruction and repression’ (quoted in Sarrar 2008), 
while Berlusconi somewhat more flippantly suggested that the treaty equated to leading to 
fewer immigrants and more oil for Italy (Dinmore and Saleh 2008).   
 
In recognising the multifariousness of narratives emanating through the apology, this chapter 
is thereby divided into three sections.  The first section explores the way in which Italian 
colonialism has frequently and unsurprisingly remained a fractural episode in the states’ 
                                                             
 
111 For example, one thinks of the infamous case where in April 2009 he advised 17,000 Italians made 
homeless by an earthquake in L’Aquila that ‘they should see it like a weekend of camping’.  Earlier that 
year, Berlusconi dismissed the idea of extra security forces on the street to confront rising rape cases, 
saying ‘we would need as many soldiers as there are beautiful girls in Italy – which we will never 
manage’ (quoted in Kington 2010).   
112 Henceforth this treaty is referred to simply as ‘the treaty’ or ‘the Benghazi treaty’. 
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bilateral relations, with the apology thereby serving as a device by which to reconcile relations.  
Moreover, in entering into such a Treaty of Friendship with a central state of the European 
Union, the apology/treaty acted as a symbolic gesture to further indicate Libya’s pre-Arab 
Spring rehabilitation into the ‘international community’. 
   
The second section locates the ways in which Italy’s self interest in regards to economics and 
immigration is embedded within the treaty.  Whereas similar self interest appears to be 
evident in other apologies, strikingly – unlike the German case study where economic self 
interest is concealed beneath obscure language – in this case study such self interest is far 
more overt and even bragged about by the Italian prime minister.  In an analysis of the ways in 
which this self interest is inscribed in the treaty, it is contended that this reproduces a 
recognisably colonial script.  That is, while the treaty assists enormous strategic access to both 
the development and consumption of Libyan natural resources, in return it commits Italy to 
completing ‘basic infrastructure projects’ in Libya, including health care facilities, a highway 
and the provision of scholarships in Italian universities (Camera del Deputati 2008).  This 
resembles the archetypical depiction of a benevolent colonial Italy bringing medical sanitation, 
modern transportation and education to its erstwhile colony.  Moreover, in terms of the 
draconian provisions for immigration consolidated within the treaty, it is argued that this 
aspect of the agreement can be situated within a wider political discourse that both securitises 
and racialises the immigration debate, reproducing the image of the African ‘other’ that is both 
threatening and requires securing against.  
 
The final section locates the apology within the fluctuating spectrum of the wider colonial 
narrative as constructed within Italy since 1945.  It is posited that, though the mea culpa does 
correspond with a series of more introspective governmental gestures over the last decade 
and a half, the apology largely reproduces the conventional compulsions towards obfuscation 
and silence.  In this manner, the vague apology – without reference to any specific crimes – 
lends itself to the wider societal trend (outside of a handful of academic works) of evading any 
genuine introspection into the atrocities of colonialism.  Moreover, an analysis of surrounding 
rhetoric from both Berlusconi and his colleagues illustrates a political establishment that 
continues to advance a particular discourse that reflects familiar cultural complacencies.  Such 
discourse includes ideas of the ‘superiority’ of Western civilisation in juxtaposition to Islam, 
notions of the civilising role of Italy in Libya and trends in fascist rehabilitation.  Thus, in making 
the above arguments, it is suggested that – in important ways – the apology and adjacent 
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discourses reconfigure a narrative that resembles conventional notions of Italy’s benign and 
progressive role in Libya.113 
 
Scripting reconciliation and rehabilitation 
As explored in Chapter 1, the most basic function of apology is to act as a gesture of 
reconciliation.  In this way, the apology and accompanying treaty ‘contributed to creating a 
favourable climate for a major improvement in bilateral relations’ between Italy and Libya’ 
(Ronzitti 2009: 125).  As such, this section posits that the apology functions as a device to 
further normalise bilateral Italian relations with Libya and, more broadly, to further emphasise 
Libya’s ‘rehabilitation’ into the so called international community.  The apology serves these 
purposes in three important ways.  Firstly, as Lind (2008) theorised in relation to other case 
studies,114 the apology acted as an indicator of Italy’s peaceful intentions towards Libya.  
Secondly, in Gaddafi cultivating the depravity of Italian colonialism as an ideological pillar in his 
regime, an apology thereby endorsed an integral aspect of his claims to legitimacy, while 
eliminating a thorny issue between the two countries that has intermittently undermined 
bilateral relations.  Thirdly, in signing the Treaty of Friendship, Italy thereby played an 
important role in affirming Libya’s consolidated position in the international community.  
These points are considered in more detail in the following passages.  However, before doing 
so, it is necessary to contextualise the 2008 apology and demonstrate the timely convergence 
of both Italy and Libya’s shared interest in the North African state’s reintegration into the 
international community. 
 
In the parlance of Washington, by the 1980s Libya was regarded as a ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah’ state  
(Takeyh 2001; Oakes 2011).  This was especially following the shooting of a 1984 policewoman 
outside the Libyan embassy in London, the state’s apparent links to a 1986 terrorist attack on a 
West Berlin discotheque and the 1988 bombing of flight Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie killing 270 
civilians.  These events resulted in the 1992 implementation of a UN embargo on aviation and 
weapons transfers, followed by the 1993 freeze of Libyan assets (Schwartz 2007: 557).  More 
                                                             
 
113 In the process of finalising this project, Chiara De Cesari’s (2012) article The paradoxes of colonial 
reparation: foreclosing memory and the 2008 Italy- Libya Friendship Treaty was published.  This author 
was not aware of the article until September 2012 when proof reading the chapter.  Like this chapter, 
Cesari also emphasises the strategic expediencies of the treaty in terms of immigration and the 
economy.  She also discusses the process of ‘social forgetting’ (De Cesari 2012: 317) within Italian 
society.  Any overlap with De Cesari’s excellent analysis is purely coincidental.   
114 Lind (2008) is essentially concerned with apologies from Japan and Germany for World War II 
atrocities. 
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than any other state, Italy has had a continued interest in Libya’s reintegration into the 
international community.  On the one hand, as explored more thoroughly in the next section, 
Italy is highly dependent upon Libya in terms of access to energy sources.  However, of equal 
importance, successive Italian governments have recognised the geopolitical strategic 
importance of Libya to Mediterranean security interests – previously in terms of a bulwark 
against Soviet expansionism in the region and, more recently, as an ally in the perceived 
conflict with Islamic fundamentalism (Varvelli 2010: 117).  Similarly, Libya is seen as both a 
problem and potential solution to alarmist and securitised notions of illegal immigration into 
Europe.  Finally, Libya’s geographical position converges with Italy’s aspirations to be a 
medium power in the region whereby, since at least the 1980s, Italian governments of varying 
ideologies have sought to position Italy in the ‘geopolitical role of ‘mediator’ or ‘bridge-builder’ 
between Europe, North Africa and, occasionally, the Middle East’ (Coralluzzo 2008: 116).  Thus, 
as a foreign policy aimed at stabilising and establishing privileged economic relations with 
geographically proximate countries, Italy has consistently forged a policy of maintaining a 
dialogue with Libya with the aim of promoting its inclusion into normalised and cordial 
international relations (Coralluzzo 2008: 117).  On Gaddafi’s part, there was also a 
convergence of interest in terms of his pre-2011 desired reintegration into the international 
community, especially given the dissolution of the Soviet sphere of influence leaving his 
position somewhat more isolated.  Equally, the post-2001 onset of the War on Terror did not 
provide an international climate favourable to isolated and authoritarian Arabic leaders.  It is 
within this pre Arab Spring context that one must locate the apology and, more broadly, 
Libya’s normalisation of relations between Italy and other Western states. 
     
Writing the ‘normalisation’ of relations 
In terms of enhancing or ‘normalising’ Italian-Libyan bilateral relations, it is useful to draw on 
the work of Jenifer Lind to illustrate the symbolic and communicative significance of apologies 
between states.  Lind (2003) draws on constructivist theory to hold that there is a link between 
ideas, discourse and perceived threats.  To this end, she demonstrates that denial and/or 
glorification of past atrocity damage bilateral relations and create the perception of a state 
having hostile intentions.  On the contrary, states that apologise and atone for the past can 
appear to have peaceful intentions and a desire to restore good relations (Lind 2008).  That the 
apology and accompanying treaty were a means of forging more cordial bilateral-relations is 
beyond dispute.  Indeed, the treaty itself being entitled ‘The Treaty of friendship, partnership 
and cooperation’ thereby gives a flavour of this consolidated relationship.  Moreover, just as 
Lind emphasised that apology can be a device for eliminating hostile postures and offering a 
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metaphorical olive branch, this, too, is codified in the treaty.  For instance, the treaty invites 
Libya to no longer celebrate October the 30th as the ‘Day of Vengeance’115 and that both 
countries will supposedly consider August 30th as ‘Libyan – Italian Friendship day’.  More 
significantly, Articles 1 -7 of the treaty under the subheading ‘General Principles’ establish 
procedures for the respect of sovereign equality, commitment not to resort to threat or use of 
force and commitment to non-interference in internal affairs (Camera del Deputati 2008).  It 
should be noted that these points were considered more than just banal diplomatic courtesies, 
especially given that in 1986 relations hit crisis point when, following US bombings of Tripoli,116 
Libya responded by launching two SS-1 Scud missiles at US military instillations on the Italian 
island of Lampedusa (Varvelli 2010: 119).  While there are no suggestions that missiles had 
been launched from any Italian based stations, Gaddafi claimed that use had been made of a 
US transmission station situated on the island (Ronzitti 2009: 126).  It therefore appears that 
this event had been taken into account in the Treaty of Friendship, with the clause ‘not to use 
or allow the use of their territories in any hostile act against the other party’ (Camera del 
Deputati 2008).117  As such, a treaty seemingly precluding violence and the use of force, 
including the use of territories, had specific importance to the military postures of the two 
states.  Thus, if we are to understand apologies as discursive scripts that indicate non-hostile 
intentions, this seems to be affirmed by the apology’s accompanying Treaty.  Despite such 
commitments, Italy played a collaborative role in the NATO led 2011 war in Libya, with Italian 
airfields used for bombing raids (Willey 2012) and, symbolically, a ballroom used by Mussolini 
adopted as a headquarters for NATO commanders and intelligence personnel (Coughlin 2011).    
 
More than just signalling supposedly peaceful intentions, the treaty and apology served to 
underscore Libya’s apparent pre 2011 rehabilitation into the international community.  As 
already mentioned, Italian foreign policy had consistently placed emphasis on bilateral 
dialogue and inclusiveness with Libya.  By 2008, these objectives had converged with Libya’s, 
with Gaddafi having made several cautious overtures at renewed acceptance; most notably 
gestures such as surrendering the main suspect of the Lockerbie Bombing, Libya’s post-2001 
                                                             
 
115 The ‘Day of Vengeance’ marked the 1970 expulsion of Italian settlers from Libya.     
116 President Reagan ordered Operation El Dorado Canyon in response to the bombing of a Berlin 
discotheque that killed two US soldiers. 
117 Notwithstanding these commitments, in the midst of international condemnation of Gaddafi’s 
response to the Arab Spring, the Italian government, after initial caution, pledged support for NATO 
operations in Libya, offered support to the rebels and allowed NATO the use of strategic air bases (see 
Lombardi 2011). 
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collaboration with the War on Terror and its 2003 renunciation of nuclear and chemical 
weapons (for more details, see Zoubir 2002; 2009).  Thus, the treaty’s endorsement of 
‘friendship’ with a Western state was to further impart Libya as an integrated and legitimate 
member of the international community.  Indeed, beyond Libya as a state, in mentioning 
Gaddafi as ‘the leader of the Revolution’ (Camera del Deputati 2008), the treaty adopted his 
regime’s phraseology and endowed his leadership with a form of international recognition.      
 
In the same way as imbuing international state legitimacy, the apology can be understood as a 
script for affirming one of the central legitimising tenets of Gaddafi’s domestic leadership.  
From the inception of his leadership, Gaddafi drew on Italian colonialism as a unifying rallying 
cry through which to juxtapose his revolutionary regime.  This is most evident in the expulsion 
of approximately 20,000 Italians and the appropriation of their property shortly after coming 
to power. Moreover, throughout his rule, Gaddafi drew on the necessity for apology and 
reparations as a central ideological objective of his regime.  Indeed, on coming to power he 
vowed not to visit Italy until Rome apologised (Zoubir 2009: 411).  In this sense, the apology 
allowed Gaddafi to claim a moral and rhetorical vindication in regard to his efforts to elicit an 
apology.  Thus, the pomp of the ceremonial returning of the Venus of Cyrene statue and 
Berlusconi’s bow before the son of a Libyan resistance leader appear designed for a Libyan 
audience.  It is here, then, that one can grasp the divergent representations of the apology by 
the two leaders:  Where Berlusconi promoted the economic benefits to the Italian audience, 
Gaddafi emphasised the contrite sentiments of the apology.  In doings so, he stated that ‘in 
this historic document, Italy apologises for its killing, destruction and repression against 
Libyans during the colonial rule’ (quoted in Sarrar 2008).  This is to suggest a somewhat more 
emphatic apology than actually offered in either the treaty or Berlusconi’s speech. 
       
The economics and migratory dimensions of apology 
A reading of the accompanying treaty makes it evident that beneath the apology lies a patently 
realpolitik deal concerning relations pertaining to both economics and immigration.  Rather 
than based on inference, this is plainly stated by Berlusconi himself, with the Italian Prime 
Minister widely reported as saying that the treaty would lead ‘to fewer illegal immigrants 
leaving from the coast of Libya and coming to us, and more Libyan oil and gas’ (quoted in 
Dinmore and Saleh 2008).  Extending from this, although the treaty is framed in terms of 
forging an equal partnership, this section contends that a closer analysis reflects an endurance 
of colonial-like postures that emphasise familiar narratives of European expertise and 
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infrastructure building while maintaining essentially exploitative access to natural resources.  
Moreover, an analysis of the immigration policies attached to the treaty and openly boasted 
about by Italian political elites reflects a familiar discourse which securitises the African ‘other’ 
and legitimises both their exclusion from Italian society as well as draconian security 
responses.   
 
Before turning to the particular ways in which the immigration and economic agreements have 
been scripted, it is fist necessary to briefly sketch the economic context in which the treaty 
took place.  The central importance of Libya in Italy’s energy policy can be vividly illustrated 
with several observations:  Libya is Italy’s primary supplier of oil and third largest supplier of 
natural gas (Varvelli 2010: 117).  Since 2004, the Italian energy company, ENI, has used a 
subsea pipeline to export almost 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas each year (Varvelli 
2010: 117).  Despite Italy’s aforementioned desire for Libya’s reintegration into the 
international community, in some senses its renewed dealings with other states represented a 
decline in Italy’s privileged relationship in comparison to other powers, even if Libya’s more 
open market benefited Italy in absolute terms (Varvelli 2010: 122).  As Varvelli (2010: 122) 
records ‘between 2002 and 2006, Libyan exports to Italy dropped from 42.8 per cent of the 
total to 37.4 per cent, while imports also dropped from 25 per cent to 14 per cent of the total.  
The indispensible reciprocity linking the two countries was apparently weakened because the 
rise in global oil demand, now that Libya was no longer isolated, made it easier to replace Italy 
as the biggest importer’.  Thus, one can situate the deal within the context of Italy’s declining 
economic role in Libya and its desire to reaffirm this special relationship in an economic as well 
as political sense.  Thus, as the following passages explore, although the treaty commits Italy 
to apparently substantial commitments, one can point, beneath such outwardly gallant 
reconciliatory sentiments, to significant dimensions of economic strategic self interest.  
 
Exploring the terms of the treaty 
Under Article 8 of the Treaty of Friendship, ‘Italy is committed to achieve in Libya ‘basic 
infrastructure projects’ to the value of US $5 billion over twenty years.  Likewise, under Article 
10, Italy commits itself to achieve, for an as of yet indeterminate cost, a number of ‘special 
initiatives’.  These initiatives include such projects as the construction of 200 housing units, the 
allocation of a number of university scholarships, treatment at Italian institutions for Libyan 
victims of mine explosions and the return of Libyan manuscripts and artefacts that, in the 
sanitised words of the Treaty, were ‘transferred to Italy in the colonial era’ (Camera del 
Deputati 2008).  Excluding the undisputed economic self interest embodied in the Treaty, $5 
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billion dollars is not an insignificant amount of money and diverges substantially from 
Belgium’s derisory ‘Patrice Lumumba Fund’ (see Chapter 4).  However, in critical analysis, one 
may point to resembling characteristics between the terms of the treaty and erstwhile colonial 
relations.  Such characteristics can be seen both in terms of the practicalities of economic 
relations and in terms of the language and rhetorical functions by which these unequal 
relations are narrated. 
 
In regards to the practicalities of the relationship, it is clear that the $5billion, although eye-
catching, is not necessarily the straight forward compensatory scheme as widely reported in 
the media at the time (for instance, The New York Times ran the headline ‘Italy to pay Libya 
$5billion’ (The New York Times 2008), while France 24 led with ‘Italy’s Berlusconi hands Libya 
$5bn apology’ (France 24 2008)).  In fact, in the terms of the treaty, no money is actually 
transferred to Libya, but rather the money is to provide for ‘basic infrastructure projects’, for 
which ‘Italian companies [are] to ensure completion’ (Camera del Deputati 2008).  Moreover, 
‘the financial funds are managed by the Italian party while Libya will make the land available, 
at no cost to Italy or the manufacturers’ (Camera del Deputati 2008).  In other words, while the 
treaty purports to establish an ‘equal and balanced relationship’ (Camera del Deputati 2008), it 
is clear that it emphatically ensures that the means of production remain in the metropole.  To 
situate within Wallerstein’s (2004) world systems analysis, this represents a continuation of 
the core’s use of advanced technology, while the periphery merely provides the raw material 
and land which is extracted by the core.  Thus, while undoubtedly a significant sum, the oft 
quoted $5billion dollars is a reinvestment into Italian businesses and corporations and is 
dwarfed by recent lucrative contracts for Italian companies, such as ENI’s 2008 signing of six 
Exploration and Production Sharing contracts ensuring Italy’s oil supply from Libya for a further 
forty-four years for oil and forty-seven years for gas (Varvelli 2010: 126).  This is to illuminate 
an economic relationship whereby the $5billion is less compensation, than strategic 
investment in a lucrative bi-lateral relationship.   
 
Beyond the unequal economic configurations reproduced through the treaty, one can, as is 
central to the thesis, point to important ways in which such compositions are scripted in a 
manner that is reminiscent of colonial discourse.  This is most evident in the paternalistic 
projects for which the treaty commits Italy.  For instance, there is a convergence between the 
myth of the road building, infrastructure laying, benign Italian colonialist and the ‘basic 
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infrastructure projects’ (Camera del Deputati 2008) that are central to the treaty. 118  In other 
words, just as the conventional Italian colonial narrative celebrates bringing roads, education 
and hospitals to Africa, so too does the treaty enable a 1,700km highway across Libya to be 
built by Italian companies (Reuters 2010),119 the allocation of university scholarships and the 
treatment program for mines victims.  Indeed, the very language of Italy achieving ‘basic 
infrastructure projects’ is to infer on Libya the classic colonialist perception of a country that is 
inadequate in providing fundamental provisions without the aid of European assistance.   
Likewise, in Italian companies ensuring the completion of such projects, there is the 
implication that such expertise resides uniquely in the metropole and requires European 
implementation in Africa.  Of course, it is unclear the extent to which such a convergence 
between colonial and contemporary discourse is either a conscious or unconscious process.  
Nevertheless, the salient point is that, even if one is to accept that such convergence was not 
consciously premeditated, it clearly and without irony reflects a reproduction of the central 
themes of colonialism, whereby it is the burden of the metropole to benevolently contribute 
the rewards of modernity to the colony.   In such a way, the treaty allows for the construction 
of the apology and Treaty as Italy’s ‘Grande Gesto’ (Gazzini 2009), whereby the treaty is not 
framed as reparation for the devastation of colonialism, but a continuation of the amiable and 
civilising Italian presence in Africa, even to the extent in which the treaty requests to ‘respect 
the commitments made by Italy’ (Camera del Deputati 2008). 
 
Immigration – a securitised and ethnicised debate 
As stated above, it is contended here that the Treaty codifies an immigration discourse and 
policy that is framed in racialised and securitised language.  Article 19 of the Treaty allows for 
the intensification of ‘cooperation in combating terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking 
and illegal immigration’ (Camera del Deputati 2008).  Thus, in its first sentence on the matter, 
the treaty unreflectively reproduces the familiar conflation of African immigration with drugs, 
crime and the ‘War on Terror’.  Likewise, the immigration debate is infused with racial 
prejudices.  For instance, Marcello Pera, President of the Senate, at a political rally in 2005 
stated his aversion to uncontrolled migration and warned of the dangers of Italy ‘becoming all 
half-caste’ (quoted in Triulzi 2006: 433).  Similarly, Berlusconi, responding to criticisms 
                                                             
 
118 For a wider discussion of this narrative see pages 165-176.      
119 According to Italy’s infrastructure minister, Altero Matteoli, the road stretching virtually the breadth 
of the country from near the Egyptian border to the Tunisian boarder has a value of ‘something more 
than 5 billion’.  The minister did not specify in which currency (Reuters 2010).  
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specifically related to deporting migrants to Libya, stated that ‘the left’s idea is of a multi-
ethnic Italy […] that is not our idea’ (quoted in Babington 2009).  In espousing an overtly 
violent agenda towards immigrants, Umberto Bossi, a minister in Berlusconi’s cabinet from 
2008, was reported calling for boats carrying illegal immigrants to be shot out the water, 
regardless of whether the boats were carrying children.  To capture the flavour and virulence 
of this rhetoric, it is worth repeating part of the interview as reported in Corriere della Sera 
(BBC 2003). 120 
 
Bossi: Either the interior minister [Giuseppe Pisanu] comes to the cabinet meeting on 
Friday with extremely convincing regulations for the implementation of the law on 
immigration in his pocket or the whole thing is going to go to blazes. And I will not be 
happy with just any old regulations. No, I want to hear the cannon roar. 
  
Interviewer: I beg your pardon? 
  
Bossi: There is no point in our wasting time taking each other for a ride.  There are two 
ways to implement the law approved a year ago.  Either we say in a general kind of 
way, as some people would like, that our ships will tackle the illegal migrants' vessels 
and take on board only the women and children.  Or else we write down in black and 
white that force will be used, and that is the way I want it. 
  
Interviewer: The use of force? How? 
  
Bossi: After the second or third warning, boom... the cannon roars. Without any 
beating about the bush. The cannon that blows everyone out of the water. Otherwise 
this business will never end. 
  
Interviewer: Opening fire on rusty old boats full of defenceless and starving wretches, 
maybe even women and children? 
  
Bossi: Illegal immigrants must be hounded out, either nicely or nastily. Only those with 
a job contract can enter the country. The others, out! There comes a time when it 
becomes necessary to resort to the use of force. The navy and the finance police are 
going to have to line up in defence of our shores and to use guns. 
 
It is only within the parameters of this discourse that the specific policies consolidated under 
the treaty can be contextualised.   In terms of substantial policy, the treaty is rather vague; it 
reaffirms commitments to agreements made in 2000 and 2007, as well as promoting ‘the 
realisation of a system for control of land boarders [in] Libya to be entrusted to Italian 
companies [who] possess the necessary technological skills’ (Camera del Deputati 2008).  In 
                                                             
 
120 Despite the newspaper’s meticulous transcript, Bossi insisted his views were misrepresented (BBC 
2003).  
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concrete terms, this serves to strengthen the existing collaboration on immigration that has 
been in place since at least 2003.  Such collaboration has included, ‘joint naval patrols and 
readmission agreements in return for aid’ (De Haas 2008: 1309), the establishment of Italian 
led training courses for Libyan boarder police officers, the supply of technical equipment to 
assist Libyan border controls and the 2003 financing of a camp for illegal immigrants within 
Libya (European Commission 2004: 58-59; Lutterbeck 2009: 172).  Similarly, in 2003 Italy 
approved the ‘the financing of a program of charter flights for the repatriation of illegal 
immigrants from Libya towards the originating countries’ (European Commission 2004: 59).  
This effectively entails a relationship whereby Libya had ‘been collaborating closely with Italy 
in concerted expulsions of thousands of undocumented migrants from Italy via Libya to their 
alleged origin countries’ (De Haas 2008: 1310).  In other words, the Treaty effectively entails a 
consolidation of a system that allows third country nationals intercepted in international 
waters to be transferred to Libya.  Amnesty International has stated that it ‘is gravely 
concerned that human rights have become a casualty of the measures taken by Italy to curb 
irregular migration.  The organisation renews its call on the Italian authorities to cease the 
interception and return of third-country nationals to Libya’ (Amnesty International 2010).  
Interestingly, although the treaty calls upon both parties to have ‘respect for human rights’ 
and observe the UN Charter and Declaration of human rights (Camera del Deputati 2008), as 
Varvelli (2010: 128) observes, this aspect of the treaty is not legally binding. 
 
In analysis, it is pertinent to note that such collaboration regarding immigration closely 
parallels archetypal colonial structures of rule.  This is to say that it is the metropole that 
apportions large parts of its ‘security’ activities to the colony.  In other words, through 
exchanges in technology, training and detention apparatus, it is the Libyan state that takes on 
a larger role in ensuring Italy’s objectives of minimising undocumented immigration across the 
Mediterranean.  Moreover, with its authoritarian complexion under Gaddafi and the fact that 
it is not party to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Libya represents a 
convenient partner for democratic Italy to delegate thorny issues that potentially violate 
norms of human rights and legislation in the EU.  In this sense, the collaboration is not 
dissimilar from the US’s practice of extraordinary rendition and establishment of Guantanamo 
Bay, whereby foreign territories are utilised so as to transfer potential human rights 
infringements away from its own sovereign territory.  As already mentioned, such security 
arrangements necessitate a particular surrounding discourse that - as epitomised by Pera, 
Berlusconi and Bossa – casts immigration as a threat to Italian society and values, thereby 
requiring robust solutions.  It is this ‘othering’, entangled as it is with racial prejudice that, like 
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conventional colonial discourse, enables the realisation of policies such as those consolidated 
through the 2008 Treaty of Friendship. 
   
Situating the apology within the wider colonial narrative  
This section draws on the conventional and evolving ways in which Italy’s colonial history is 
narrated by both political elites and within public discourse.  It is widely recognised in the 
academic literature that Italian society has not substantially reflected on its colonial past.  In 
concurring with this observation, this section suggests that there are broadly two discernible 
yet overlapping elements to the conventional narrative of Italian colonialism.  The first 
element is exemplified by its enduring absence from popular, political or even academic 
debate.121  Secondly, where it is alluded to, Italian colonialism tends to be characterised as 
being of a ‘less pernicious’ and somehow more moderate and more amiable nature than that 
of other European empires (Andall and Duncan 2005: 11).  While since the mid 1990s there 
have been various ambiguous and contradictory government incursions into the colonial past, 
it is argued here that the core pillars of silence and historical sanitisation remain to this day.  In 
situating the apology within this narrative, it is contended that the apology and its surrounding 
discourse actually perpetuate these constructed distortions.  Of course, the apology does 
unavoidably endow Italian colonialism in Libya with a negative implication.  However, in being 
vague and nondescript, the apology resembles the obfuscating impulse of the conventional 
narrative.  Moreover, as explored below, the apology is supplemented by political rhetoric 
from both Berlusconi and members of his cabinet that enounce the ‘superiority’ of Western 
civilisation, the ‘progress’ that Italy made in Libya and even a rehabilitation of Mussolini’s rule.  
In making this argument, the following passages commence with a discussion of how colonial 
memory has been marginalised in the post-war years, together with an exploration of the 
distorted image of a benign colonialism as testified by the concept of Italiani Brava Gente.  
Finally, through a deconstruction of the apology and accompanying political discourse, it is 
suggested that Berlusconi’s mea culpa sits with recent forays of introspection, yet ultimately 
recasts sentiments that are reminiscent of the conventional colonial narrative. 
           
                                                             
 
121 Since the 1970s there has been an increase in academic research on Italian colonialism.  
Nevertheless, this period remains starkly under researched, especially in comparison to the vast 
literature on other aspects of Italian history.  
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‘Silence’ and ‘obfuscation’122 
As Andall and Duncan (2005: 9) write, ‘in the decades after Italy lost possession of its colonies, 
colonialism appeared to have no place in the nation’s collective consciousness and was absent 
from public discourse’.  In analysing the mystification and negation of Italian colonial history, it 
is important to recognise that ‘silence’ is not merely the negative or passive absence of an 
entity, but is frequently constructed or willed into being.  To this end, Del Boca (2003: 18) 
writes that ‘post-war governments not only eluded their obligations to clarity but actively 
impeded the emergence of truth’.  Certainly in the period following the war there was no 
genuine introspection into Italian colonialism from either academia or political parties of any 
end of the ideological spectrum.  After the war there was no Italian equivalent of the 
Nuremberg trials and both Italian political elites and those of the victorious powers found that 
introspection (legal or otherwise) into colonial events would be of no utility at a time of post 
war rebuilding and the onset of bipolar Cold War tensions.  To this end, early Republican 
governments used ‘delay, trickery and every possible expedient’ to evade legal requests from 
former colonies for the trial of those considered war criminals (Labanca 2004: 308;  see also 
Pankhurst 1999).  Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of World War II there seemed to be a 
consensus regarding colonialism from both the right and the left, where even left wing parties 
and anti-Fascist movements were arguing for the return of liberal and fascist era colonies 
(Labanca 2005: 29; De Michele 2011: 106).  
 
Beyond the evasion of accountability for war crimes, in the post war climate Del Boca (2003: 
18) identifies the most significant government distortion of colonial history as the publication 
of L’Italia in Africa, a text composed by a committee of which fifteen of the twenty members 
served as governors or officials in the colonial enterprise.  Del Boca (2003: 18) summarises this 
text in the following terms: 
 
It should suffice to mention the colossal, costly and almost incredible effort of 
mystication promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the publication, in fifty 
volumes, of L’Italia in Africa.  The supporters of this corpus claimed to intend to 
provide an assessment of the Italian presence in the colonies of Eastern and North 
Africa.  Instead, L’Italia in Africa is a coarsely and impudently falsified account that 
aims to exalt Italian colonialism and underline its “difference” from other 
contemporary colonialisms.  
                                                             
 
122 Employing the term obfuscation in regards to constructed notions of the Italian past, Palumbo (2003: 
11) writes that ‘the postwar historiographical neglect and obfuscation of the Italian colonial past is 
naturally matched by the blankness left by this past in the national culture’.   
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For all their density, these accounts omit to mention the existence of concentration camps in 
Libya, Somalia and Eritrea or the use of chemical weapons in the Ethiopia (Del Boca 2003: 19).   
This initial negation of the colonial past extended far beyond the initial post war years, and 
continued throughout the Cold War (von Henneberg 2004: 39).  Importantly, owing to the 
stripping of her colonies in the 1940s, Italy did not undergo the same crisis of decolonialism 
experienced by other metropoles in the 1960s.  There was, as von Henneberg (2004: 38-39) 
explains, ‘no Indian or Algerian crisis or catharsis for Italy – no Ghandi, Fanon or even Sartre or 
Camus to inspire or inflame public opinion on the question of Italy’s moral and international 
responsibility’.  In this sense, while other European countries experienced post-colonial pangs, 
this was not the case in Italy.  Indeed, even the social protests of the 1960s tended to focus on 
inequalities within capitalism and war in Vietnam, rather than grappling with Italy’s own 
specific colonial past (von Henneberg 2004: 39).  
 
In her study of high school textbooks, De Michele (2011) illustrates how this theme of 
obfuscation is also evident in the state education system.  While the overt colonial and racist 
stereotypes of immediate post war textbooks have largely dissipated, colonial occupation of 
Libya is ‘discussed briefly as something of little importance’, thereby strengthening ‘the 
traditional view that Italians had not committed atrocities and that the colonial campaigns 
were a brief parenthesis in Italian history’ (De Michele 2011: 116).  In a similar study, Leone 
and Mastrovito (2010) find that the majority of contemporary textbooks use vague and 
ambiguous language that veil Italian atrocities.  Likewise, one can point to examples of overt 
attempts to remove Italian colonialism from societal introspection during the latter years of 
the First Republic.  The 1981 film Lion of the Desert, with an all star cast including Oliver Reed 
and Anthony Quinn, was banned by the Italian government on the grounds that it was 
‘damaging’ to the army’s honour (The Economist 2008).  By the time of the 2008 apology, the 
film had still not been publicly broadcast in Italy.  Similarly, the 1989 BBC documentary Fascist 
Legacy detailing crimes committed under Mussolini was protested against by the Italian 
Foreign Minister and by the Italian ambassador in London (Petrusewicz 2004: 269; Mellino 
2006: 466).  The documentary was immediately purchased by the state television channel RAI, 
reportedly for a ‘high price’ (Walston 1997: 179), yet was not broadcast until 2003 and only 
then ‘on a small private channel’, rather than by the state broadcaster (Mellino 2006: 466).  
Such a climate of negating and tacitly censoring the colonial past is obviously not conducive to 
the offering of a government apology.   
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On top of the archaeology of silence, a further pillar in the conventional characterisation of 
Italian colonialism pertains to its supposedly ‘less pernicious’ nature (Andall and Duncan 2005: 
11).  In one sense, this is remarkably similar to the perceptions fostered in Germany (see 
chapter 3), where, like Germany, Italy was perceived as a ‘late comer and junior partner’  
(Triulzi 2005: 149) in comparison to the other colonial powers; certainly not a real colonial 
power like Britain, Portugal, France and so forth.123  Moreover, Italian colonialism and fascism 
were frequently presented, both inside and outside of Italy (although not in the countries that 
actually suffered Italian colonialism), in the context of a mythical national characteristic 
ascribed to the Italian populace.  This supposed national trait – as captured by the concept of 
Italiani Brava Gente – is now explored in regards to how it sits with narratives of the colonial 
and Fascist past. 
    
Exploring Italiani Brava Gente 
Upon the Italian Prime Minister’s visit to the US in 1985, Ronald Reagan enquired:  ‘How’s your 
crisis going?’ Drolly, Craxi’s response was ‘very well thank you’ (quoted in La Palombara 1987: 
1).  It is this response that is indicative of an apparent light hearted or carefree persona.  As 
Ventresca (2006) writes, ‘politicians, intellectuals, the general public – have cultivated, 
promoted and internalised the myth of Italians as brava gente’.  Roughly translating as Italians 
good people, the motif asserts the well trodden stereotype of an essentially amiable and good 
natured national trait.   In Favero’s (2010: 138) words, Italiani Brava Gente functions ‘as an 
ideological laundry for reformulating and then setting aside disquieting moments of national 
shame’.  It is by this formula that, for instance, the German character is perceived as 
militaristic, in contrast to Italian fascism which is seen as more moderate and comparatively 
benign.  Embodied by the fictional Captain Corelli courting women and playing mandolin while 
the German fascists engage in the real violence (Favero 2010: 140),  the representation 
enables a central theme of post-war Italian memory that ‘juxtaposes the ‘good Italian’ against 
the ‘bad German’ and casts Italy as a victim rather than a partner of the Nazis’ (Ventresca 
2006: 192).  Likewise, where Hitler is represented as the incarnation of evil and all surveying 
totalitarian leader, as Ahmida (2006: 177) writes, ‘even critics of Mussolini portrayed him 
merely as a buffoon or ordinary dictator’. 
 
                                                             
 
123 It is, of course, true to say that in its geographical and temporal span Italy was more marginal than 
other colonial powers such as Britain.  Nevertheless, it seems disconcerting to say that any one 
colonialism is somehow ‘better, ‘worse’ or in some way more amiable than another. 
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Importantly, the depiction of Italians as essentially good people serves to absolve the 
population from atrocities in both Africa and Europe (Petrusewicz 2004: 269).  In relation to 
colonialism, it paints a picture of ‘the good Italian, sympathetic, always ready to help his 
neighbor, a bringer of civilization and human values’ (Mellino 2006: 463).  As Mellino (2006: 
463) writes, ‘not only did it promote the idea of Italian colonialism as an atypical example of 
the genre, but it also sweetened the image of fascism, in practice dissociating fascism from the 
Nazi Holocaust’.  Thus, unlike the intense French introspection into the Vichy regime and 
collaboration, Italians, in relation to the Holocaust, are not understood as being anti-Semitic 
and the notorious race laws and deportations can be explained merely through Italy’s junior 
relationship to Germany.  More recently, while the facilitating role of Italy in the Holocaust is 
largely evaded, there has instead been an emerging emphasis on so called ‘good camps’, 
where Jews were saved from transportation to Nazi death camps (Walston 1997: 170).124  In 
relation to Italian colonialism in Africa, as Del Boca writes ‘there were no doubts: those ruling 
upon Eritrea and Somalia were “good people”’ (cited in Favero 2010: 146).   
 
In this way, the pervasive idea of Brava Gente enabled Italian colonialism to be, if remembered 
at all, recalled ‘for its exotic coloration, for the roads, the schools and hospitals that Italians 
built in Africa’ (Labanca 2004: 309).  This theme is very much encapsulated with the 
publication of a series of orientalist illustrations on Italy’s presence in Africa in the 1960s 
popular magazine Domenica del corriere.   In Labanca’s (2005: 36 -37) words, they were ‘wholly 
inspired to apologise for the mildness of the national character [....] it was a ‘nazionale-
popolare’ formula which (except for the Africans) seemed to suit most people: from the 
politicians of ‘Italy the bridge between Europe and Africa’ to the easily absolved veterans, from 
the left wing parties to the Catholic and right wing parties’.  It is such notions of the innate 
amiability of Italians that is also extant within the Treaty’s commitment to completing ‘basic 
infrastructure projects’ in Libya.  Moreover, as examined shortly, Brava Gente also infuses 
contemporary political rhetoric that accompanied the apology.  However, before discussing 
                                                             
 
124 For a wider discussion on this subject, see Walston (1997).  While undoubtedly such camps did save 
the lives of many people, such ideas of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ camps are obviously problematic.  As Walston 
shows, such camps as that of Ferramonti in Calabria commenced as being ‘repressive’, but later played a 
role in saving Jews.  As he further describes, in Rab ‘the two types of camp were situated next to each 
other’, as if to emphasise the pitfalls of generalising any political action as either innately ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  
Moreover, one must be careful in any glorification of good camps, of which themselves surely entailed 
severe hardship and repression.  
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this further, it is necessary to first situate the apology within an emerging trend by which 
recent Italian governments have been grappling with the colonial past. 
 
Timid incursions into the colonial narrative           
Historical narratives and perceptions of the past do not remain static, but fluctuate, in part, in 
accordance to the imperatives and societal conditions of the moment.  In this way, there have 
been oscillations and ‘hot spots’ where understandings of Italy’s colonial history have come 
under scrutiny.  In terms of challenges to the conventional narrative, the most robust 
challenge has been the field of academia, where scholars starting with Rochat in the 1970s and 
later Del Boca, Triulzi and Labanca have written authoritatively on diverse issues of both Italian 
colonialism and the shaping of its historical memory.  However, where, in the Belgian and 
British case studies, developments in academic research spilled over into more mainstream 
public consciousness, in the Italian case this does not seem to have occurred to such an extent.   
To recall, government enquiries proceeded from high-selling books that challenged 
conventional perceptions in both the British and Belgian case studies.  In contrast, in Italy such 
critical self examination has even been actively hindered at official levels.125  In this way, 
despite the increasing and critical academic research, this does not seem to have permeated 
public perceptions, which, if anything, with the passing of generations seem to have become 
more remote than ever before.126   
 
Over the last decade and a half, perhaps the most illuminative developments in Italian societal 
dealings with its colonial past can be viewed through some of the clumsy and ill at ease 
handlings of controversial issues by successive governments.  On the one hand, these dealings 
do speak to at least the beginnings of a more concerted effort at considering the past.  On the 
other hand, the irresolute, awkward and contradictory gestures indicate a political elite that 
remains more comfortable with euphemisms and platitudes than any serious introspection.  
Illustrative of this is the government’s 1996 admission that Italy did use gas in the war in 
Abyssinian.  That this was widely known before and only emerged under sustained pressure 
                                                             
 
125 This is evidenced by the aforementioned obstruction of documentaries and films that are critical of 
the past, as well as the previously analysed representation of the colonial past in high school textbooks.  
Beyond this, as De Michele (2011: 105) reflects, access to historical archives was denied to certain 
historians up to the beginning of the 1970s, with some restrictions even extending beyond this.  
126 Commenting on the fading memory with the passing of generations, Labanca (2005: 39) rhetorically 
asks ‘who today would remember who Pietro Toselli is?  And yet, in previous generations, there were 
those who called their children ‘Tosello’ or ‘Tosella’. 
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illustrates the ‘extent of the discomfort’ felt by recent Italian governments at the colonial past 
(Andall and Duncan 2005: 14).  Similarly, Giangiacomo Migone, President of the Senate’s 
Foreign Affairs committee joined his Ethiopian counterpart in laying a wreath at the battlefield 
to commemorate the 1996 centenary of the Battle of Adwa.  This gesture, however, was only 
secured after initial embarrassment when Prime Minister Lamberto Dini refused to send a 
delegation to partake in the commemoration for fear that this would expose him to right-wing 
criticism shortly before national elections (Triulzi 2006: 435).  Moreover, unlike the German 
case study where the centenary of the Herero genocide garnered a high degree of media 
attention, the Adwa centenary passed with minimal media coverage (Triulzi 2006: 435), 
barring a single late night television programme by a freelance director (Labanca 2005: 40).     
 
Perhaps the best example of such oscillating and contradictory postures is the controversy 
over the return of the Aksum obelisk.  Following the 1947 Peace Treaty, Italy committed itself 
to returning all materials taken from Ethiopia, including the looted fourth century obelisk.  
However, this was intermittently obstructed by various Italian governments.  Pankhurst (1999: 
237), for instance, cites an example of an Ethiopian ambassador being offered the suggestion 
that, rather than returning the artefact, an inscription should be placed beside it reading 
‘Presented by the people of Ethiopia to the people of Italy in token of friendship’.  In 1995 the 
Dini government finally set in motion the artefact’s return by sending an undersecretary of 
foreign affairs to arrange logistics with Ethiopian officials (Del Boca 2003: 22).  However, as Del 
Boca explores (2003: 24), this process was substantially halted due to apparent engineering 
constraints that seemed to mask political concern of right-wing criticism.127  The obelisk was 
only returned in its entirety in 2005.    
 
 A similarly awkward gesture in direct relation to Libya was in regards to the 1998 shared 
communiqué between respective foreign ministers, Umar Mustafa al-Muntasir and Lamberto 
Dini.  Just as in the other case studies where it is recognised that apologies do not occur in 
rhetorical vacuums, but tend to be proffered amidst an array of similar preceding contrite 
sentiments, it is clear that this document very much represents a precursor to the 2008 Treaty 
                                                             
 
127 In this regard, Del Boca highlights right-wing criticism of the obelisk’s return, including from 
Maurizion Gasparri, deputy of Alleanza Nationale, who argued it was ‘by now part of the urban 
landscape of Rome’ (quoted in Del Boca 2003: 24).  Although the mayor of Rome, Francesco Rutelli, 
cited his concern that the limestone stele would shatter if returned to Rome, Del Boca (2003:24) 
recognises that ‘it was also insinuated that Rutelli feared being smeared by the right as the 'mayor who 
lost the stele”’. 
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of Friendship.  In their joint statement, Dini committed Italy to ‘correcting the errors of the 
past’, and expressed ‘regret for the Libyan people’s suffering at the hands of the Italian 
colonialism’ (al-Muntasir and Dini 1998).  Tellingly, the same document opens with the 
statement that ‘in an effort to boost relations between the two friendly people, Italy calls upon 
Libya to forget the past’ (al-Muntasir and Dini 1998), as if to suggest that the thorny relations 
between the two states could be resolved if only Libya were to adopt the same amnesia 
achieved in Italy.  The reasons for discussing such gestures as explored above are that they 
resonate clearly with the 2008 apology.  This is to say that, as examined in the following 
passages, the 2008 apology, like other recent gestures by Italian governments, still contains 
vestiges of the impulses to silence and obfuscation. 
 
Deconstructing the apology and proximate governmental discourse 
In order to situate the apology within both the conventional understandings of the colonial 
narrative and the evolving ways in which Italian governments enmesh themselves into such 
historical episodes, it is necessary to partake in a deconstruction of both the apology (and 
adjacent treaty) itself and the accompanying political discourse that surrounds it.  To start with 
the apology:  In comparative analysis, one of the critiques this thesis has identified of colonial 
apologies is that, rather than disavowing colonialism in its totality, the apologies focus on just 
one particularly egregious event within colonialism’s wider context.  In this regard, Britain 
apologised for Bloody Sunday, Germany the Herero genocide and Belgium the assassination of 
Patrice Lumumba.  The argument that has been advanced is that by disavowing only one 
particularly egregious misdeed, there is an implicit condoning of wider colonial violence.  In 
contrast, it is interesting to note that this critique cannot be levelled against Berlusconi’s 
apology to Libya where he expressed ‘in the name of the Italian people our regret and 
apologies for the deep wounds that we have caused you’ (quoted in Gazzini 2009).  Indeed, of 
all the case studies in this project, this is the only example of an apology for the colonial 
project in that country per se.   
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that this does not in itself constitute a sustained rebuke of Italian 
colonialism.  For one, the apology was offered to Libya – a country in which Italy has an 
enduring strategic interest – rather than to other countries in which Italy colonised.  Secondly, 
as explored in Chapter 1, sincere apologies invariably entail the transgressor detailing the 
events for which they are sorry.  For instance, a sincere apology demands that one says ‘I’m 
sorry for crashing your car, I was drunk’, rather than just ‘I’m sorry’ – a statement which may 
even sound obtuse.  In this regard, even with their severe limitations, the other case studies do 
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chronicle the events for which they are apologising for.  Britain and Belgium, for instance, 
created immensely detailed reports of minute by minute developments in the events of Bloody 
Sunday and Lumumba’s assassination.128  Germany detailed its transgression saying it was for 
events that ‘would today be termed genocide’.129  However, to analyse Berlusconi’s apology, 
there is no detail beyond the ‘deep wounds’ caused and the ‘scar’ left.  To situate this 
alongside the conventional colonial narrative, the ‘deep wounds’ and ‘scar’, while professing a 
negative impact, are euphemistic and ambiguous as to the actual events for which he is 
apologising.  To this end, it represents a continued negation of the actual atrocities; people 
killed, the concentration camps, the use of chemical weapons and so on.  It fits with the vague 
sense that fascist and liberal colonial endeavours were unpleasant and distasteful, while 
nevertheless sustaining the absence of meaningful governmental and societal introspection 
into the actual violence perpetrated by the state.  With its nondescript and ambiguous nature, 
it leaves a rhetorical space which can continue to be filled, as shall shortly be considered, with 
the wider and more sustained continuations of Brava Gente and historical distortion.  
Moreover, this ambiguity is codified in the Treaty of Friendship  where, in its sole mention of 
contrition, the Treaty invokes Berlusconi’s and Dini’s own ambiguous words in reading that 
‘Italy already expressed regret for the suffering caused to the Libyan people as a result of 
colonialism’ (Camera del Deputati 2008).  It seems, in this respect, that the very wording of the 
Treaty was coordinated so as to enable such vague sentiments.   
 
Given that the content of the apology was ambiguous as to the colonial past, one may turn to 
accompanying discourse to illuminate how this past is framed in contemporary elite rhetoric in 
a broader sense.  In doing so, it is evident that such discourse continues to gloss over atrocities 
and suggest a benign brand of colonialism.  Representative of this is a 2004 statement by 
Berlusconi’s then Foreign Minister, Gianfranco Fini, in a diplomatic visit to Libya, saying 
 
There is not the slightest doubt that colonialism in the last century was one of the 
most difficult moments in the relations between Europe and, in this case, North Africa, 
but, and this is obviously a personal view, in speaking of Italian colonialism I think we 
should speak of it bearing in mind the fact that it is others in Europe who should be 
ashamed of certain ugly events.  We have our responsibility too, but, to Libya at least, 
the Italians brought not only roads and employment, but also those values, that 
                                                             
 
128 For a discussion and critique see pages 129-131. 
129 Again, there are aspects of this that are deeply unsatisfactory as a disavowal of colonialism or even 
genocide. For a critique see pages 88-90. 
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civilisation, and those laws that are a lighthouse for a whole culture, not only for 
Western culture (quoted in Mellino 2006: 470). 
 
Thus, in this one text, Fini conveyed the central pillars of the conventional narrative; that the 
Italian mode of colonialism was less ‘ugly’ than that of other colonisers and that Italy’s primary 
role was, in the spirit of Brava gente, a benign one of bringing infrastructure and ‘civilisation’ 
to the colony.  Clearly the Foreign Minister, who once described Mussolini as the ‘the greatest 
statesman of the 20th century’ (quoted in Owen 2008), neglected to mention the less savoury 
aspects of Italian colonialism.  
 
Likewise, to analyse Berlusconi’s accompanying discourse, one can also detect a curious 
admixture of brava gente, historical negation and even fascist revivalism.  In terms of brava 
gente, it is interesting to note that his manner represents a departure from the mode of 
politics identified in the other case studies, especially the Belgian and British ones.  In these 
cases, the contrite politicians (Cameron, Blair, Michel, Verhofstradt) cultivated both their 
apologies and their broader political style as sincere and reflective.  In contrast, Berlusconi’s 
infamously boisterous manner is, in this case, expedient to constructing a particular script for 
the Italian audience.  This is to say that his immediate statement that the apology was about 
more gas and fewer immigrants encapsulates the trivialising nature of Berlusconi’s bilateral 
dialogue.  In a succinct sound-bite designed for the Italian audience it undercut the sombre 
introspection of apology and its negative connotations and exhibits the slightly mischievous 
charm of Brave gente. 
 
Such exhibitions of Brave gente have also been used in other moments of historical distortion.  
Examples of this include Berlusconi’s claims that Mussolini’s was ‘a benign dictatorship’, that 
he ‘did not murder anyone’ and that, rather than imprisoning or murdering people, ‘Mussolini 
sent people on holiday to confine them’ (quoted in Farrell 2003)  While there is the impulse, 
perhaps in the spirit of brava gente, to attribute this to mere buffoonery,130 this would be to 
deny the seriousness of the Prime Minister and owner of large parts of the nation’s media 
partaking in the denial of historical atrocity.  Likewise, in the same interview, Berlusconi 
                                                             
 
130 In this spirit, Abraham Foxman, director of the New York based Anti-Defamation League and well 
known campaigner against anti-Semitism, said in response to Berlusconi’s comments that the Italian 
Prime Minister ‘is a friend.  He is a good friend, but a flawed friend’ (Peroni 2003).  This is to illustrate 
the pervasiveness by which serious historical revisionism is dismissed or trivialised as part of 
Berlusconi’s maverick nature. 
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rejected the ‘comparison of my country to another dictator and dictatorship - that of Saddam 
Hussein - which caused millions of deaths’ (quoted in Peroni 2003).  Thus, just as the 
conventional formula of ‘Germans bad, Italians good’ served a particular post-war societal and 
political moment, so, too, does the more contemporary juxtaposition of Iraqi and Italian 
dictators.  This is to say that the revivalism of Mussolini in relation to Saddam Hussein is one 
framed at a particular geopolitical moment that serves to contribute to the script of Italy’s role 
in the War on Terror. 
 
In similar tones, Berlusconi has repeatedly spoken of the ‘superiority’ of Western civilisation, 
evoking how ‘we’ have Michelangelo and Mozart, yet they do not, as well as ‘Islam’s’ inability 
to be part of ‘modernity’ (Said 2001: 147).  In 2001 he said     
 
We should be conscious of the superiority of our civilisation, which consists of a value 
system that has given people widespread prosperity in those countries that embrace 
it, and guarantees respect for human rights and religion. This respect certainly does 
not exist in the Islamic countries (quoted in Testas 2003: 183). 
 
He conveyed similar sentiments in another speech, saying: 
 
Consider that the attacks on New York and Washington are attacks not only on the 
United States but on our civilisation, of which we are proud bearers, conscious of the 
supremacy of our civilisation, of its discoveries and inventions, which have brought us 
democratic institutions, respect for the human, civil, religious and political rights of our 
citizens, openness to diversity and tolerance of everything (quoted in Hooper and 
Connolly 2001). 
 
It is by such rhetorical turns that Berlusconi draws on some of the central tenets of 
Huntington’s (1993) Clash of Civilisations thesis, evoking the sweeping generality of a 
civilisation in terms of its purported respect for human rights, representative institutions and 
separation of church and state (Huntington 1996).  It is, of course, such ill founded notions of 
civilisation and superiority by which Western powers formerly justified colonialism.  Moreover, 
in explicitly linking the superiority of Western civilisation to Islam and contextualising such 
statements within the 9/11 attacks, Berlusconi is again scripting a particular contemporary 
violence on the ‘other’ in the form of the War on Terror.  Thus, while the specificities of the 
apology are vague and ambiguous, an analysis of a surrounding discourse outside of the 
apology illuminates a discourse that retains many of the features of colonial language.  It is by 
this token that the surrounding discourse continues to juxtapose the ‘other’ with homage to 
the notions of civilisation, progress and superiority.  Moreover, the revisionism and 
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rehabilitation of Mussolini’s rule is to negate the violence for which Berlusconi supposedly 
apologised; it is to provide a discourse that, even in apologising, is reminiscent of the 
conventional narrative of obfuscating the brutalities of colonialism. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, like other case studies in this thesis, this chapter has contended that Berlusconi’s 
Grande Gesto to Libya has a multiplicity of meanings that serve to advance particular politically 
expedient scripts.  Firstly, as a fractious episode in Italy and Libya’s relations, public contrition 
serves as a device by which to mend and strengthen bilateral relations.  This was especially 
significant in terms of the two states’ timely and converging pre-Arab Spring interest in Libya’s 
reintegration into the ‘International Community’.  In this way, the apology is a speech act 
whereby Italy endorsed Libya and, more particularly, Gaddafi as responsible partners of the 
West.  Married with this reintegration is the nakedly economic and migratory components of 
the treaty.  In analysing the ways in which such factors are inscribed, it is contend that the 
phraseology within the Treaty resembles conventional colonial dogmas.  This is most evident in 
respect to the $5bn compensation being managed by Italy so as to complete ‘basic 
infrastructure projects’ (Camera del Deputati 2008), such as a highway and health care facility.  
Such arrangements reproduce the perceptions of a paternal and benign Italy, intent on 
providing the modern infrastructure that the periphery cannot provide itself.  Moreover, such 
arrangements, as Berlusconi himself boasted, are coupled with facilitating advantageous 
access to Libya’s raw materials as well as lucrative business contracts for Italian companies 
operating in the former colony.  In regards to the immigration component of the treaty, this 
chapter has situated rhetoric on the issue within elite political discourse that draws on dual 
notions of ethnicity and threat.  In this respect, this section highlighted particular statements 
by cabinet ministers that illustrated vitriolic and violent intentions towards ‘illegal’ 
immigration.  It is only within such discourse that one can situate the draconian ‘security’ and 
deportation measures explored previously in the chapter.   
 
The final section located the apology within the parameters of the conventional perceptions of 
Italian colonialism as articulated since the inception of the First Republic.  It is contend that 
there are broadly two dimensions within this narrative, termed here as ‘silence’ and 
‘obfuscation’.  Such narratives shift societal memories of colonialism to the margins of Italian 
society and, where they do exist, emphasise an essentially benign and progressive character of 
Italian colonialism, certainly in comparison to other colonial powers.  In one sense, clearly 
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there is a certain rupture to this conventional narrative, where an apology unavoidably 
connotes a negative perception of Italian colonialism.  However, in deconstructing the apology, 
it has been suggested that such contrition offers vague and unarticulated platitudes such as 
the ‘wounds’ and ‘scars’ of colonialism, without showing any introspection or recognition of 
actual atrocities committed by the liberal and fascist governments.  Such ambiguity sits 
comfortably within the broader process of marginalisation and sanitisation that took place 
within the First Republic.  Moreover, an analysis of the wider discourse of political elites 
reflects an endurance of colonial like concepts, such as notions of European cultural 
superiority, the progressive and civilising role of Italy within Libya and a perceptible 
trivialisation of Mussolini’s rule.  Thus, in affirming the central tenets of this thesis, this chapter 
has pointed to important ways in which the apology, together with its surrounding political 
and rhetorical context, scripts a renewed narrative that, in significant respects, resembles 
orthodox colonial perceptions. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I only like confessions nowadays, and the authors of confessions write chiefly in order 
not to confess, saying nothing of what they know.  When they pretend to be owning 
up, that’s the moment to beware; they’re putting make-up on the corpse.   
 
Albert Camus (2006: 76) The Fall 
 
This thesis has identified colonial apologies as crucial sites where contemporary European 
elites wrestle with the colonial past and its meaning in the present.  They are rituals that are 
informed and shaped in a melting pot of contradictory and ambivalent landscapes and 
sentiments.   They are forged in imperatives of liberal legitimation, the normative ascendency 
of human rights, simultaneous assumptions of colonial guilt and nostalgia, enduring 
geopolitical inequalities and the preservation of notions of the state’s apparently benign past.   
Although seemingly a narrow phenomenon, the study of these multifaceted textual and 
symbolic rituals gleans valuable insights into larger processes whereby latter day (post-) 
colonial relations are illuminated, deliberated over, renegotiated and recirculated.   
 
In unpacking this significance, the thesis has undertaken an empirical case study based analysis 
of apologies from four European states for transgressions committed against former colonies.  
These case studies pertained to the German apology for the genocide of the Herero people of 
modern day Namibia; the Belgian apology for involvement in the assassination of Patrice 
Lumumba, the first post-independence Prime Minister of the DRC; the British apology for the 
Bloody Sunday massacre in Derry in 1972 and the Italian apology for colonialism in Libya.  
Utilising the concept of collective memory, the thesis sought to explore and map the processes 
by which apologising politicians draw on these undesirable pasts and how, in turn, such 
mnemonic elaborations have been employed in identity formation and political expediency.  In 
undertaking this research agenda, the project principally contributes to the understanding of 
the ways in which contemporary discourses frame, negotiate and reproduce present day 
colonial/postcolonial relationships. 
 
Clearly colonial apologies do, to some extent, offer altered perceptions of the past to those 
that once prevailed at the height of empire:  They offer remorse for certain events and reflect 
a more measured and tempered tone towards the past.  Nevertheless, the thesis has argued 
that colonial apologies are not acts that significantly renounce, disavow or radically destabilise 
the mentalities and ideological complacencies of the colonial project.  Instead, the apologies 
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serve to discursively recycle complexions that are reminiscent of the unequal patterns forged 
in the colonial period.  This, it has been argued, is cemented in two ways:  1.) The apologies 
advance particular interests of states (or certain people within the states) that historically 
practiced colonialism.  2.) The apologies and adjacent elite discourses are laden with tropes 
and narratives that are remarkably reminiscent of the core legitimising tenets of the colonial 
enterprise.  In elaborating on these postulations, the conclusion first unpacks and explores 
these arguments in more detail and with more complexity.  The second section proceeds to 
discuss the limitations of the thesis and areas for further research.  The final section details the 
academic implications and contributions of the thesis’ findings.  In particular, this final section 
frames the core contributions of the thesis as a challenge to some of the core ideological 
assumptions of the European liberal polity. 
     
The expediencies of apology 
To restate:  The empirical chapters demonstrated that contrite politicians do draw certain 
dividends in their mea culpa.  Before cataloguing these in more detail, it is necessary to 
reiterate that, while emphasising the gratuity of apology, the thesis has sought to curtail and 
add nuance to the notion that these contrite recollections of the past are harnessed with 
instant efficacy and immaculate Machiavellian cunning by political elites of the day.  To this 
extent, the thesis drew on and critiqued an overly ‘presentist’ or ‘top-down’ model of 
collective memory.  In other words, the thesis challenged the idea that elites, facing minimal 
resistance, stridently manipulate the past as they see fit, instead capturing a political elite that 
are somewhat more cowed than this picture.  In particular, it speaks of political leaders that, to 
use Zerubavel’s (1996: 283) phrase, enter into ‘mnemonic battles’ over the past.  Rather than 
monopolising the past, politicians must, over an elongated period of time, vie and compromise 
with alternative memories, including those of the previously colonised.  This is to paint a 
process by which, in order to maintain credibility, metropolitan elites must cede ground and 
tacitly negotiate with competing memories.  In this respect, the very act of apologising 
represents a more moderated discourse that jars with states’ and politicians’ reflexive 
inclinations towards self-aggrandisement.    
 
While sketching the portrait of the compromised politician, this is certainly not to suggest that 
the metropolitan leaders are rendered impotent.  Indeed, elite narratives of the past remain 
unequally voluble; privileged as they are by the trappings of office - access to the media, the 
perceived gravity and formality of state institutions and so on.  To this degree, even where 
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apologies represent uncomfortable climb-downs from the orthodox glorification or denial of 
the past, the metropole’s politicians may still garner certain rewards.  Notwithstanding 
similarities between the case studies, there are, nevertheless, variances in the forms by which 
such self interest manifests itself.  Thus, in comparing the case studies, one may decipher four 
key forms by which the thesis has identified expediency: 
   
1. The electoral and presentational expediency of apology 
In domestic party political terms, the Belgian and British case studies traced the processes by 
which, following widespread public perception of endemic elite ‘sleaze’ and corruption, the 
use of mea culpa signposted to a domestic audience an apparent culture of transparency, 
integrity and flexibility among the new governments (cf. Cunningham 2004a; Kerstens 2008).  
Characteristic of a more ‘open collar’ style of politics, it signalled governments that are more at 
ease with employing an idiomatic discourse that contrasted favourably, at least in electoral 
and presentational terms, with the previous administrations.  In analysis, it would be 
misguided to suggest that pursuit of this aesthetic is the reason that governments apologise; 
clearly there are any number of other less arduous platforms by which modern politicians 
could broadcast this style.  However, unlike their preceding administrations, the Blair, 
Cameron and Verhofstadt governments’ propensities for such apparently humble discourses 
facilitated the establishment of Truth Commissions and subsequent apologies for particular 
thorny issues of the past.  In other words, where the previous administrations were less 
reflexive and more orthodox in their responses to deeply contested pasts, the new 
administrations’ cultivated political styles were more conducive to reflective and contrite 
stances.  As such, it is not that the new administrations actively sought out past state 
transgressions for which to apologise.  Rather, in environments of contestation and rupture of 
official narratives, it was these governments’ manner that accorded with introspective stances.  
Moreover, following the findings of the relevant Truth Commissions, the governments in 
question could opportunistically utilise the visual and discursive aspects of apology to 
presentational effect. 
 
2. Strategic economic self-gain  
Shifting from the domestic, one can also point to realpolitik economic imperatives that 
intersect with apology.  Such sentiments are most evident in the Italian and German case 
studies.  To this end, in deconstructing the German apology for the Herero genocide, Chapter 3 
contended that the apology can be understood as a response to recent claims for reparations 
by the Herero community, particularly the Chief Hosea Kutako Foundation’s legal claim in a US 
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court in 2001 for reparations from the German government and businesses amounting to 
US$4billion.  This negation of reparations, it was argued, is interlinked with an objective in 
resisting land reform that would adversely affect the privileged position of German 
descendants’ land ownership in Namibia (Jamfa 2008: 207).  In this regard, the chapter 
explored how Wieczorek-Zeul’s apology employed legally savvy grammar and language so as 
to evade and disarm such demands.  Also pertaining to economic self-interest, the Italian case 
study explored how Berlusconi’s 2008 apology was adjoined with The Treaty of Friendship, 
Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya.  Chapter 6 traced how this treaty, at 
least before the Arab Spring, accompanied lucrative long term deals for Libyan oil and gas 
firms, while gleaning Italian strategic access to Libyan natural resources.  Indeed, Berlusconi 
was himself rather candid about this, reportedly proclaiming that the treaty would lead to 
fewer immigrants and more oil and gas for Italy (Dinmore and Saleh 2008). 
 
3. Underscoring a foreign/diplomatic policy agenda 
While all apology, including the interpersonal, is an exercise in relationship management, the 
Belgian, British and Italian case studies have placed particular emphasis on the diplomatic 
significance of its utility in bolstering relationships with key strategic partners.  For instance, 
Chapter 4 traced how the Belgian apology was an exercise in building relations with 
Democratic Republic of Congo President L.D Kabila – a man who cultivated himself as a 
political descendant of Lumumba (Kerstens 2008: 194).  Likewise, as the President of the 
Lumumba Commission recognised, it was considered that reflecting on the past would assist in 
initiating the Verohstadt government’s more pro-active diplomacy in the region ‘on a good 
foundation’ (Versnick 2002: 44).   In a similar regard, the Italian apology may be understood as 
a strategic overture to Colonel Gaddafi.  Contextualised within Italy’s pre-2011 geopolitical 
strategic interest of building relations within North Africa, the apology chimed with Gaddafi’s 
long held coveting of Italian apology and, as such, implicitly endorsed an ideological pillar of his 
regime.  This served to temporarily facilitate more cordial relations between the two leaders 
and states.  Not dissimilarly, in the British case study, Chapter 5 pointed to the conjuncture of 
the Saville Inquiry (including the subsequent apology) and the Northern Ireland Peace Process.  
To this end, it was contended that the Saville Inquiry/apology constituted a symbolic overture 
to the ‘nationalist community’ of Northern Ireland, thereby further building bridges and 
enticing the community’s participation into the consociational logic of the Peace Process. 
    
4. Reaffirming a liberal normative complexion 
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Finally, in one sense, apology for episodes of egregious violence serves to discursively reaffirm 
the states’ liberal normative complexion. Since the 1990s and the end of the Cold War, it has 
been increasingly important for states to, at least at a symbolic level, adhere to cosmopolitan 
discourses of human rights.  To this extent, there has emerged what Levy and Sznaider (2010: 
4) call a ‘memory imperative’, ‘which finds its expression in a set of political and normative 
expectations to engage with past injustices’.  While a critique of this supposed liberal discourse 
is offered later within this conclusion, it is, for the moment, sufficient to recognise that where 
episodes of historical human rights violations are placed under the intensity of the public 
microscope, there are pressures exerted on governments to address them.  This can be seen in 
all the case studies, but it is perhaps illustrated most prominently in the German case.  Given 
the particularities of German remembrance of the Third Reich and the Holocaust, it was 
contended that, following renewed public scrutiny, the apology for the Herero genocide 
correlates with the normative imperative of the state’s anti-genocidal legitimising stance. 
 
In itemising the above expediencies of mea culpa, it is interesting to note that this plurality and 
diversity of self interest – even within a single case study – illuminates the multiple audiences 
and imperatives to which the contrite politicians speak.  In regards to colonial relationships, it 
is pertinent to recognise that some of these expediencies accompany treaties and policies that 
directly recodify and entrench unequal relations between the formerly colonial and colonised.  
For instance, the enduring Italian interest in Libyan natural resources and German interest in 
European settlers in Namibia quite clearly resemble orthodox geopolitical interests.  In other 
cases, for instance the electoral presentation of particular politicians or the exhibiting of 
states’ liberal credentials, it is not immediately evident that this is impacting on the 
contemporary relationship in concrete policy making terms.  Nevertheless, such presentational 
pitches constitute indulgent acts of speaking about, exhibiting, congratulating and venerating 
the European.  It renders the violence committed against the colonised as merely a conduit for 
the presentational aspects of the metropole.  In this respect, the apologies serve to advance 
the interests of the states that historically practiced colonialism while rendering, to a 
significant degree, those who suffered the violence as passive backdrops in a European story. 
 
Reformulating a colonial-like discourse   
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In itemising the above expediencies of apology, there is one omission that feeds into the 
second point of the thesis’ argument:  That is, states and politicians, it seems, draw on mea 
culpa in a manner that, at least in the immediate term,131 advances scripts that recycle 
orthodox colonial tenets and defend, reaffirm or sustain grandiose notions of the state’s 
benign or glorious past.  The modes by which states conventionally narrate their pasts are 
replete with extravagant narratives of chivalry, daring and triumph over adversity.  Indeed, 
Empire has typically provided fertile ground for such plotlines; the legitimising tenets being 
fantasies of superiority, destiny, adventure, savagery, civilisation and so forth.  In this sense, 
one might assume that apology signposts a renunciation of these very complacencies; that 
there is an incompatibility between apology and the orthodox aggrandising postures that 
states reflexively take in relation to their past.  On the contrary, the case studies here have 
posited that, even in apology, many of these colonial mentalities persist.  This does not mean 
that contemporary rhetoric exactly replicates the discourses that prevailed at the zenith of 
Empire; certainly apology does inescapably endow certain events with negative connotations 
and does represent a certain humility and introspection regarding the past.  However, as 
meticulously illuminated in the case studies, there are lingering modes by which the 
aggrandising postures endure.  It is these modes that are discussed in more detail below: 
 
Revering and sanitising the colonial past 
The key way in which apologies sanitise the wider colonial project is in the scope of their 
contrition.  In comparative analysis, three of the four case studies – Germany, Belgium and 
Britain – point to apologies where the politicians have renounced only a narrow egregious 
incident, rather than disavowing the wider processes and landscapes in which the incidents 
took place.  To this end, the states in question demonstrate mea culpa for limited incidents - 
the Herero genocide, the assassination of Lumumba, the massacre of civil rights protestors in 
Derry.  It is these episodes, dramatic and emotive as they are, that, as detailed in the empirical 
chapters, had become subject to intense public scrutiny and contestation.  In other words, in 
experiencing strong societal examination, there was a certain rupture in official state 
narratives, whereby these episodes could no longer be credibly incorporated into the familiar 
plotlines of the states’ supposedly progressive and benevolent pasts.  It is in the context of this 
rupture that mea culpa seeks, perhaps to little avail, to amputate these events from the wider 
                                                             
 
131 Beyond the immediate term, it is argued that apologies cannot retain the credibility of colonial 
narratives indefinitely.  Instead, apologies will only lead to further contestations and demands for 
further apologies.  This is explored in more detail in the final passages of this conclusion. 
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plotline of the colonial endeavour.  Though unavoidably opening the narrative to further 
contestation, the apology functions to suggest that these particular egregious acts were 
somehow anomalous to the otherwise favourable colonial endeavours (cf. Gibney 2002: 281). 
Given that the apologies pertained to either very narrow incidents or, as in the Italian case, 
remain rather vague and euphemistic expressions (see pages 172-173), there is a sense by 
which both a wider elite rhetoric and the apologising text itself fills this vacuum.  It is this 
parallel discourse that demonstrably infuses the colonial past with glorifying and/or sanitising 
sentiments.  To take just examples from the apologising politicians themselves:  Belgian 
foreign minister, Louis Michel, spoke of ‘a set of positive contributions’ that Belgium made to 
the Congo (Persdienst Buitenlandse Zaken 2004).  Likewise, he also described Leopold II as a 
‘visionary’ and a ‘hero’ (quoted in Flandersnews.be 2010).  Despite the apology to Libya, 
Berlusconi described Mussolini’s rule as ‘a benign dictatorship’ (quoted in Farrell 2003).  In the 
apology for the Derry massacre, Cameron (2010) simultaneously spoke of the British armed 
forces displaying ‘enormous courage and professionalism in upholding democracy and the rule 
of law in Northern Ireland’, while declaring the army, in his opinion, to be ‘the best in the 
world’.   Indeed, these are just limited examples and the empirical chapters are replete with 
similar discursive interventions as offered within the apology text and by adjacent political 
elites.   
 
Beyond the rhetoric of political elites, the empirical chapters have also pointed to alternative 
mnemonic sites that propagate enduring glorifying or sanitising sentiments in regards to 
colonialism.  For instance, while Chapter 3 suggested that while the German state was less 
prone to glorifying the colonial past than the other cases, the chapter nevertheless pointed to 
the current vogue for films and televised melodramas set in German administered territories 
that recirculate colonial fantasies of exoticism, racial stereotype and frontier ruggedness  
(Struck 2010; 2011).  Likewise, the Belgium case study examined the Royal Museum of Central 
Africa as a prominent mnemonic site that, beyond the apology, put forth exhibitions regarding 
the Belgium role in Africa that are imbued with civilising, paternalistic and orientalist 
overtones (see Rahier 2003; Hochschild 2005; Hasian and Wood 2010).  It is in underscoring 
such representations throughout the case studies that this thesis has located a curious and 
seemingly contradictory process, whereby the comparatively novel expressions of regret and 
remorse are conjoined with the more typical impulse towards colonial veneration. 
 
Exalting contemporary paternalistic policies 
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There is a sense by which the apologies function as less of a platform of self flagellation, than 
one of self congratulation.  In particular, it is evident that, in apologising, politicians take care 
to meticulously exhibit apparently altruistic and benevolent policies towards the former 
colony.  The Bloody Sunday apology, for instance, venerates the British government’s role in 
working towards peace in Northern Ireland.  On its part, the commitments undertaken in the 
Treaty of Friendship commit Italy to undertaking the very activities that the state once exalted 
as the benevolent gifts of Italian colonialism, such as building infrastructure, roads and 
hospitals.  The German apology states the willingness to ‘help Namibia tackle the challenges of 
development’ and assist ‘the necessary process of land reform’ (Wieczorek-Zeul 2004).  With 
similar condescension, the Belgian apology committed the Lumumba Fund to ‘democratic 
development’, ‘strengthening the rule of law and training of youth’ (Michel 2002: 52).  Laden 
with such sentiments, it appears that apologies redraft the paternalistic and belittling postures 
of the colonial era.  In the process they project the apologising state as one which fosters 
benign and compassionate foreign policies towards the formerly colonised.     
 
Beyond infantilising evocations, it is interesting to note that such gestures are loaded with an 
unspoken irony: that the European state now congratulating itself for supporting democratic 
governance in the Congo is the one that oversaw fundamentally undemocratic colonial rule in 
the region, before then assisting in the assassination of its first democratic leader and offering 
long term complicity in regards to General Mobutu’s rule.  Equally, the very state that engaged 
in the dispossession of Africans from their land in South West Africa is now the one offering 
assistance in land reform.  It is Britain that is emphasising its role in facilitating peace in 
Northern Ireland, rather than its colonial role in instigating conflict.  There is something 
reminiscent of the colonial in this:  in colonial discourses of providing salvation to famished 
and impoverished subalterns, it was frequently disregarded that it was colonialism itself that 
fuelled the famine and impoverishment.  Here, there is a similar scenario: in the process of 
apology, the European state is projected as a contemporary solution to problems that it played 
a large part in creating.    
 
Speaking for the colonised 
In her seminal work, Spivak (1988) ponders the question as to whether the subaltern can 
speak.  In her complex essay, Spivak considers the dilemma of Western intellectuals speaking 
on behalf of the colonised.  In turning to apologies, this thesis has located a similar dilemma, 
whereby, even if one (problematically) assumes the best intentions, metropolitan apology for 
colonial transgression entails the Western official speaking and narrating a violence bestowed 
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upon the subaltern.  In other words, just as the orthodox colonial powers denied and 
bestowed ‘history’ upon the subaltern, so too can this process be seen in apologies.  This 
dilemma pertains to all the case studies, but is most forcibly embodied in the Belgian and 
British cases, whereby it is the metropolitan state institutions that undertake ‘Truth 
Commissions’ into the past.  It is by this format that institutions of the metropole assign 
themselves to adjudicate and pronounce ‘truth’, almost as if these atrocities only have 
authenticity if they are verified by European officialdom.  It is not that the formerly colonised 
literally cannot speak.  In fact, the thesis has demonstrated that subaltern contestation plays a 
central role in the rupturing of European states’ ‘official’ narratives.  Nevertheless, in 
apologising, it is European politicians and states that capture the media coverage and get 
acclaim for making grand and noble gestures of reconciliation.       
 
Limitations and suggestions for further research 
The significances of the above mentioned enduring colonial assumptions are turned to 
imminently.  However, as with any research project, it is first necessary to recognise both 
avenues for further research and certain limitations that are inherent to this thesis. 
 
Case study selection 
First, to explore issues of method, there are unavoidable limitations here regarding the 
question of case study selection.  As considered in the Introduction, the thesis opted for case 
studies where there had been positive occurrences of the empirical phenomena in question.  
That is, the thesis undertook in-depth textual analysis of empirical examples where apologies 
have been realised.  The thesis has thereby neglected potentially illuminative case studies 
where mea culpa has not been offered.  For example, there have been recent high profile 
rebuffed calls for France to apologise to Algeria, Turkey to address the Armenian genocide and 
the UK to apologise in light of detentions and torture committed at the time of the Mau Mau 
rebellion.  Equally, there are innumerable colonial projects where apologies have not been 
offered and there have not yet been discernible high profile demands for apology.  Thus, 
where this thesis examined the mnemonic constructs of the colonial past through the offering 
of apology, one could alternatively gain insights into states’ awkward relationships with their 
colonial past through their refusals to apologise.  In particular, there is room for further 
research as to why some polities are reticent in offering apology, even in the face of 
considerable international and domestic contestation at official narratives. 
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Likewise, the thesis undertook a conscious decision to focus on examples of European apology.  
Certainly, there have been examples of non-European apology (albeit from European settler 
states) for historical wrongs committed against indigenous peoples, in Canada and Australia, 
for example.  Beyond these domestic cases, this thesis omitted non-European empirical 
examples of apology for aspects of oversees colonialism, Japanese mea culpa being the most 
prominent example of this.  Interestingly, a cursory study of the Japanese post-war apologies 
sheds light on several similar dynamics to those of this thesis.  For instance, there has been a 
tendency to use ‘vague and nonspecific’ language (Yamazaki 2006: 36), conjoined with 
accompanying and enduring sanitising or glorifying discourses from both governmental 
politicians (Lind 2008) and other officialised mnemonic sites, especially school textbooks.  
Finally, like the case studies of this thesis, there has been a trend to apologise for narrow 
issues that have become of high public profile, such as the, euphemistically phrased, use of 
‘comfort women’.132  While this thesis is a study of mnemonic representations of European 
colonialism, there is certainly scope for further research regarding comparative analysis 
between European and non-European forms of political apology.133 
 
The capacity to generalise findings 
In focussing on four European case studies, there remain prominent questions as to how far 
the findings of this thesis can be generalised to apply to other European states.  The thesis has 
pointed to remarkably similar contradictions throughout the case studies; that the states in 
question are torn between a disavowal of egregious episodes of violence and their reflexive 
inclination towards veneration of the past.  Such contradictions, one could suggest, are 
inherent in colonial projects per se; that is, colonialism has long been riddled with the dilemma 
of ‘civilising’ through violence and tackling ‘savagery’ through oppression.  It seems, moreover, 
that, even where apology has not been realised, that other former European colonial powers 
are beset with similar discursive anxieties and contradictions.  Nevertheless, just as Sartre 
(1956) advanced that ‘Le colonialisme est un système’, it remains to be seen if the postcolonial 
anxieties and ambivalences of apologetic states described in the case studies constitute a 
system.  In other words, there is further mileage available in regards to whether the findings of 
                                                             
 
132 Expressing ‘apologies and contrition’, in 1992 spokesman for the Japanes government, Koichi Kato, 
said that ‘We cannot deny that the former Japanese army played a role’ in the abuse of  ‘comfort girls’ 
(quoted in Associated Press 1992).  Comfort women refer to women used as sex slaves by Japanese 
Forces during World War II.    
133 For an example of an excellent analysis of both German and Japanese WWII apologies, see Lind 
(2008). 
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these narrow case studies may be accorded more systematically to other former European 
colonial powers.      
 
Methodological nationalism 
In regards to questions of the format of the project, this thesis couches its assumptions based 
upon an implicit methodological nationalism.  This is applicable to what Chernilo (2006: 5-6) 
describes as ‘the all-pervasive assumption that the nation-state is the natural and necessary 
form of society in modernity; the nation-state is taken as the organizing principle of 
modernity’.   Indeed, the very approach of this thesis having four case studies - each pertaining 
to the mnemonic representations of an apologising state - does reflect an organising principle 
that gravitates around the nation-state.  Such a method, perhaps problematically, reproduces 
the idea that it is at state level where perceptions of the past are primarily articulated and 
disseminated.  While the thesis has demonstrated that there are certain international 
imperatives to apology, perhaps the inbuilt case study format has obstructed the deciphering 
of spaces where memories are negotiated and articulated that transcend the state.  To this 
end, in recent years there has been an emergence of academic literature that emphasises the 
increasingly cosmopolitan and globalised dynamics of memory (for instance, Levy and Sznaider 
2002; Levy and Sznaider 2010; Amine and Beschea-Fache 2012; Gavriely-Nuri and Lachover 
2012).  As such, there is scope for further research to more closely examine the cosmopolitan 
mnemonic dynamics and implications of political apology. 
 
The Eurocentric scope of the thesis 
The most prominent limitation wrestled with through the course of this project is that of the 
scope of the thesis, which has been consciously focused towards European elites.  One of the 
key arguments of this thesis is that political mea culpa provides yet another platform for the 
European state to narrate the colonial past; that there is a form of ventriloquism where, even 
in elaborating contritely on the violence committed against the colonised, it is the European 
elite that is given a stage.  In other words, even in apology, there is a sense in which the 
colonised are spoken about, rather than given voice.  In this regard, there is a question as to 
whether this thesis further fuels this exact dilemma.  Firstly, the thesis is by a white European 
and emanates from a European academic institution.  More pressingly, the thesis is an 
examination of European polities, European politicians and European mnemonic 
representations.  In undertaking this, the work has attempted to demonstrate that European 
elites must interact with, vie and negotiate with disparate representations from their former 
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colonies.  Nevertheless, there is a sense in which this very work has retrodden the Eurocentric 
path that it disparages.   
 
To offer a defence: this thesis does not claim to speak for the colonised and has, from its 
inception, not claimed to be even primarily about the colonised (although undoubtedly there 
have been places where the empirical case studies have demonstrated competing 
representations from the formerly colonised).  The focus of this thesis has been European 
states and the ways in which European elites construct, negotiate and grapple with the 
colonial past.  In this respect, the animating dilemma that pervades and drives this thesis is 
predisposed to researching these European discourses from the (former) coloniser.  
Nevertheless, the pre-set parameters of the thesis leave a space for wider research – from a 
different perspective – that could build on or compliment this thesis.  That is, there is certainly 
room for a wider study of how demands for apology are formulated, articulated and 
responded to by the (formerly) colonised  and how, by extension, these demands inform group 
identities, circulating within uneven power configurations – privileging  certain ‘victims’ while 
marginalising others. 
 
The thesis’ contribution 
Notwithstanding these limitations, it may be suggested that this thesis makes an important 
academic contribution.  The key contribution of the thesis is in identifying and dissecting an 
unexplored site of analysis that significantly enriches the study of discourses that are 
embedded within and sustain contemporary patterns of (post-)colonial relations.  Mea culpa 
has been shown to be a multifaceted process that is delicately poised to encapsulate and shed 
light on a plethora of dimensions that inform and shape the contemporary articulations of 
European elites.  For instance, it seems that the process of apology is fashioned through such 
disparate and ambivalent features as enduring fantasies of empire, colonial guilt, persisting 
geopolitical hierarchies, self-interest, human rights imperatives, axiomatic impulses towards 
state valorisation and so on.  To this end, the project is situated within, and adds value to, an 
array of postcolonial literature that locates discourse and representation as mediums that are 
integral to the processes of colonial domination.  In this respect, the study of colonial apology 
provides for an examination of a particular novel phenomenon that stands at the intersection 
of sentiments of humanitarianism, liberalism and also contemporary colonial hierarchy.  The 
study of this seemingly narrow issue of apology speaks to wider debates within International 
190 
 
Relations and adjacent disciplines regarding the significance of the colonial past and European 
states’ uneasy relationship with the legacy of Empire.  
 
Collective memory 
In addition, the project adds value in terms of the study of collective memory.  In many senses, 
beyond complimenting it with postcolonial analysis (discussed below), this thesis has used the 
concept of collective memory more as a lens through which to grapple with representations of 
the past, rather than seeking to substantially reshape the theoretical grounding of the concept.  
In this way, the objective was not to destabilise or significantly alter the concept, but to draw 
on its starting assertion that the way in which societies recall the past is mediated socially 
through multiple sites and discursive exchanges.   Nevertheless, the project makes a 
contribution to the study of the emerging new ‘grammar’ (Assmann 2006: 219) by which states 
represent the past.  In this regard, there has been recognition of a trend whereby certain 
states are developing a discourse which is discernibly more self-disparaging than the 
conventional glorifying grammar.  Indeed, Schwartz (2008) goes so far as to speak of a ‘post-
heroic’ mode of representing the past.  Such a ‘post-heroic’ memory, he writes, entails a 
scenario in which ‘epic undertakings are replaced by limited conflicts; democracy is expanded 
by repudiating inequality and valorizing victimhood above greatness, weakness over strength’ 
(Schwartz 2008: 8).  This thesis contributes by further problematising and complicating the 
question of such a ‘post-heroic’ grammar.134  In this respect, the thesis shows that there is a 
certain endurance of ‘heroic’ narratives that valorise aspects of colonial endeavours.  
However, the thesis does more than simply show that alongside contrite recollections there 
are also heroic postulations.  Instead, the thesis serves to blur the lines between heroic and 
contrite mnemonic postulations; it unravels the structures by which the very act of offering 
contrite stances of the past is at once bounded with preserving, defending and perpetuating 
conventional aggrandising narratives.  Moreover, as shown throughout the thesis, the very 
texts and persons that offer such contrition equally espouse conventional platitudes in the 
next breath.  It is recognition of the merging of these dual and seemingly incompatible 
sentiments – contrition and glorification – that marks the contribution of this work to the 
understanding of the operation of this new manner of representing the past. 
                                                             
 
134 This is not to create a straw-man out of Schwartz.  In fact, in his excellent book, Abraham Lincoln in 
the post-heroic era: history and memory in late twentieth-century America, Schwartz (2008: 187) 
recognises that, even in the post-heroic age, we continue ‘to recognise many heroes in our time: 
military, civic (including police and firemen) and sports heroes stand out in the public mind’.   
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Contribution to International Relations 
In regards to the discipline of IR, the focus on these rituals positions this work within an array 
of literature that, in recent years, has moved the discipline slowly away from some of its more 
positivist inclinations and its preoccupation with such narrow issues as anarchy, balance of 
power and the security dilemma.  To this end, the theoretical developments in regards to 
constructivism, poststructuralism and the discipline’s belated recognition of postcolonial 
analysis since the 1990s have left welcome spaces where discourse is recognised as a key 
aspect of enacting and fostering particular power relations.  Most pressingly, the thesis 
continues in this vein and, drawing on postcolonial analysis, has located an empirical 
phenomenon that powerfully and subtly captures not only the character of enduring colonial 
and hierarchical power relations, but also sheds light on the frailties and the anxieties that are 
extant within these unequal relationships.  Moreover, in theoretical terms, the thesis takes 
unprecedented steps in IR in marrying key tenets of both postcolonial analysis and sociological 
work on collective memory.  It has been suggested that postcolonial analysis and collective 
memory share an overlooked appreciation for the central role of text and representations of 
the past in shaping contemporary social, economic and political landscapes.  Likewise, they 
both recognise the uneven – yet perpetually fluxed – power struggles over the capacity to 
inscribe perceptions of the past in ways that resonate with current day power configurations.  
It is hoped – moving beyond the issue of political apologies – that this work will encourage and 
facilitate further empirical and theoretical research in IR and kindred disciplines that builds on 
this marriage. 
 
The key contribution, however, of the thesis to the discipline of IR is through expanding 
understandings of the performative and ritualistic processes by which liberalism reproduces 
itself in the international system.135  In particular, the thesis identifies a series of 
contradictions, incongruities and even hypocrisies in the very processes through which elites 
                                                             
 
135 As previously discussed, while liberalism is a broad theory with a rich intellectual history, the 
significance to this thesis are the modes by which contemporary elites symbolically, ritualistically and 
very publically exhibit their liberal credentials.  In this sense, their mea culpa for past atrocity intuitively 
constitutes proclamations of moral aversion to such violence as well as commitments to norms of 
human rights.  Moreover, the apologies sit with liberal imperatives that advocate inter-state/community 
reconciliation, harmony and – in the post-cold war world – renewed commitments to international 
justice and fairness.     
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enact and ritualistically both frame their liberal credentials and engage in 21st century forms of 
power politics.  Certainly, this is not the first work to locate internal contradictions in 
liberalism:  there are, for instance, multiple works that point to the inequalities forged by 
institutions and polities promoting neo-liberal economic agendas (for example Van der Pijl 
1998; Peet 2003), as well as works critiquing the imperialist overtones of liberal orchestrated 
humanitarian interventions (Gregory 2004; Bricmont 2006).  Equally, there is an array of 
research that, pointing to such eminent figures as Kant, Locke and Mill, traces the 
philosophical roots of liberalism and captures its illiberal genealogy and its uncomfortably 
close and frequently problematic relationship with imperialism (Sullivan 1983; Jahn 2005).  
While these works are undoubtedly valuable, this thesis affirms that an understanding of the 
operational dynamics of liberalism necessitates moving beyond the philosophical and 
intellectual lineage of the tradition and requires critical interrogation of a portfolio of 
contemporary liberal performative practices, of which apology is a key site.  It is through this 
very contemporary practical aspect of doing international politics that one can garner a 
heightened comprehension of the dilemmas and conundrums facing both the theoretical 
doctrine of liberalism and its current disciples amongst today’s political elite.  It is in the thesis’ 
concluding remarks that these conundrums are now brought into sharp focus. 
 
Concluding remarks: conundrums for the liberal European polity 
A central theme running through this thesis is that colonial apologies simultaneously exhibit 
both the liberal credentials of the apologising state and their lingering colonial mentalities; it is 
to show an uneasy and complex relationship that straddles an unresolved past and a troubled 
present.  Thus, the final passages of the thesis highlight some of the dilemmas that the thesis 
has educed in this regard and frames them as challenges to the ideological underpinnings of 
the, once colonial, European liberal polity.  This is not to suggest that the thesis holds glib 
answers to these conundrums.  Nor is it to offer anything as grandiose as to suggest that these 
challenges radically destabilise the hegemonic ascendency of liberal ideology.  It is, however, 
to reelicit some of the dilemmas contributed by this thesis and capture the ways in which they 
sit awkwardly with liberal polities’ contemporary projected identities. 
 
1. Collective guilt and the supremacy of the individual 
Perhaps the most immediate quandary regarding liberal polities’ mea culpa is the fissure 
created with liberal concepts of justice.  This raises the common objection, most forcibly 
articulated by former Australian Prime Minister John Howard (2008), that guilt cannot 
193 
 
somehow be inherited from one generation to the next.  In other words, liberalism emphasises 
the idea that individuals can only be held responsible for the actions that they themselves have 
undertaken.  Yet, the intergenerational apologies of this thesis accept responsibility for the 
actions of the polities’ predecessors.  Additionally, the apologies seem to accept degrees of 
guilt for the political community at large.  This, it must be recognised, is not a novel 
observation and, as well as being discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, is also considered in 
the works of Trouillot (2000) and Celermajer (2009), among others.  Moreover, unlike the 
following analysis, this observation is not one that permeates and sets apart this work.  
Nevertheless, it is pertinent to note that state apologies mark a curious break from the 
otherwise radically atomised and individualistic ontology of the (neo) liberal capitalist order. 
 
2. The universality of human rights 
One of the cornerstones of democratic liberalism is the apparent universality of human rights.  
From one perspective, apologies can be seen to endorse such an approach, insofar as they 
recognise and condemn human rights infringements committed against people whom they 
once overtly or tacitly assumed to be less worthy of such dignities.  In this manner, there is, at 
least at first sight, a sense in which apology may function so as to accord a moral dignity to one 
who has been transgressed against (see pages 34-35).  However, as shown throughout this 
thesis, apologies are discernibly not universal.  Instead, the colonial apologies address specific 
human rights violations, while leaving others untouched.  As traced in each chapter, the 
apologies apply to isolated incidents where there have risen societal contestations at the 
events and where there is expediency to be gleaned from contrition.  Even the Italian case 
study, which offered an apology for colonialism in Libya, is notable for the absence of 
contrition to other former colonies that are now deemed of less geopolitical strategic 
importance.  This, a critical soul may suggest, indicates that the universal doctrines of human 
rights are, at least in apology, somewhat less than universal.  Instead, they are only applicable 
where there are particular circumstances in which it is advantageous for them to be so.  As 
Gibney (2002: 281) writes in relation to this, ‘the approach to apologizing taken by the former 
colonial powers has been eerily reminiscent of the way colonialism itself was carried out: 
divide and conquer’.  It is in this observation that one can locate a break or contradiction from 
the idea of universal human rights which liberal polities rhetorically advance and apologies 
intuitively endorse. 
 
3. Preserving myths that sit awkwardly with liberal discourse 
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Related to the onset of supposedly universal human rights, it seems that apologies correlate 
with the liberal imperative to renounce arbitrary and egregious violence.  As such, apologising 
for such acts may be seen as an act of liberal affirmation and legitimation.  To return to 
Goffmann’s (1971: 113) concept of splitting (see page 32), the apology may be understood as a 
face-saving rhetorical act of divorcing the liberal polity from the transgression in question.  In 
this vein, the liberal polity establishes its identity and, indeed, its legitimacy in opposition to 
such a transgression.  Certainly this thesis has demonstrated that contrite discourses do feed 
into states’ projections of their liberal values.  However, in equal measure, this thesis has also 
demonstrated that, enmeshed with such liberal proclamations, states maintain many of the 
‘heroic’ and expansionist discourses of identity.  In such a manner, there is a certain 
schizophrenia at play, where states seemingly renounce egregious violence on one hand, yet 
simultaneously revere many of the processes that facilitate this violence.  While examples of 
this have been detailed throughout the thesis, this duality is perhaps most vividly captured in 
the Belgian contrition for involvement in the assassination of Lumumba and the parallel 
myhtologisation of Leopold II.  The thesis has thereby recognised a tension in the ways that 
states use the past to trumpet their contemporary identities.  On the one hand, states 
increasingly renounce past violence in bolstering their liberal credentials, on the other hand 
states have not set aside the more embedded and orthodox ‘heroic’ narratives that are 
complicit in such violence.  Carrying the implicit weight of colonial expansion, violence and 
dispossession – such dualities make for an uneasy ideological marriage. 
    
4. The progressive and reconciled relations with former colonies                  
In an era of both formal independence and the decline of bipolar geopolitical tensions, there 
has been an increasing imperative for former colonial powers to reconcile and forge more 
amenable relations with their erstwhile colonies.  In such a way, Western liberal states have 
become more adept in the parlance of attesting to formal equality among nations.  Notably, in 
the very text of their apologies, there is a tendency for liberal polities to emphasise new and 
more egalitarian relations with their former colonies; endorsing progressive and apparently 
reconciled interstate relations.  The Treaty of Friendship, for instance, speaks of ‘the 
construction of a new phase of Italian-Libyan relations based on mutual respect, equal dignity 
and equal and balanced relationship’ (Camera del Deputati 2008).  Likewise, the German 
apology talks of a vision of ‘equal access’ to resources, ‘friendship’ and ‘mutual respect’ 
(Wieczorek-Zeul 2004).  Yet alongside such proclamations of apparent equality, this thesis has 
pointed to the endurance of policies and discourses that, even in apology, belie such 
sentiments.  As traced in the empirical chapters, paternalistic and infantilising sentiments 
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linger within the apologising texts themselves.  Moreover, there are persisting policies 
attached to the mea culpa that serve to entrench and reproduce inequalities.  Should one opt 
to term such discourses and policies as ‘neo-colonial’, then, once more, it is possible to 
observe – in the Petri-dish that is apology - a certain incongruity with supposedly liberal 
sentiments.  This is to say that there is an espousal of equality couched within dynamics that 
resemble (though do not entirely replicate) colonial complexions of inequity. 
 
5. The dripping effect  
Finally - the most severe dilemma for the contrite liberal polity:  This thesis has posited that 
mea culpa may be understood as a defensive posture in the face of severe societal 
contestation at ‘official’ narratives of the past.  That is, the Herero genocide, the Lumumba 
assassination, Bloody Sunday, could no longer be credibly reconciled with the states’ 
characterisations of their benevolent pasts and, by extension, their contemporary identities. 136  
Apology, in this sense, disavows these episodes in an attempt to preserve or shield the wider 
narrative of the past.  In mea culpa, politicians draw on these events in the process of 
rhetorically enouncing that such acts were historical anomalies and that these transgressions 
are not indicative of the states’ supposed benign character.  The apologies, in this sense, are 
transformative utterances that proffer new historical constructions.  In the face of challenge, 
these contrite narratives offer negotiated and seemingly more credible, stable and mutually 
agreeable narratives of the past.   
 
It is, then, that in offering apologies, politicians speak of closing chapters, moving on, drawing 
a line under the event.  British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, (prior to Cameron’s Bloody 
Sunday apology) sought to plug this leak, saying that ‘the days of Britain having to apologise 
for its colonial history are over’ (quoted in Kearney 2005).  Yet these new narratives can be no 
more than temporary holding positions; they will inescapably face further challenge and 
contestation, both from the formerly colonised and within the metropole itself.  Rather than 
preserving an authorised official narrative, apologies make the state vulnerable to demands 
for other apologies.  Beyond the short term, they beget further critical examination and 
inadvertently shed light on wider structures of violence.  There can only be a dripping effect, 
                                                             
 
136 As already discussed, Chapter 6 details how the issue of Italian colonialism experienced less intensive 
domestic contestation than in the other case studies.  Nevertheless, the chapter does trace an 
increasing level of introspection within Italian society. 
196 
 
where domestic and international audiences enquire as to whether these isolated crimes really 
were so anomalous to these states’ colonial projects. 
 
It is, of course, well known that Europe is now lurching from economic crisis to political crisis.  
But this thesis has also pointed to a mnemonic and discursive dilemma; one that speaks to the 
heart of liberal polities’ self identity.  The states, at least of this thesis, are increasingly 
suffering a deficiency in the credibility of their constructions of their past and, in turn, their 
contemporary projected sense of ‘self’.  To return to Sartre (2001: 84):  This may not yet be the 
end, but ‘Europe is taking in water everywhere’. 
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